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In the months of July and August of 1972, the United States 
exported a total of 9.5 million metric tons of wheat to the Soviet 
Union--an amount greater than the total United States commercial exports 
in the previous crop year. The Russian purchase coupled with a sharp 
cutback in Peruvian fish mean production and food and feedgrain crop 
failures in other parts of the world led to an unexpected increase in 
the demand for U. S. wheat. In the space of one year's time, world 
grain markets were transformed from a condition of large surplus stocks 
and relatively low prices into a situation in which there were short 
supplies, burgeoning demand and rising prices. 
Though wheat prices have since returned to lower levels, the 
experience of 1972 and 1973 has not been lost on the suppliers and users 
of American wheat. News of a Russian crop failure can still send prices 
soaring on futures markets where it is recognized that relatively small 
changes in world supplies can result in wide variations in prices. 
The Problem 
The year 1972 represents what appears to be a key juncture in the 
posture of United States grain trade. Prior to 1972, a large proportion 
of U. S. wheat exports were on a non-commercial basis to developing 
countries. Following the concurrent devaluation of the dollar and the 
1 
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Russian grain purchase, there was a large increase in both commercial 
and total American wheat exports. Though prices have varied widely in 
the subsequent time period, the increase in total exports has been 
sustained while exports on a non-commercial basis have dwindled to a 
very small amount. 
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In light of these developments, the direction of future trends in 
world wheat supplies and demands has become of the utmost importance to 
the United States wheat economy. Are the events since 1972 to be 
interpreted as the result of a fundamental change in the economic environ-
ment in which world wheat trade is conducted or are these events to be 
viewed simply as a series of aberrations in what would otherwise have 
been a "normal" world wheat market? The response to this question will 
have a significant effect on the future United States' policy towards 
wheat production, levels of inventories and world wheat commerce. A 
"fundamental change", for example, might imply the need for a constant 
level of wheat stocks and an aggressive marketing policy vis-a-vis the 
other major wheat exporters whereas a "series of aberrations" would 
probably call for policies which allowed for wide variations in inven-
tories. 
A detailed analysis of key importing and exporting countries and 
regions along with a forecast of their future imports and exports will 
not only provide a projection of future trade levels, it will also help 
to answer the question posed above by putting the events of the past 
few years into the perspective of long run trends in wheat production 
and consumption. In this way this analysis will prove to be a valuable 
guide for determining the direction of future U. S. agricultural policy. 
Objectives 
The purpose of this study will be to analyze the supply and demand 
relationships in the world wheat market and develop models to. forecast 
the future prices of American wheat. Specifically, this study will: 
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1) Identify market information which will be useful in determining 
the nature of the price discovery process for wheat. The 
information examined will include: 
a) a review of analytical and predictive models of wheat; 
b) the collection of data on wheat inventories, exports, 
imports, area harvested, yields, food used, feed use, and 
seed use for the United States and the major wheat importing 
and exporting countries of the world. 
c) an examination of government agricultural policies and 
institutions which would affect the price and flows of 
wheat between the U. S. and foreign markets. 
2) Evaluate and construct models which will use the information 
obtained under objective 1 to project consumption, production, 
and prices for the American wheat economy. 
3) Measure the impact of variations in export demand on the United 
States wheat economy and determine the response over time to 
these variations. 
Organization of the Study 
The remainder of this study will be divided into six chapters. 
Chapter II will examine the theoretical underpinnings of international 
trade and discuss briefly some of the issues pertinent to the trade of 
agricultural commodities. This will be followed by a review of balance 
sheet models of the U. S. wheat economy and models of world wheat 
commerce. 
Chapter III will separate the world into major wheat importing 
and exporting countries and regions. Regression equations will be 
estimated to explain the changes in wheat supply and demand for each 
country or region. Key countries will be singled out for individual 
balance sheet analysis. 
Chapter IV will use the results of Chapter III to project the 1985 
levels of supply and demand for each of the countries and regions 
specified. The projections will then be aggregated for the world 
excluding the United States to determine the 1985 demand for American 
wheat exports. Changes in supplies in important countries will be 
posited to map out the possible levels of variation in demand for U. S. 
exports. 
In ChapterV, a simultaneous equation model will be constructed to 
explain the interaction between the wheat sector of the United States 
and the rest of the world. The emphasis in this chapter will be on 
developing a forecast of a 1985 long run trade equilibrium using the 
projections from Chapter IV. 
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Chapter VI will be concerned with the impact of variations in world 
supplies on the 1985 world wheat economy in equilibrium. Price movements 
and adjustments in the quantities supplied and demanded will interact in 
bringing the system back into equilibrium. 
The final chapter will review the important findings of the study 
and draw conclusions. The importance of the study will also be 
evaluated and related areas for future study will be suggested. 
CHAPTER II 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE THEORY AND 
MODELS RELATED TO WHEAT 
• 
This chapter will look at how the price system operates in theory 
and in fact on the world level. To do this, the chapter is divided into 
two parts. Part I will examine general world trade theory for both the 
single and the two good case to be followed by a discussion of some of 
the issues in international agricultural trade. Part II will focus on 
wheat models at both the domestic and international level with an 
emphasis on comparing their structures, methodologies and forecasts. 
It is hoped that the discussion to follow will provide a solid founda-
tion for the analysis presented in succeeding chapters. 
Part I: Trade Theory 
The Single Good Case 
The key to maximizing the well being of both producers and consumers 
lies in the marketing system. Bresler and King (1970) define a market as 
• • • an area or setting within which producers and consumers 
are in communication with one another, where supply and 
demand conditions operate and the title to goods is transfered. 
The actual movement of goods in space or time is usually but 
not necessarily involved. In this communication process, 
prices are established, and these prices move up and down in 
response to changes in the underlying supply and demand 
forces (p. 75). 
5 
6 
On the world scale, the market for wheat should be envisaged as 
conglomeration of markets in countries and regions throughout the world. 
In isolation, the price in each of these markets would be set independently 
as a function of local supply and demand conditions, but as part of a 
hierarchy of markets, the price in every market is determined not only 
by that market's local conditions, but also by the supplies and demands 
of all the other markets of the world. This is best illustrated with a 
simple interregional trade model shown in Figure 1. 
For Figure 1, it is necessary to make a few clarifying assumptions 
and definitions. First, assume that a particular good, say wheat, is 
exchanged between only two regions or countries--an importing region, M, 
and an exporting region, X. Second, let these regions be spatially 
separated and let there be a given non-zero transport cost for the ship-
ment of wheat between regions. Finally, assume that any trade barrier 
is a given quantified constant which can be added to the transport cost 
differential. 
The exporting region (X) of Figure 1, is characterized by a rela-
tively large supply, low demand and a low equilibrium price of P , while 
X 
the importing region (M) has a relatively large demand, low supply and 
a high equilibrium price of PM. On the price scale, note that the prices 
of the exporting region have been moved up by amount t which represents 
the unit cost of interregional transfer (including the unit tariff charge, 
if there is one). The excess supply schedule is derived by taking the 
horizontal difference between supply and demand in the exporting region 
and excess demand is obtained from the horizontal difference between 
demand and supply in the importing region. The intersection of excess 
supply and excess demand establishes the interregional equilibrium 
-price, P. 
IMPORTING REGION (M) 
c d 
QM 
QUANTITY IN M 
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QUANTITY IN X 
Figure 1. Trade of a Single Good between Two Regions 
• 
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Figure 1 shows that, without trade, consumers in region M will 
have to pay a relatively high price, PM, for their wheat. On the other 
have, region X can provide a sufficient amount of wheat to meet intra-
regional needs at a much lower price, PX. By allowing trade between 
the two regions, there arises the opportunity for arbitrage. Prices in 
the exporting region are bid up and prices in the importing region are 
bid down as traders transfer wheat between regions. When the inter-
regional equilibrium price is attained at P, the quantity transferred, 
OQt' will be equal to ab--the amount exported from region X--and this 
will equal cd--the amount imported by region M. Region X consumers will 
pay price P while in region M consumers will pay price P + t for wheat. 
The Two Good Case 
Though the interregional trade model in Figure 1 provides a concise 
analysis of the interaction between two regions for a single commodity, 
it fails to address three fundamental topics: 1) the basis for trade, 
2) the direction of trade flows, and 3) the incentives to restrict trade. 
All of these questions address themselves to a broader dimension of trade. 
The first focuses on whether a region should concentrate resources and 
specialize in the production of a few exportable commodities and trade 
for the goods it doesn't produce or whether it should attempt to produce 
sufficient amounts of all commodities desired by its population. The 
second question is concerned with delineating a criterion for deciding 
what goods a country should specialize in producing. The last question 
will look at some of the welfare aspects of trade within an individual 
country, i.e., which groups gain and which groups lose because of trade. 
The Basis for Trade. The answers to the first two question were 
developed over 150 years ago as part of the theory of comparative 
advantage. Though this concept was introduced by Adam Smith (1776, 
p. 478i), David Ricardo was the first to develop the theory in depth. 
He began by assuming the two country two good model shown in Table I. 
TABLE I 
DAVID RICARDO'S HYPOTHETICAL COMPARISON OF LABOR PRODUCTION COSTS 




Labor Cost of Production (in hours) 





Taken from Sodersten (1970), p. 16. 
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Note that Portugal has an absolute advantage over England in the produc-
tion of both wine and cloth, but, of these, Portugal has a comparative 
advantage in wine. It can produce wine at 67% (80/120) of the labor 
cost in England while cloth can be produced as only 90% (90/100) of the 
English labor cost. Though England has an absolute disadvantage in both 
wine and cloth, it has a comparative advantage on cloth. The cost of 
English wine is 150% (120/80) of the cost of Portugese wine, but English 
cloth is only 111% (100/90) of the cost of Portugese cloth. 
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As long as the ratio of the cost of producing cloth in England to 
the cost of producing cloth in Portugal is different from the ratio of 
the cost of producing wine in England to the cost of producing wine in 
Portugal, both countries will have a comparative advantage in producing 
one of the two products and there will be an incentive to trade. If the 
ratio's are the same, the price of wine in terms of cloth will be the 
same in both countries and neither will have an incentive to specialize 
or trade. 
Direction of Trade Flows and the Resulting Gains. The same single 
two country, two good example can also be used to determine the direction 
of the trade flow and the gains that will result from trade. Suppose 
that both England and Portugal are in a state df autarky--i.e., each of 
them consumes and produces in isolation. In England, then, the cost of 
a unit of wine will be 1.2 (120/100) units of cloth whereas the cost of 
that same unit of wine in Portugal will be only .89 (80/90) units in 
cloth. Without trade, wine will be more expensive than cloth in England 
and cheaper than cloth in Portugal. 
Now assume that the two countries are permitted to trade. As long 
as the world price of a unit of wine in terms of cloth is between 1.2 
and .89, both countries will find it advantageous to trade. If, for 
example, the world price of wine were 1.0 units of cloth, England could 
produce cloth and trade it for wine at a price that is .2 units below 
the price of internally produced wine. Portugal, likewise, could produce 
wine and exchange it for English cloth at a price that is .11 units of 
wine below the price (90/80) of internally produced cloth. 
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Although this simple model is based upon some rather restrictive 
assumptions--the labor theory of value, linear production functions, 
and a two good, two country world--the central conclusions will remain 
intact even if the assumptions are relaxed. A more complete discussion 
of the theory of comparative advantage can be found in Sodersten (1970) 
pp. 10-22 and 71-75. 
The direction of trade flows and the gains from trade can also be 
shown graphically using the thinking of the more recent marginalist 
economists. In Figure 2, a production possibilities frontier, RTUS, is 
shown for the two good economy of Country A and represents the maximum 
level of production which can be attained with Country A1 s resources 
for different combinations of the two goods. ,The frontier is concave 
with respect to the origin indicating that successive increases in 
the production of one good, say wine, will require greater and greater 
sacrifices in the production of the other (cloth). On the same graph 
is a set of community indifference curves. They are a summation of 
the tastes and preferences with regard to wine and cloth of all the 
individuals in Country A. Since each curve represents a different 
constant level of utility, shifts of these curves up and to the right 
imply increases in the community's level of satisfaction. The convex 
curvature with respect to the origin of the indifference functions 
show that successive increases in the amount of one good consumed will 
result in diminishing satisfaction with each additional unit of that 
good. 
The level of equilibrium of Country A under autarky is the point at 
which the production possibilities frontier is just tangent to the 
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Figure 2. The Gains from Trade for a Single Country Producing 
and Consuming Two Goods 
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shown at point T. At this point, the rate at which wine can be sub-
stituted for cloth in production will be equal to rate at which the 
community is willing to substitute wine for cloth in consumption for 
13 
a given level of utility. These rates of substitution in equilibrium 
will determine the price ratio of the two goods which is equal to 
OPW/OPC or the slope of the line tangent to point T. Since there is 
no trade, the quantities produced of wine and cloth--OWA and OCA' 
respectively--are equal to the quantities consumed. 
Suppose Country A now has an opportunity to trade with other 
countries and further suppose that price ratio of wine to cloth on 
the world level is OPl~/OP(:--indicating a relatively higher price for 
cloth. At the new international prices, it w~ll be to Country A's 
advantage to decrease its production of wine from OWA to owp and 
increase its production of cloth from OCA to OsP· This new combination 
of wine and cloth at point Y is less preferred than the original 
combination at point T, but CcCF units of cloth can be traded on the 
world market for wpwC units of wine. Through specialization and 
trade Country A can reach a level of cloth and wine consumption 
(point U) that would have been unattainable under autarky. Other 
countries involved in the exchange will have different production 
possibility curves and different community indifference functions but 
they will benefit from trade in the same manner. 
Incentives to Restrict Trade. There is one problem with the 
conclusion that because two countries benefit from trade that it is 
therefore desirable to trade. As brought out by Sodersten (1970), 
• . • the main point that Ricardo and the classical 
economists overlooked in their argument about the bene-
fits of trade [was] one that has been raised by modern 
welfare economics • . . There is no guarantee that 
every consumer will be better off under free trade 
than under no trade, even though the country as a whole 
will be better off •.• (p. 39). 
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Approached from the viewpoint of welfare economics, the prevalence 
of tariffs, import quotas and other trade barriers can be interpreted 
as the logical outcome of attempts by certain interest groups to 
maintain or increase their incomes (and utility) by inhibiting 
competition from abroad. If the increase in the utility of these 
interest groups through the restriction of trade is greater than the 
decrease in utility for the rest of the society, the trade barrier is 
justified. 
Issues in International 
Agricultural Trade 
From the point of view of the major exporters of agricultural 
products, the most important trade issues center around policies and 
institutions which restrict trade. The most important policies are 
those which result in trade barriers such as tariffs, quotas, and 
other import restrictions. The most significant institutions are the 
economic customs unions (particularly the E.E.C.) and the international 
monetary system. Though neither of these institutions necessarily 
restricts agricultural trade, both have been major impediments to the 
expansion of American exports in the past decade. 
15 
Policies Which Restrict Trade. For agriculture, trade restrictions 
have long played an important role in world commerce. These restrictions 
have taken a number of forms. Traditionally, the most important form of 
trade restriction has been the tariff. The effect of a fixed tariff on 
a commodity, say wheat, is shown in Figure 3 in which Japan is purchas-
ing ab. tons from the United States at a price of OP • The United 
e 
States' exporters receive a price of ZP for which they are willing to e 
supply ef tons--an amount equal to the quantity (ab) that Japan desires 
to import. 
Suppose Japan decides to impose a tariff of t dollars per ton on 
wheat imports. This will decrease the quantity demanded by Japanese 
consumers and increase the quantity supplied of wheat by Japanese 
I 
producers. At the new higher price of OPJ (=OPe+t), Japan will wish 
to decrease its imports from ab to cd. American exporters will have 
to accommodate their customer by decreasing exports by an equal amount 
from ef to gh. On the American side, this will bring about a decrease 
in price from ZPe to ZPus· Hence, the tariff has a dual effect--it 
increases the Japanese price of wheat by the amount of the tariff but 
the resulting decrease in Japanese excess demand causes a decrease in 
1 the U. S. price. 
The theoretical conclusions have been supported by empirical 
research. In a 1961 study, Mordechai Kreinen found that tariff reduc-
tiona in 1955 resulted in a 59% increase in the volume of exports upon 
which the tariffs had been reduced as opposed to only a 17% increase in 
1 For a more complete discussion of tariffs and international trade, 
see Heller (1973), pp. 163-182. 
p 
JAPAN UNITED STATES 
Figure 3. The Impact of a Tariff on Trade 
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imports for which the tariffs remained the same. In· a later study, 
Belassa (1965) found that because of higher supply elasticities in the 
United States than in other industrial countries, imports would rise 
faster in America with the elimination of tariffs. 
In the area of agriculture, Luttrell (1979, p. 3) maintains that 
"much of the increase in the proportion of farm products exported 
in recent years is a result of major changes in U. S. and other nations' 
foreign trade policies". In particular, he points to the reduction 
of trade barriers. He contends that U. S. imports and exports move in 
the same direction. Specifically, American farmers cannot expect to 
receive concessions from other countries without granting some trade 
concessions themselves. 
Besides tariffs, there are a number of nontariff barriers--quotas, 
variable levies, quality standards, licenses, etc.--which can severely 
restrict trade. Hillman (1978, p. 6) has written a book on the subject 
of nontariff agricultural trade restrictions in which he contends that 
since World War I, "the world, particularly the industrial countries, 
[has] turned increasingly to nontariff barriers rather than to tariffs 
as protective measures for its internal agricultural programs" (p. 6). 
In part, he says, these nontariff barriers have emerged in response to 
the reduction of tariffs in the Kennedy Round negotiations as more and 
more countries "began searching for more oblique methods to protect 
domestic producers and traders" (p. 9). 
One of the problems with nontariff barriers is that they often 
reduce the price responsiveness of markets even more than tariffs. As 
a result, in the 1972-74 period, "a 3.5% deviation from trend in world 
grain production caused considerable trouble in world markets" (Hillman, 
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p. 5). Similar conclusions were drawn by Shei and Thompson (1977) in 
an analysis of the influence of trade restrictions on the stability of 
~orld wheat prices. They conclude that, " .•. greater world market price 
variability results as more countries prevent world price signals from 
being reflected across their borders into the domestic market through 
some form of trade control . " (p. 637). 
Institutions Which Have Restricted Trade. Many of the recent 
changes in tariff and nontariff barriers have come as a result of the 
creation of economic customs unions such as the European Economic 
Community (EEC), the Latin .Alnerican Free Trade Association (LAFTA), 
the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and the Central American 
Common Market (CACM). Palacio (1977) has shown that as a result of a 
set of common trade barriers for non-member countries, the member 
nations of each of these groups have stimulated as increase in trade 
among themselves at the expense of trade with nations outside their 
respective associations. Though these trade associations do reduce 
trade barriers for member nations, they often result in an increase 
and a broadening of trade restrictions to non-member countries as 
attempts are made by the association to accommodate the demands for 
protection from diversified interest groups in all of its member 
nations. 
Nowhere are the policies of a trade association more successful 
than in the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the EEC. The CAP is a 
comprehensive system of agricultural commodity price supports insulated 
from world market fluctuations by a complicated but extremely efficient 
set of variable levies. The effect of these levies is to keep the prices 
of imported agricultural goods well above the prices of EEC produced 
goods. irrespective of the level of actual world prices. 
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The CAP and particularly the system of variable levies has come 
under sharp criticism from major exporters of agricultural products 
such as the United States and Canada. The Europeans maintain that the 
CAP is simply a form of internal producer income maintenance and, as 
such, is not subject to trade liberalization negotiations. A couple 
of recent articles, however, show that the variable levy system goes 
far beyond producer income maintenance. 
In a study of the effect of the CAP on European imports of meat, 
dairy products and eggs, Pagoulatos, Debertin and Pagoulatos (1978, 
p. 80) calculated that " .•• Extra-EEC impor~s under free trade 
conditions in 1972 would have been about 180 percent higher than 
actual for imports of meat, 70 percent for butter, 85 percent for 
cheese and 150 percent for eggs ••• " After studying the impact of 
tariff and nontariff barriers on Australian agricultural exports to the 
EEC, the same conclusions are echoed by Sampson and Yeats (1977). They 
found that " .•. the Common Agricultural Policy's potential for trade 
restriction, under levies and a variety of other protectionist measures, 
are indeed significant •.. " (p. 106). They go on to say that 
" ..• No inherent reason exists why these trade control measures should 
be treated differently within the context of the current multilateral 
trade negotiations from those measures applied in the nonagricultural 
sector ••• " (p. 106). 
Although the reduction of trade barriers over the last 30 years has 
been important, the most significant recent development for U. S. agri-
cultural trade has been the devaluation of the dollar in 1971 and the 
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conversion to a system of floating exchange rates in 1973. For much of 
the 1960's, U. S. agricultural exports suffered from an overvalued 
dollar. The costs of overvaluation are illustrated in Figure 4 taken 
from Shuh (1974). The supply and demand curves shown are for both 
domestic and foreign markets. Given an exchange rate in equilibrium, 
the level of international demand will be at a level of ~ and the 
industry will have an excess supply of Q1Q2 which it will export at a 
price of P1 • Now, suppose that over time under a system of fixed 
exchange rates the currency has become overvalued. To foreign purchasers, 
this will be viewed as a price increase causing a fall in international 
demand from 1o to IO· At this lower level of foreign demand, the 
industry will export less (Q3Q4) at a lower price (P2). The magnitude 
by which the value of exports is reduced is shown by the shaded area in 
Figure 4. 
The effect of the change to flexible exchange rates, as·Schuh (1974) 
points out, 
that an important basis of massive disequilibrium in 
world agriculture . . • has been eliminated. Resources in 
U. S. agriculture will be more nearly valued at their 
world opportunity cost levels, and the U. S. will be closer 
to realizing its true comparative advantage and capitalizing 
from a trade standpoint, on the sizeable investments in 
science and technology that it has made in the past •.. (p. 11) 
The sharp increase in U. S. wheat exports in 1972 was in part 
due to decrease in the value of the dollar. To be sure, the Russian 
wheat purchase was also important, but even as the world wheat market 
has begun to return to a more stable level of prices, American wheat 
exports have remained above their pre-1972 levels. This seems to 
reflect a change more permanent than a short fall in the Russian crop, 
particularly since the other major exporters have not shown any such 
dramatic increase. 
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Figure 4. The Effect of an Overvalued Exchange 
Rate on Exports 
21 
22 
Clearly, tariffs, nontariff barriers, and economic customs unions 
and exchange rates play an important role in determining the direction 
and magnitude of world agricultural trade. The specific nature of these 
policies and their impact on world wheat demand and supply will be 
discussed in relation to the analysis of individual countries in the 
following chapters. 
Part II: Wheat Models 
In the first part of this chapter, the economic theory relating to 
international trade was developed and discussed. In contrast, this 
section will concentrate on: 1) the methods used to estimate the struc-
tural relationships of the wheat economy of a~ individual country and 
2) the techniques used to relate the wheat economies of many countries in 
a trade model. Each of these sections will be divided into two parts. 
The first section will include an initial analysis of the balance sheet 
structure of a wheat economy followed by an examination of some of the 
econometric models which have been formulated to estimate this structure. 
The second section will begin with an examination and comparison of world 
wheat trade models on the basis of their methodologies and forecasts. 
It will conclude with a brief discussion of some of the techniques used 
to predict wheat trade flows among countries. 
The· Structural Relationships of a 
Wheat Economy 
The Balance Sheet Breakdown. Of primary importance in the quantita-
tive formulation of a·cornrnodity model is the balance sheet disaggregation 
of the supply and demand functions. For wheat, this entails a breakdown 
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of supply into separate relationships, for acreage, yields, imports and 
carry-in stocks. The demand breakdown should include relationships for 
the food use, feed use and seed use of wheat, exports and carry-out 
stocks. This decomposition of supply and demand is justified in both 
economic and statistical theory. 
In the estimation of economic relationships, it is often useful to 
separate those things which are a function of economic or policy vari-
ables from those which are not. For example, in general, wheat yields 
are thought to be a function of weather and technology while acreage is 
a function of the previous year's wheat price and policy variables. 
Carry-in stocks are determined by the price expectations of holders of 
inventories and imports will depend on the difference between the 
domestic and the world price of wheat. With this breakdown, it is 
possible to identify and estimate the relationships between the key 
elements of supply and the important technical, economic and institu-
tional variables. 
Like supply, the demand side can also be broken down into its 
major components. Each of these components represents the demand for 
different category of final goods. The basis for this in theory is 
explained by Friedman (1976, p. 153): " •.• The demand for final pro-
ducts reflects directly the 'utility' attached to them; the demand for 
factors of production does so indirectly, being derived from the demand 
for the final products ..• " Wheat is usually not in demand as a 
final product but is demanded as an input in the production of flour, 
bread, pastries, noodles, feed rations, alcoholic beverages, and a 
number of other final and intermediate products. Since wheat is used 
as an input in a variety of products--all of which are a function of 
different economic and technical relationships--it is desireable to 
classify wheat demand by its uses and estimate each use separately. 
The most important uses of wheat are for food, feed.and seed. 
Carry-out and export demand represent special cases of demand. 
Carry-out represents wheat consumption deferred until the next time 
period. At that time it becomes part of the available supply. 
Export demand, as was illustrated in Figure 1, is actually the 
excess demand of other countries for wheat. Because these countries 
have a different set of tastes and preferences, their utilization 
pattern will be different. It is therefore desireable to separate 
domestic consumption from foreign consumption. 
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Statistically, it is desireable to break wheat supply and demand 
down into their components as a way of limiting specification bias. 
This type of statistical error arises when" ••• we exclude variables, 
accept approximations, aggregate, and commit various other sins of 
omission and commission ••. " (Griliches, 1957, p. 8). By separating 
out the components of wheat supply and demand, it is possible to build 
a more correctly specified model. 
Econometric Models of a Wheat Economy. One of the earliest balance 
sheet simultaneous models was of the United States wheat economy by 
Meinken in 1955. In Meinken's study, feed use, per capita food use, 
export demand, carry-out demand, world price and a domestic price were 
specified as the endogenous variables in a six equation model. Annual 
data for the period 1921-1938 excluding 1930 (when the federal government 
bought 192 million bushels of wheat and held it off the market) were 
used in the estimation of the model. The significant contribution of 
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Meinken's model was its balance sheet structure. This structure has 
provided the basis from which many subsequent models have been built. 
One of the models which borrows from Meinken was a 1968 study of 
the U. S. wheat economy by Mo. The latter used annual data from 1928-
1964 to estimate a six equation simultaneous model which--in contrast 
to Meinken--recognized the importance of government agricultural programs. 
Mo also took his statistical analysis a step farther than Meinken by 
solving for the short and long run multipliers. In this report, Mo's 
study stands out as an applied example of the formulation of a Tinbergen 
econometric policy model. 
Another model which borrowed Meinken's balance sheet structure 
was estimated by Barr in 1973. This model covered only a 12 year 
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time period beginning in 1960 and was much less sophisticated than the 
study by Mo. Barr's major innovation was the specification of price 
as an exponential function of food use as a percent of ending stocks. 
This formulation was designed to account for the short world supplies 
and resulting high prices that occurred in 1966 and 1972 when the 
Russians imported large quantities of wheat. 
Barr's study is the last USDA model of the U. S. wheat economy 
which does not include an expanded foreign sector. After 1973, balance 
sheet models for American wheat no longer contained only a single 
export relationship. Attempts were made in USDA and elsewhere to 
develop more comprehensive world models for wheat because of the 
increased importance of exports. 
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World Wheat Trade Models 
An Examination and Comparison of Methodologies and Forecasts. The 
first USDA study of the world wheat economy actually was published in 
1970 (Hutchinson, Naive, Tsu). The world was divided into 22 geographic 
regions and wheat supply and demand projections were made out to 1980 
for each region. The study was primarily a trade flow model designed to 
determine equilibrium quantities and prices in some future period by 
world regions for a given level of exogenous factors. 
The 1980 projections of the Hutchinson, Naive and Tsu model indi-
cate that " ••• world supplies of wheat should continue to be bountiful 
and that unless major producing countries come to grips with adjustment 
problems, the supplies will become too bountiful .•. " (p. 96). The 
South Asia region of India and Pakistan in particular was projected 
under the then current trends to have a substantial exportable surplus 
in 1980. The authors, however, were skeptical of that region becoming 
a major source of wheat exports because of the region's high production 
costs. 
A somewhat similar world wheat trade model was completed by Schmitz 
and Bawden in 1973. They built a spatial equilibrium model for which 
the primary purpose was to determine " .•• the effects of space and 
domestic and foreign policies [including tariffs] on wheat production, 
prices and trade •.. " (p. 6). Schmitz and Bawden also divided the 
world up into regions and projected supply and demand for wheat in each 
out to 1980. This information along with a set of transport prices, 
tariff barriers, and initial domestic wheat prices was used in an 
algorithm which solved for the optimum trade pattern and the resulting 
set of equilibrium prices. 
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Schmitz and Bawden's 1985 projections led them to conclude: "A 
rather dismal future is predicted for the wheat economies in the large 
exporting regions such as Australia, Argentina, Canada and the United 
States •.• " (p. 63). This conclusion was based on the trend toward 
increased self sufficiency in wheat for the developing countries, the 
possibility that small increases in yields would substantially increase 
yields in the USSR and China, and the probable continuation of trade 
restrictions and tariffs in other parts of the world. 
A study similar to the spatial equilibrium world trade model of 
Schmitz and Bawden was conducted by Grennes, Johnson and Thursby for 
all grains in 1978. This study, however, was designed to provide a set 
of structural relationships rather than a set of projections. Wheat 
comprises one sector of the model and the authors use the estimated 
parameters to determine the response of the world wheat economy to 
changes in various variables. 
The most comprehensive world wheat trade forecasting model to date 
is the combined grain, oilseed and livestock model--better known as 
GOL--used by USDA (Rojko et al., 1978a; 1978b; 1978c; and Reiger, 1978). 
The primary contribution of the GOL model is the inclusion of the inter-
relationships between the livestock sector and the grain and oilseed 
sectors of world agriculture. Hence, unlike the studies cited previously, 
the GOL model provides a measure of the interaction of wheat supply and 
demand with its substitutes ~n productibn and consumption. 
A second advantage of the GOL model is that it provides a balance 
sheet breakdown of supply and demand by country. Earlier studies, at 
best, provided this type of breakdown for only the major developed 
countries. 
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One problem with the GOL model is that it is somewhat dated. 
Though the results of the model were published in 1978, all the pro-
j~ctions are made from a 1970 base. The events of the early seventies--
the dollar devaluation and the Russian wheat purchase in particular--
both changed and exposed the underlying economic and institutional 
relationships in world agricultural trade. A more recent base year 
could have taken better account of this information. 
Because of the organization of the GOL model, it is difficult to 
determine exactly what conclusions should be drawn about the 1985 
projections of the world wheat economy. Under the alternative assuming 
no change in "current" policies and tariffs, the GOL model predicts 
U. S. exports to be 35.5 million tons at a re~l U. S. price of $65.10 
per ton (Rojko et al., 1978b, pp. 65-66). In comparison with 1970 levels, 
exports are projected to double while prices are expected to remain about 
the same; im comparison with 1975 levels, 1985 exports are projected to 
be up by about 10 percent while prices will be down by about $90 to $100 
per ton. 
The most optimistic forecast of future wheat prices comes from a 
model at Agriculture Canada--USDA's Canadian counterpart. This world 
wheat simulation model was developed by Zwart and Lattimore (1977) and 
follows the technique of previous models of estimating wheat supply and 
demand functions for different regions of the world and then incorporating 
these results into an algorithm to solve for a world equilibrium. The 
model is not as detailed as the GOL model and it differs from the models 
of Schmitz and Bawden (1973) and Grennes et al. (1976) because it 
excludes transport costs and solves for a single world price. 
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The parameters for the Zwart and Lattimore simulation are estimated 
from annual data for the period 1955-1972. Using the 1975/76 crop year 
as a base, the simulation model projects gradually increasing prices 
for the following five year period, reaching a level of $5.02 a bushel 
at the Gulf in 1980. The authors do not report their forecast of exports 
in 1980 but their price and ending stock projections indicate that they 
expect supplies to remain tight until the end of the decade. 
Recent studies at USDA have tended to stress the interdependence of 
the United States and the world wheat market. A technical bulletin that 
is soon to be published by Gallegher et al. (1978) incorporates a more 
detailed geographic breakdown of the foreign demand for American wheat 
into a model of the U. S. wheat economy. The findings indicate--as has 
been found in previous studies--that the policies of Japan and the EEC 
stabilize domestic prices at the expense of world and U. S. prices. 
Techniques Used to Predict Trade Flows. The trade models presented 
above can be divided into two categories based on whether their final 
solution provides a prediction of trade flows or not. For example, the 
studies by Zwart and Lattimore (1977), Hutchinson et al. (1970), and the 
GOL model do solve for the equilibrium prices, supplies and demands for 
all of the specified regions but they do not determine which exporters 
will supply wheat to which import markets. In order to ascertain this 
trade pattern, an added degree of sophistication is required. The 
question of what determines the flow of wheat from a particular exporter 
to a particular import market must be answered. 
The Schmitz and Bawden study implies that transportation costs are 
the major determinant of these flows. Their spatial equilibrium 
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solution provides a set of flow projections based on shipping costs 
between importing and exporting regions. 
Grennes et al. (1978) maintain that transportation costs are not a 
sufficient explanation of trade flows. Wheat, they say, is not a 
homogenius product but is differentiated with respect to quality, 
transportation costs, the time of year it was harvested and the country 
in which it was produced (e.g., political ties may be important to some 
importers). All of these differences, fortunately, are primarily a 
function of the country in which the wheat is produced. This enables 
Grennes et al. to incorporate into their study a theoretical model by 
Armington (1969) designed to determine the demand for products distin-
guished by place of production. Grennes et al. are thereby able to 
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determine trade flows based on the country of origin. 
The method used by Gallagher et al. (1978) to determine trade 
flows was market share analysis. The theoretical method for this 
analysis was first developed by Telser in 1962. In 1971, Sirhan and 
Johnson (1971) used a market share model to estimate the foreign demand 
for American cotton. They specified the American share of a particular 
import market to be a function of the American share in the previous 
years and the ratio of the U. S. price to the average of the other 
exporters' prices. 
The advantage of the market share approach is that it implicitly 
takes account of transportation costs, quality differences, trade 
barriers and preferences, etc. since these are the historical factors 
which have determined trade flows--without the complexity and cumbersome 
assumptions of the Armington model. Though other ways of estimating 
trade flows have been developed, the market share approach for most 
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purposes is the simplest, the most flexible and the most theoretically 
sound method now available. 
Not all elements of the theory and the models covered in this 
chapter will be used in the analysis to follow. That would not be 
possible since some of the theories and techniques are incompatible. 
The broader purpose of this chapter, however, has been to put the current 
study in perspective of what has gone before and thereby provide the 
reader with an insight into the contributions of this work. In this 
respect, this chapter has presented but a small sample of the breadth 
and depth of the literature on trade theory and models. It is hoped 
that this sample will be adequate ·for the intended purpose. 
CHAPTER III 
BALANCE SHEET FORECASTING MODELS OF 
COUNTRIES AND REGIONS 
As was explained in the previous chapter, a balance sheet breakdown 
of an individual country's wheat economy will permit the separate esti-
mation of those elements of supply and demand which are functions of 
different independent forces. In this chapter, balance sheet components 
will be estimated for each important wheat importing and exporting 
country. The individual countries of lesser importance in world wheat 
commerce will be aggregated into major geographic regions of the world 
for which simple supply and utilization trends will be estimated. 
There are, then, two areas of disaggregation in this model: a 
disaggregation of wheat supply and demand into balance sheet components 
and a disaggregation of the world into the countries and regions which 
are significant in international wheat commerce. In both areas there is 
what might be called an "optimal11 level of disaggregation. If the 
geographic or balance sheet breakdown is too fine, needless complexity 
and detail will be added to the model; if the breakdown is inadequate, 
significant forces in world wheat trade may be altered or obscured. It 
is therefore important to choose for individual analysis only those 
components and countries which will have a significant impact on world 




Identification of Balance Sheet Components 
to be Estimated 
For wheat, the balance sheet identity can be shown as follows: 
Production + Carry-In + I t Stocks mpor s 
= Food + Feed + Seed + Other + 
Use Use Use Uses 
Carry-Out + 
Stocks Exports 
Since the objective of this approach is to project future levels of 
export supply (import demand), the identity can be solved for net 
exports (net imports). It is safe to assume that other uses are 
relatively insignificant and that, for most countries, except the major 
exporters, inventory stocks represent primarily pipeline stocks with only 
small differences between carry-in and carry-out stocks. The balance 
sheet identity will therefore reduce to: 




= Use Exports 
With estimates of these four balance sheet components (production, food 
use, feed use, and seed use), it will be possible to trace changes in 
world supply or demand to particular sectors of the wheat economies of 
the important importing and exporting countries. 
Identification of Geographic Aggregations 
for Estimation 
All the countries shown in Table II are to be singled out for a 
balance sheet analysis of their wheat economies with the exception of 
the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China for which adequate 
TABLE II 
GEOGRAPHIC AGGREGATIONS USED IN MODEL ESTIMATIONS 
Western Europe 
Germany, Italy, Netherlands, France, United Kingdom 
Rest of Western Europe 
Africa 
Egypt 
Rest of Africa 
~ (Excluding People's Republic of China) 
India, Japan 
Rest of Asia 
Latin America and the Caribbean 
Argentina, Brazil 
Rest of Latin America and the Caribbean 
Communist Countries 





Rest of Oceania 
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data were not available. For the regional aggregates and the Communist 
countries, single wheat production and domestic utilization equations 
were estimated. 
All of the individual countries identified had at least five percent 
of the world wheat import or export market at some time during the study 
period with the exception of the Netherlands, which was singled out 
because of its central place in European commerce. Note that the country 
with the largest share of the world's wheat trade--the United States--is 
not included. The balance sheet components for the United States will 
be estimated instead as a part of a simultaneous equation model developed 
in Chapter V. 
Much of the discussion of the logic of the geographic breakdown to 
be used fits better into the analysis of each individual region. A more 
detailed evaluation of the importance of each individual country in the 
context of world wheat trade will therefore be considered as a part of 
the regional analyses to follow. 
The Data 
The 1960-1976 series of annual data used in this study were obtained 
primarily from four sources: 1) the International Wheat Council (IWC), 
2) the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), 
3) the United States' Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) and 4) the Organi-
zation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The names and 
definitions of all the variables used in the balance sheet estimations are 
given in Appendix A. The dependent variables are defined first, followed 
by a list of independent variables in the order in which they first occur. 
The actual country and region balance sheets developed from the four 
primary sources above are given in Appendix B. 
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For each of the balance sheets listed, an error term is given which 
shows the amount by which the total supply and total demand fail to 
balance in each year. There are two reasons the balance sheets fail to 
balance. First, the data for a given balance sheet may come from two or 
three different sources. The data collection and accounting techniques 
may differ among sources resulting in a discrepancy when figures from 
these sources are summed together. 
Second, an adjustment was made to put all balance sheet data and 
prices in terms of a July/June crop year. This method used assumed that 
the change in the given variable was constant from one year to the next 
and that by adding the fraction of the amount by which the variable 
changed to the value of the variable, a reasonable approximation of the 
July/June level of the variable is obtained. When large changes in a 
variable occurred and when the direction of change was erratic, the crop 
year adjustment method tended to understate the true change. On the 
balance sheets, this resulted in large error term values for 1972-1975 
when there were major disturbances on the international wheat market. 
The Organization and Method of Presentation 
of the Balance Sheet Results 
The presentation of the balance sheet estimates will be organized 
according to the major geographic regions given in Table II. In each 
geographic section there will first be a discussion of regional, institu-
tional, political, economic, social, and physical characteristics which 
affect wheat trade, production, and consumption. This will be followed 
by an analysis of the countries in the region which have been singled 
out for detailed balance sheet analysis. A total of 12 countries have 
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been selected for detailed study. In general, six equations will be 
estimated for each of the 12 individual model countries. On the supply 
side, production will be estimated using two different methods. One 
method estimates production indirectly by first obtaining equation 
estimates for wheat hectares harvested (HH) and wheat yields (YLD). 
The product of the predictions of these two equations yields an estimate 
of production. For the second method, a production (PDN) equation is 
estimated directly. The advantage of the first method is that it allows 
for the separation of yields--a variable primarily affected by weather--
and hectares harvested--a variable that is primarily a function of 
economic and institutional forces. The second method is desirable for 
its simplicity. In cases where the results of the two methods are the 
same, the simpler method will be used. Otherwise, the method with best 
fit which conforms to economic theory will be employed. 
On the demand side, equations for food (FOOD), feed (FEED), and 
seed (SEED) use will be estimated. In Chapter IV, these will be summed 
to obtain projections of total wheat utilization (DU) in each of the 
model countries. 
Finally, each geographic section will conclude with an estimate of 
the aggregate supply and utilization relationships for the remainder of 
the region. As a rule, the majority of the discussion and analysis will 
focus on individual countries since the "rest of the.region" estimates 
are at too high a level of aggregation to determine the influence of 
connnon economic and institutional variab'les. Therefore, the regional 
aggregate estimates will be designed primarily to identify wheat produc-
tion and utilization trends. 
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Western Europe 
Western Europe is one of the primary wheat consuming and producing 
areas of the world. In the past 30 years wheat consumption has out-
stripped production and the region has had to import the balance--
usually from the U. S., Canada, or Argentina. As the results of this 
section will show, it appears that Western Europe is approaching self-
sufficiency in wheat and that short of a major change in the agricultural 
policy of the EEC--the future market for wheat imports in Europe may be 
restricted to varieties which cannot be produced in the area. 
Geographic Delineation of the Region 
For the purposes of this study, Western Europe was broken down into 
five countries--Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, France and the United 
Kingdom--and one remaining region designated as the "Rest of Western 
Europe" containing the aggregate of the unspecified countries. The 
reasons for specifying Germany, Italy, France and the United Kingdom are 
obvious--they are the major wheat consuming, producing and importing 
(exporting) countries in the region. Even though the Netherlands is not 
important when judged by these standards, it does hold a central place 
in the international agricultural commerce of the European Economic 
Community. The port of Rotterdam handles a large volume of the wheat 
destined for Western Europe and a relatively lengthy series of what 
prices exists for wheat entering Rotterdam from the U. S., Canada and 
Argentina. 
In contrast to some recent studies (Grennes et al, 1978) the EEC is 
not considered a national entity in this study. There are three reasons 
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for this. First, though the European Community was in existence for the 
length of the study period, a uniform policy linking together the agri-
cultural policies of member states did not take effect until the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) began in 1967. Second, the United Kingdom, 
Ireland and Denmark did not actually join the Common Market until 1973 
although their agricultural policies were gradually adjusted to those 
of the CAP beginning in 1971. The EEC before and after these recent 
entrants cannot be considered the same unit. 
Finally, due to exchange rate changes among the member nations in 
the last ten years, it is no longer clear that a uniform agricultural 
policy exists. Particularly since a system of floating exchange rates--
which fluctuate frequently--replaced the Bretton Woods Agreement of 
fixed exchange rates in 1973, it has been difficult for the governing 
body of the EEC to maintain parity in economic policies and tariffs. 
Individual country estimations should give a clearer picture of agricul-
tural developments within the EEC. 
This, of course, does not mean that the EEC is unimportant in the 
analysis to follow. As will be seen, the Common Agricultural Policy not 
only plays a central role in projecting the wheat supplies and demands 
of member countries, but has major influence on non-member countries in 
the region as well. For this reason, a special section is devoted to the 
explanation of the agricultural and trade policies of the European 
Economic Community. 
Agricultural and Trade Policies of the 
European Economic Community 
The purpose of the EEC--as with any customs union--is to promote 
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trade among the member nations at the expense of trade with nations 
outside the Community. Tariffs, levies, and pricing policies are the 
primary traditional instruments used in achieving these objectives 
although the establishment of common standards and regulations are often 
of equal importance. 
Perhaps the area in which the EEC has been the most successful has 
been agriculture and the instrument of this success in the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP). The CAP is a comprehensive common agricultural 
pricing and tariff policy. Although transitional regulations for the CAP 
were initiated in 1962, the major provisions of the policy did not take 
effect until 1967. 
Briefly, the Common Agricultural Policy hqs five policy objectives: 
1) increasing agricultural productivity, 2) maintaining a fair standard 
of living for the rural population, 3) stabilizing markets, 4) assuring 
regular supplies, and 5) maintaining reasonable consumer prices (USDA, 
1968, p. 5). To achieve these objectives a common pricing mechanism 
has been established throughout the Community for designated commodities. 
This internal pricing structure is maintained by a system of variable 
tariffs which effectively precludes price competition from commodities 
produced outside the Community. 
For cereals (wheat, barley, rye and maize), a target price is set 
each year for the succeeding crop year. The target price for grain is 
a fixed wholesale price for Duisburg, Germany--the largest marketing 
center in the Community where grain is in shortest supply. The basic 
intervention price is set below the target price and is the floor below 
which the EEC will not allow prices to fall. When prices get near this 
floor, designated Community intervention and marketing centers are 
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obligated to accept all quantities of grain offered to them at inter-
vention prices discounted for transportation costs to Duisburg and 
adjusted for local surplus or deficit conditions. Hence, local producer 
prices can differ considerably within the Community. 
A market ceiling is essentially provided by the threshold price 
which is the minimum price at which imports are allowed to enter the EEC. 
This price fs set at Rotterdam and when transport costs from Rotterdam 
to Duisburg are added, the cost of the imported grain will be at or above 
the target price. The variable levy on a particular grain is calculated 
as the difference between the threshold price and the lowest adjusted 
c.i.f. price at Rotterdam for that grain. This levy is adjusted daily 
for changes in world market prices and is collected on all imports of 
I 
that grain regardless of the actual price of the shipment. 
The variable levy system insures that the cheapest and lowest 
quality import wheat, for example, will always be more expensive than 
Community produced wheat regardless of the location within the EEC, the 
time of year or the quality of EEC wheat. In general, this has meant 
stable but relatively high grain prices within the European Community. 
The only exception has been a short period in 1973 when world wheat 
prices exceeded intra-EEC prices. The Community responded by placing 
an embargo on wheat exports in an attempt to keep prices from exceeding 
the threshold level. 
In addition to the policies which apply to all grains, there are a 
few EEC policies which have been designed specifically for wheat. One 
important policy toward wheat arose because "Although wheat production 
has exceeded Community requirements for a number of years, the wheat 
produced is primarily soft wheat, leaving an import requirement for high 
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quality hard wheat . " (Berntson et al., 1969, p. 17). At the same 
time, the EEC does not produce enough feed grains to meet its own needs. 
Hence, the Community instituted a subsidy called a "denaturing premium" 
to encourage the feed use of wheat. The denaturing premium began as a 
unified Community policy in 1967 and lasted until 1973 when short wheat 
supplies resulted in a phase out of the subsidy. This denaturing 
premium has been in part responsible for the large amount of wheat used 
for feed in the European Economic Community and, as shown in the regres-
sion results to follow, it has been an important factor in the variation 
of European wheat consumption. 
The Five European Model Countries 
Because all five of the individual European model countries are 
affected by many of the same policies, the balance sheet estimation 
results will be discussed in general with country differences and 
similarities being pointed out. This section will conclude with a 
comparison of the impact of the CAP on Italy and Germany. 
Supply. A number of different independent variables were considered 
in an attempt to explain the variation in each of the five model countries' 
production, yields and areas harvested, but, in the final analysis, 
technology and the beginning of the Common Agricultural Policy turned 
out to be the most important. Trend (YR) was used as a proxy for 
technological change and a dummy variable (D6776) and dummied trend 
(DYR6776) were used to account for the CAP. The only country for which 
the CAP was not a significant variable in at least one of the three 
supply equations was the United Kingdom. This possibly is because the 
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TABLE III 
BALANCE SHEET EQUATIONS ESTIMATED FOR GERMANY 
DeEendent Variables a 
Statistics HHG YLDG PDNG FOODG FEEDG SEEDG 
Intercept 1391 -2.08 4625 5539 6269 244 
Regression 
Coefficients 
YR .087 -27 
(t) (5.23) (1. 91) 
D6776 -1488 -9360 -3049 -397 
(t) (-5.03) (-2.68) (-2.83) (-4.69) 
DYR6776 22 158 43 5.98 







Mean 1483 3.88 5786 3784 2435 262 
R2 .88 .64 .86 .64 .84 .80 
DW 1. 69 1.93 2.09 1.46 1.88 2.87 
a . 
See Appendix A for a definition of variables and their units. 
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TABLE IV 
BALANCE SHEET EQUATIONS ESTIMATED FOR ITALY 
DeEendent Variables a 
Statistics HHI YLDI PDNI FOOD I FEED I SEED I 
Intercept 8484 -1.62 -13466 -1872 683 1220 
Regression 
Coefficients 
YR -64 .057 350 -7.44 













Mean 4092 2.26 9156 8779 181 714 
R2 .88 .83 .66 .61 .64 .66 
DW 1.67 1.68 2.16 1.93 2.17 1.64 
a See Appendix A for a definition of variables and their units. 
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TABLE V 
BALANCE SHEET EQUATIONS ESTIMATED FOR THE NETHERLANDS 
DeEendent Variables a 
Statistics HHN YLDN PDNN FOODN FEEDN SEEDN 
Intercept 208 4.38 167 2025 1554 -58 
Regression 
Coefficients 
YR 5.5 7.11 -15 1.28 
(t) (3.04) (1. 90) (-2.53) (2.38) 
D6776 631 7.15 -1041 104 
(t) (4. 62 (-2.45) r-2. 22) (2.56) 
DYR6776 -9.45 .106 .15 -158 
(t) (-4.51) (2.63) (2.15) (-2.53) 
DPPLCN -2.04 
(t) (-3. 27) 
DYR7476 -6.42 
(-3.08) 
Mean 139 4.67 651 993 282 23 
R2 .64 .50 .19 .67 .46 .40 
DW 2.25 2. 72 2.43 2.35 2.06 1.42 
a See Appendix A for a definition of variables and their units. 
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TABLE VI 
BALANCE SHEET EQUATIONS ESTIMATED FOR FRANCE 
DeEendent Variables a 
Statistics HHF YLDF PDNF FOODF FEEDF SEEDF 
Intercept 4238 -4.51 -14367 11340 -10963 1368 
Regression 
Coefficients 
YR .11 421 -88 222 -9.3 
(t) (6.56) (4.93) (-4.39) (2. 4 7) (-3.83) 
D6776 -240 -3492 17502 
(t) (-2.27) (-2.29) (2.57) 
DYR6776 48 -262 
(t) (2. 07) (-2.52) 
Mean 4097 3.49 14270 5297 3445 731 
R2 • 25 .74 .61 .95 .52 .50 
DW 2.93 1.45 2.32 1.27 2.32 1. 75 
a See Appendix A for a definition of variables and their units. 
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TABLE VII 
BALANCE SHEET EQUATIONS ESTIMATED FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM 
DeEendent Variables a 
Statistics HHUK YLDUK PDNUK FOOD UK FEED UK SEEDUK 
Intercept -702 4.09 -5105 5169 -8665 -166 
Regression 
Coefficients 
YR 24.79 134 170 5.34 





Mean 984 4.09 4061 5169 2681 197 
R2 .71 .64 .66 .76 
DW 2.43 1.95 2.85 2.24 
a See Appendix A for a definition of variables and their units. 
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1 
CAP took effect at a much later date (1971) for the UK at a time when 
the impact was obscured by disturbances in the world wheat market. 
The criterion for choosing between a straight production equation 
(PDN) and an equation calculated from the product of the yield (YLD) and 
area harvested (HH) estimates was to take the alternative which most 
clearly reflected the impact of the CAP. For Germany and Italy, the 
production equation provided the best fit while the product of yields 
and area harvested was more suitable for France and the Netherlands. 
In the United Kingdom where the CAP was not a factor, the calculated 
relationship was used because it resulted in a more conservative forecast 
which appeared to be warranted given the last two years' production. 
Demand. Food use is the balance sheet component which accounts 
for the greatest proportion of domestic utilization in each of the five 
countries. Again, changes in the trend due to the CAP explained food 
use of wheat in three of the five countries. In Italy, population was 
found to be a good explanation while food use in the United Kingdom had 
such a narrow variation around the mean that all attempts for explaining 
this variation were unsuccessful. Hence, the mean itself was used as the 
predictor. 
Though feed use is much smaller than food use in all five countries, 
it accounted for the largest part of the variation in domestic utilization 
in every country. The feed use equations for Germany, Italy and the 
Netherlands are similar because they are all a function of a price and 
the discontinuation of the denaturing premium. Italy is somewhat 
1 The United Kingdom joined the EEC in 1973 but an adjustment of UK 
agricultural policies to coincide with the CAP was begun in 1971. 
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different from the other two in that a wheat-corn price ratio (RWCRNPI) 
is used instead of a deflated producer price and because the dummy and 
dummy slope specified account for the period from the beginning of the 
CAP to the discontinuation of the premium (rather than specifying the 
discontinuation alone). 
France and the United Kingdom show feed use to be a function of 
trend and the changes brought about with the adoption of the CAP. In 
neither country was feed use found to vary significantly with price. 
Seed use, in general, fluctuates with the area planted and, to a 
lesser extent, with the area harvested. All of the seed use equations 
had the same empirical specification as their respective area harvested 
equations. 
Italy and Germany: A Comparison of the Effect of the CAP. A plot 
of the predicted and actual demand and supply for both Italy and Germany 
is shown in Figure 5. In the early 1960's, both countries tended to 
consume more wheat than they produced. In Italy, however, production 
was trending upward faster than utilization while in Germany both produc-
tion and utilization were relatively flat. When the CAP came into effect 
in 1967, Italy is shown to be self sufficient in wheat. It was at this 
point that trends changed in both countries. In Germany, both wheat 
production and utilization began to increase while Italian wheat produc-
tion began to decline falling well below utilization. With the discontinu-
ation of the denaturing premium in 1974, demand fell and Germany produced 
a substantial surplus. The end of the denaturing premium in Italy caused 
demand for wheat to taper off somewhat but not enough to change the 
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Figure 5. A Comparison of the Impact of the Common Agricultural 
Policy on Italy and Germany 
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This example shows that the effect of the Common Agricultural Policy 
on member countries' wheat economies was not uniform. The effect on the 
German wheat economy reflects the general pattern while Italy is the 
exception. But this exception would not have been identified had an 
EEC aggregation been used instead of the individual country analysis. 
Rest of Western Europe 
The Rest of Western Europe is composed of the remaining countries 
in the EEC (Belguim, Luxemburg, Denmark, and Ireland) and the non-
Communist countries of Europe outside the EEC. Total wheat production 
by this group of countries is shown in Table VIII to be a function of 
time. Domestic utilization of wheat, on the other hand, appears to be 
heavily influenced by the policies of the EEC. Wheat utilization was 
stable until the beginning of the Common Agricultural Policy in 1967 
after which it increased at a steady rate. This probably reflects the 
effects of the EEC subsidy on ag~icultural exports to the countries 
outside the Community. The dummy variable in the equation for 1973 (D73) 
accounts for the embargo on wheat exports by the EEC in that year. 
At the beginning of the study period domestic utilization in the 
Rest of Western Europe was about 3.5 million tons greater than production. 
By the end of the period this "deficit" had shrunk to about 1. 2 million 
tons due to the more rapid increase in wheat production relative to 
utilization. If this trend continues, the region will become self suffi-
cient in wheat in the near future. 
TABLE VIII 
BALANCE SHEET EQUATIONS ESTIMATED FOR THE 


































For Africa, there are no major world exporters of wheat and Egypt 
is the only major importer (the latter accounts for about 40 percent of 
Africa's wheat imports and about five percent of total world imports). 
Therefore, Africa is analyzed as two regions: Egypt and the Rest of 
Africa. 
Egypt 
The major thrust of Egyptian policy with respect to wheat is the 
provision of a cheap source of food for the population. As a result, 
" Demand for agricultural imports has accelerated in Egypt because 
prices for basic commodities have remained fixed at artificially low 
' 
levels, while urban population and income have been rising faster than 
anticipated ••. " (Parker, 1977, p. 4). Unfortunately, for farmers, 
this policy also means low government set producer prices for wheat. 
Hence there is little incentive to increase production of wheat. 
Supply. The production of wheat in Egypt is related to the lagged 
deflated government-fixed producer price. Because the direct estimation 
of production (PDNE) did not have a significant price variable--as shown 
in Table IX--the product of the area harvested (HHE) and yield estimates 
(YLDE) were used for projection purposes. 
The wheat area harvested in Egypt is a positive function of the 
previous year's producer price. A lagged ratio of the producer price of 
wheat to the producer price of corn gave similar statistical results 
but was less effective in forecasting the downward turn in area harvested 





















B~ANCE SHEET EQUATIONS ESTIMATED FOR EGYPT 
AND THE REST OF AFRICA 
DeEendent Variables a 
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Es~Et Rest of Africa 
HHE YLDE PDNE FOODE PDNRAF DURAF 
387 2.53 1179 -8859 12427 21772 
191 271 454 
(8.08) (7.23) (26.71) 
.37 .087 









562 2.82 1583 3955 6011 9127 
.42 .80 .04 .98 • 78 .98 
2.26 2.13 .55 • 85 1.86 1.90 
a See Appendix A for a definition of variables and their units. 
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Like area harvested, yield is a function of the producer price of 
wheat but the latter equation has a different specification. Wheat 
yields in Egypt were relatively constant until 1969 when a change in 
government pricing policies resulted in an upward trend. A dummy 
variable and a dummied trend is used to reflect this change of policies 
in the yield equation. 
Demand. Only the food use component of domestic utilization was 
estimated for Egypt because 1) feed use was insignificant for most of 
the 17 year study period and 2) seed use was reported to be a constant 
100,000 tons since 1970. Trend was used to explain the growth in the 
food use of wheat along with a dummy and a dummied trend for international 
financial problems which arose in Egypt following the 1967 Arab-Israeli 
war. The foreign reserves with which Egypt purchased wheat imports were 
severely depleted by 1968. A lower level of imports forced a lower 
level of wheat consumption on the population. 
Although a relation for feed use was not estimated, it became more 
significant near the end of the study period. This may be the result of 
very low government-imposed wheat prices. Instead of selling their 
wheat to the government purchasing agency in 1976, " ••. Most farmers 
chose to sell their wheat to their neighbors " (Parker, 1977, p. 7). 
Much of this wheat may have been used to feed animals. 
Rest of Africa 
For the rest of Africa, production and domestic utilization of wheat 
were estimated using trend. A comparison of the two trend coefficients 
reveals that wheat utilization in Africa is increasing at almost twice 
the rate of wheat production. It appears that rapid urbanization and 
growing western influence would make Africa one of the fastest growing 
wheat import markets in the world. 
Asia 
56 
The continent of Asia is an extremely large land mass encompassing 
a variety of climates and cultures. In terms of food grain production 
and consumption, the continent can be viewed as two separate areas. 
In the northern and western parts of Asia, wheat is the major food grain 
while in the south and east rice is most important and wheat is second. 
Since the USSR and the People's Republic of China are to be 
discussed separately later, India and Japan are the only two remaining 
countries of the continent which are significant in international wheat 
commerce. India and Japan are both major wheat importers and India is 
one of the world's largest wheat producers. 
India 
Supply. The growth in Indian wheat production over the last decade 
has been remarkable. Two factors have been responsible for this growth. 
First, in 1968 new higher yielding varieties of wheat were introduced 
into the wheat growing regions of the country. Second, this was coupled 
with an effort by the government to bring more acres under irrigation 
using inexpensive tube wells with diesel or electric motors. (See IWC 
1967/68a, p. 57.) The result has been steadily increasing wheat produc-
tion since 1968, except for the crop years 1973/74-1974/75 when production 
was limited by adverse weather and shortages of fertilizers and irrigation 
equipment. (See IWC 1973/74a, p. 41 and IWC 1974/75a, p. 39,) 
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TABLE X 
BALANCE SHEET EQUATIONS ESTIMATED FOR INDIA 
DeEendent Variables 
a 
Statistics HHIN YLDIN PDNIN FOOD IN FEED IN SEED IN 
Intercept 8340 -1.82 3697 -46797 29.6 
Regression 
Coefficients 
YR .042 974 
(t) (8.45) (14.13) 
06876 -55042 -102760 
(t) (4.51) (-3.92) 
DYR6876 828 1595 




(t) (12. 50) 
HHIN .105 
(t) 
Mean 15880 1.06 17699 19437 219 1655 
R2 .95 .82 .95 .93 .91 
OW 1. 68 1.10 2.02 .98 1.38 
a See Appendix A for a definition of variables and their units. 
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The supply estimates in Table X take account of the changes in seed 
and irrigation use through the use of a dummy variable and a dummied 
trend for the period from 1968-1976. In addition to these two independent 
variables, both the production and area harvested equations are a function 
of a lagged deflated wholesale price of wheat in India. Yields in India 
were specified strictly as a function of technology (trend). Though the 
inclusion of a dummy variable to change the slope and intercept would 
have provided a better fit and a more reasonable Durbin-Watson statistic, 
it was felt that this latter specification would lead to overly optimistic 
yield projections. 
For the purposes of projection, the direct estimation of production 
appeared to provide somewhat better estimates ~han the indirect estima-
tion using area harvested times yields because the influence of price 
was stronger in the former. 
Demand. The domestic utilization equations estimated for India are 
relatively simple. Food use was determined to be a function of time. 
Though food use estimates using population as the independent variable 
were very similar, it was felt that time was easier to use for projec-
tions. 
Feed use in India is very small in comparison with food use. It 
was found to be dependent on the amount of wheat produced indicating 
that given a large wheat crop, producers would feed some of it to 
livestock. 
Seed use in India was estimated using the number of hectares 
harvested times a constant use per hectare. This was preferrable to 
using a regression since seed data for the early part of the period had 
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to be generated using a ratio of seed use to hectares harvested for the 
years for which data were available. 
On the whole, India's need to import wheat has decreased substan-
tially over the past ten years. The policies of the government to 
encourage wheat production have resulted in a rate of increase for pro-
duction that has, on the average, been greater than the increase in demand. 
The result is that India is approaching self-sufficiency in wheat. 
Japan 
Supply. Japan's wheat production had been steadily declining until 
1973 when it appeared to hit a floor in the neighborhood of 225 thousand 
metric tons. As expected, this reflects a decl~ning hectarage devoted to 
wheat. The area harvested has declined from over 650 thousand hectares 
in 1961 to a floor of about 85 thousand hectares in the 1973-1976 period. 
Yields in Japan have not shown any significant trend. 
The left half of Table XI shows the supply equations estimated for 
Japan. Although both the production and area harvested equations have 
parameters that will result in lower future projections, the minimum 
level appears to already have been reached. Hence it is assumed that 
from 1973 forward, production and area harvested are likely to be main-
tained at a level of 225 thousand tons and 85 thousand hectares 
respectively. Yields were projected to remain at their mean for the 
past two decades. 
Demand. Food use in Japan has been increasing over the study period 
and was found to be a function of the deflated producer price of rice 
(a proxy for the retail price of rice) and per capita GNP in 1975 billions 
TABLE XI 
BALANCE SHEET EQUATIONS ESTIMATED FOR JAPAN AND THE REST OF ASIA (EXCLUDING CHINA) 
De2endent Variables a 
Rest of Asia 
Ja an (Excluding China) 
Statistics HHJ YLDJ PDNJ FOODJ FEEDJ SEEDJ PDNRAS DURAS 
Intercept 3147 2.53 7476 -2706 740 1.11 46693 -61687 
Regression 
Coefficients 
YR -41.4 -97.8 76 1075 1390 







Mean 335 2.53 826 3940 602 20 26424 32868 
R2 .96 .85 .97 • 25 .95 .90 .97 
DW .65 2.02 2.00 1.08 .78 1.38 .96 
aSee Appendix A for a definition of variables and their units. 0\ 
0 
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in yen. The variation in feed use over the past 20 years has been more 
difficult to explain. The producer prices of wheat and barley did not 
appear to be correlated with the feed use of wheat. However, a lagged 
deflated average imported wheat price corrected for exchange rate changes 
between the U. S. and Japan provided some explanation for changes in the 
feed use of wheat. 
Japanese seed use has followed a pattern very similar to that of 
production and area harvested, declining to a minimum level of about 
eight thousand metric tons in the early 1970's and remaining at that 
level. As expected, seed use was estimated as a function of area har-
vested as shown in Table XI. 
Rest of Asia (Excluding China) 
For the rest of the Asian continent, excluding China and the USSR, 
production and utilization were estimated using trend. As is evident 
from the equations in Table XI, the utilization of wheat for the rest 
of Asia is not only greater than production, but it is also increasing 
at a faster rate. Therefore, non-communist Asia as a whole represents 
an expanding market for wheat imports. 
Latin America and the Caribbean 
In South America two countries were estimated separately: Brazil, 
the major wheat importing country of the region and Argentina, the major 
wheat producing and exporting country of the continent, The estimation 
of equations for both of these countries brought to light two difficulties 
which, up to this point, have been of little significance in estimating 
equations for other regions: inflation and the different crop year. 
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Inflation is clearly the greatest of the two problems. During the 
study period (1960-1976) both countries had suffered from significant 
levels of inflation. Brazil's yearly irtflation rate had been as high 
as 90 percent in 1963. It later decreased and averaged about 20 percent 
a year until 1975 when it shot up to a rate of 43 percent. For Argentina, 
the inflation problem was even worse. At the beginning of the period 
the annual inflation rate was from 20 to 30 percent but by 1971 the 
situation began to deteriorate and by 1975 the Argentine currency was 
devaluating at a hyper-inflation rate of 500 percent a year. These rates 
of inflation pose serious problems in determining the impact of prices 
on the wheat economies of the respective countries. At high rates of 
inflation, the choice of an index to deflate prices is of relatively 
greater importance than in a.case where the rate of inflation is only 
three to four percent a year. A deflator based on the last three months 
of the year--during the period of the wheat harvest--may be more appro-
priate (and much different) than a deflator based on the average rate 
of price increase for the entire year. 
Finally, inflation brings into question the nature of the response 
of producers and consumers to the price system. Even if prices are 
"correctly" deflated so that they reflect the real value of the good in 
question, the market participants may not correctly anticipate inflation 
and they may act on a different set of decision criteria. It is impossible 
to know whether the market participants are reacting to real price changes 
or some unknown perceived price change. It is likely that as the variance 
of the rate of inflation increases, anticipated and actual price changes 
diverge. 
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The second problem area encountered in the South American continent 
was that of the radically different crop year. In contrast to the July/ 
June crop year which is prevalent in countries of the northern hemisphere, 
South American countries (and Australia to be discussed later) have 
wheat crop years with the wheat harvest occurring in a three month period 
from November through January. Although wheat data have been adjusted 
to approximate the levels of production, stocks and consumption on a 
July/June year basis, they are not strictly comparable with the data of 
northern hemisphere.countries. 
Brazil 
Supply. Production of wheat in Brazil ov~r the study period showed 
no trend until 1967 when the government initiated a ten year development 
plan, after that wheat production began increasing. (See USDA, 1967, 
p. 31.) Since yields trended slightly upward over the entire period, 
the production pattern primarily reflects changes in area harvested. The 
estimates for production, area harvested and yields are shown in the left 
half of Table XII. The production equation (PDNB) uses a dummy and a 
dummied trend to account for the change in government policies in 1967. 
Brazilian yields are explained with a simple trend variable and area 
harvested was found to be a function of the previous year's deflated 
producer price of wheat and trend, along with a dummy and dummied trend 
to reflect the 1967 change in government policies. 
In the Brazilian case, the estimate calculated from yields and area 
harvested was preferable to the direct estimate of production primarily 
because it allowed deflated producer prices to play a part in determining 
the level of production. One shortcoming of the calculated estimate is 
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TABLE XII 
BALANCE SHEET EQUATIONS ESTIMATED FOR BRAZIL 
De2endent Variables a 
Statistics PDNB YLDB HHB FOODB FEEDB SEEDB 
Intercept 251 -2.37 10124 624 340 40 
Regression 
Coefficients 
YR .0453 -177 10.26 
(t) (2.91) (-1.67) (2.27) 
D6776 -14441 30241 
(t) (-4.09) (-3.99) 
DYR6776 220 464 








(t) ( 4. 72) 
Mean 1017 .7081 1381 2475 606 134 
R2 .80 .36 .86 .90 .67 .60 
ow 2.56 2.26 1.68 .66 2.56 1.93 
a See Appendix A for a definition of variables and their units. 
65 
that it overestimates Brazilian yields for 1975/76 and 1976/77, and this 
results in overly optimistic production projections. Provisional 
International Wheat Council data show Brazilian yields for 1977/78 to be 
.67 metric tons per hectare--well below the 1.12 metric tons per hectare 
predicted by the model. Though much of the error is due to weather 
factors, it is possible that forces may be at work--such as the increase 
in area planted--to decrease yields in the last three years. 
Demand. On the demand side, food use trended upward at a gradually 
increasing rate over the period. Feed use increased until 1974 when 
there was a sharp decrease in use followed by two years in which feed 
use was higher but did not return to the 1973 level. Seed use followed 
a pattern similar to that of production. 
The right half of Table XII shows the equations estimated on the 
demand side. Food use was found to be a function of per capita income. 
Note that though the R-square is .90, the Durbin-Watson statistic is 
only .66--well outside the acceptable region. Since food use increased 
at an increasing rate, it was felt that fitting a curve to this trend 
would result in relatively high projections of future food use that were 
not likely to be sustained. Hence a lower, and hopefully more realistic 
projection was used at the expense of autocorrelated error terms. 
Brazilian feed use was found to be a function of trend and the 
deflated producer price of wheat. Although trend was an adequate explana-
tion over the earlier part of the period, the deflated price was important 
in picking up the sharp decrease in feed use in 1974 and the recovery 
thereafter. Seed use was best explained as a technical relation based 
on the area harvested. 
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Argentina 
Supply. Because of weather and political unrest in Argentina over 
the last two decades, it is very difficult to identify and quantify the 
forces which have consistently influenced wheat production. Although 
production has, in general, shown a gradual upward trend, there have 
been three years of large departures on the upside. In addition, both 
yields and area harvested are highly variable over the period and show 
no significant trend. 
The estimates in Table XIII reflect this fact. The best predictors 
for yields and for area harvested were the respective means. A number 
of prices with different deflators and lags were tried in the production 
equation but, of those which were theoretically plausible, none worked 
as well as trend with a dummy to take out the three crop years of extra-
ordinarily high production (1963/64, 1964/65, and 1976/77). Hence, 
based on the experience of the last 17 years, the predictions of this 
production equation will be within relatively narrow limits on the down 
side but may substantially underestimate actual production in years when 
good yields and a large wheat area harvested coincide. In spite of this 
recognized deficiency, the direct estimation of production was much 
better than using production estimates calculated from the product of 
the means of Argentine yields and area harvested. 
Demand. On the demand side, food use which has trended upward 
throughout the period, was best explained by population increases. In 
this case, per capita income was much less effective in forecasting 
food use--most likely due to the variation in income resulting from 

















BALANCE SHEET EQUATIONS ESTIMATED FOR ARGENTINA AND THE 
REST OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 
DeEendent Variables a 
Rest of Latin America 
Argentina and the Caribbean 
YLDAR PDNAR FOODAR FEEDAR SEEDAR PDNRSA DURSA 
1.43 -4061 -668 648 636 4240 -2506 
150 -32 89 







1.43 6898 3327 178 636 2049 3583 
.79 .93 .75 .22 .91 
2.41 1. 32 .66 2.33 1.10 
aSee Appendix A for a definition of variables and their units. 
"' ....., 
Feed use was found to be a function of the ratio of the current 
year's wheat price to the succeeding year's corn price. This seemingly 
nonsensical variable is, in fact, quite logical when the different 
wheat and corn crop years are taken into account. The December/November 
wheat crop year average price is divided by the April/March corn crop 
year average price of the succeeding year allowing for a maximum time 
overlap of the two price series. Seed use was found to be highly variable 
and not a function of area harvested. Therefore, the mean was used as 
the predictor. 
Rest of Latin America and the Caribbean 
The aggregate of the "Rest of Latin America and the Caribbean" includes 
all of the countries in the Western Hemisphere except Brazil, Argentina, 
the United States and Canada. As in the case of other geographical 
aggregations, production and domestic utilization were predicted using 
only a trend variable. The results are shown in Table XIII. In this 
region production has been almost stable over the past two decades while 
domestic utilization has been increasing steadily. Hence, the market 
for wheat exports is growing quite rapidly for this group of countries. 
Communist Countries 
The Communist countries are among the most important in international 
wheat trade because they are major producers, consumers and--at times--
importers of wheat. In addition to this, they are particularly signifi-
cant for two reasons. First, there is a lack of reliable information on 
the variables and parameters which determine the supply and demand for 
wheat in these countries. Part of this dearth of information results 
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from the secrecy of the respective governments concerning yields, 
carry-out stocks, the distribution of output, etc., and part results 
from the system itself. Prices are a form of information and where 
market prices are not used to reflect the scarcity resources, it is 
difficult to say what conditions exist and how producers and consumers 
are likely to respond. 
The second reason Communist countries are of particular importance 
in the world wheat trade is the variability of their purchases of 
wheat imports. The Soviet Union is especially notable in this regard 
but the other Communist countries have the potential for the same vari-
ability. These countries may respond to a crop failure by forcing a 
decrease in consumption or they may make up the difference with imports. 
The policy-making process by which these decisions are made is not open. 
Hence, it is difficult to anticipate how these governments will respond. 
The Soviet Union 
The USSR is the largest producer of wheat in the world with an 
annual output which has averaged 92 million tons since 1970. However, 
the variation around this mean has ranged from 66 to 110 million tons 
in that same seven year period. Part of this variation can be attributed 
to climatic factors since a large fraction of Soviet wheat is grown in 
areas of limited rainfall. Yet, as Johnson (1977) points out, 
• Also responsible are farming practices that neglect 
certain available methods to limit production variations, 
such as the major use of summer fallow. The variability 
of Soviet grain production far exceeds that in climatically 
similar areas in North America • (p. 1). 
Production in the Soviet Union has been trending upward over the 
study period but--as noted--with wide year to year fluctuations. 
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Soviet officials are projecting an increase in production that will make 
the USSR self-sufficient in grains by 1985 but most American sources 
believe they will fall well short of this goal. In an analysis of the 
long term outlook for Russian grain imports, the Central Intelligence 
Agency (January 1979) predicted that, 
.•• On balance, we expect planned fertilizer applications 
to grain will be achieved by about 80 percent. New production 
capacity needed to meet output goals is slow in coming on 
stream. Even if production targets .•• are met, planned 
applications to grain cannot be made unless transportation 
and storage losses--currently 10 to 15 percent--are reduced, 
and prospects for reduction are dim (p. 3). 
Hence, past production increases are probably a good indication of 
the levels which are likely to be achieved by 1985. The wheat produc-
tion equation (PDNCCP) shown in Table XIV is b~sed on simple trend and 
reflects a gradual increase in Soviet wheat output over the past 17 
years. 
As shown in Table XIV, the trend coefficient of 2567 on Soviet wheat 
domestic utilization (DUCCP) is considerably greater than the correspond-
ing trend coefficient of 1964 on Soviet production (PDNCCP). This· 
indicates that the demand for wheat is increasing faster than the supply 
which implies that the USSR will have to increase its wheat imports if 
current trends continue. 
People's Republic of China 
Of all the major wheat importing countries, data on the People's 
Republic of China is probably the most sparse and least reliable. The 
data that are available are from United Nations and USDA sources--not 
from internal Chinese sources. Hence, the data represent only general 
TABLE XIV 
BALANCE SHEET EQUATIONS ESTIMATED FOR THE SOVIET UNION, 
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 
AND EASTERN EUROPE 
DeEendent Variables a 
People's 
USSR ReEublic of China Eastern EuroEe 
Statistics PDNCCP DUCCP PDNPRC DUPRC PDNEEU DUEEU 
Intercept -52503 -94141 -68931 -42581 -48882 -38063 
Regression 
Coefficients 
YR 1964 2567 1441 1094 1016 916 
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(t) (2. 79) (6.10) (17.27) (7. 76) (12.45) (13.63) 
Mean 81029 80438 29235 31780 20217 24233 
R2 .34 .71 .95 .80 .91 .93 
DW 2.38 .63 1. 73 1.45 2.00 1.77 
a See Appendix A for a definition of variables and their units. 
trends which are perceived from outside the country; there is very 
little variation around these trends. 
The estimated Chinese wheat production (PDNPRC) and domestic 
utilization (DUPRC) equations are shown in Table XIV. As indicated by 
the respective coefficients on trend (YR), production of wheat is 
increasing at a faster rate than utilization. The next chapter will 




The Eastern European countries are tied very closely to the Soviet 
Union. In the past, Eastern Europe has imported the major portion of 
their wheat from the USSR but since the latter is finding difficulty in 
meeting its own needs for grain, these countries have had to look outside 
the Communist bloc for wheat. 
Though the Eastern European countries consume more than they produce, 
the trends estimated in Table XIV point to a gradually diminishing wheat 
deficit. Yet while unlike the estimates for the People's Republic of 
China, the difference between production and utilization for Eastern 
Europe will not be closed in the near future. 
Canada 
Policy and Characteristics 
Since Canada is second only to the United States as a major world 
exporter of wheat, it is important to know the economic and institutional 
factors that affect the exportable supplies of Canadian wheat. In 
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Canada, the Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) is the sole marketing agent for 
the domestic food grains market and for the international market for 
wheat, oats and barley. The CWB pays producers a guaranteed minimum 
price--which is usually set below world market prices--upon delivery of 
the grain. If the sales of the Board average out at a price higher 
than the initial minimum price, the additional proceeds are divided up 
among producers based on the amount of grain delivered. The result is 
that all producers receive the same price for their wheat before trans-
portation charges are netted out regardless of the time of year they 
market their crop. 
This type of system raises questions as to what the important 
variables are in analyzing the response of producers to changing world 
market conditions. Do producers use the initi~l delivery price to 
determine the amount of wheat acreage to plant or do they use some 
expected discounted total payment from the Canadian Wheat Board? It is 
also possible that they could use world wheat prices as a proxy for what 
the final total payment of the Board will be or that they may not 
respond at all to changes in price or CWB payments as long as their 
revenue remains within a certain range. (For further discussion of this 
issue, see Meilke, 1976.) 
An important second aspect of the Canadian marketing system is the 
market quota system which was initiated after a number of successively 
large harvests raised wheat stocks to unprecedented levels at the end of 
the 1969/70 season. The Canadian government instituted an "emergency" 
one year program for the 1970/71 crop year called Operation LIFT (Lower 
Inventory For Tomorrow) designed to cut wheat acreage in half by paying 
farmers to put land into summer fallow. Delivery quotas for wheat were 
then instituted for the following years but were relaxed when world 
wheat market conditions tightened and prices rose. 
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A final aspect of Canadian grain marketing program is the Western 
Grains Stabilization Program begun in 1976. This program guarantees 
that " .•• each year the net cash flow to prairie grain producers as a 
group will not be below the previous five-year average • ." (Oleson, 
1979, p. 4). It is a voluntary program to which producers contribute 
one-third and the federal government contributes two-thirds of the 
financing. Given the recent enactment of the Western Grains Stabili-
zation Program, it is difficult to determine the exact impact the program 
will have on Canadian wheat production. It should not only achieve its 
stated objective of stabilizing farm income, but it should also stabilize 
production levels. (For a thorough discussion!of Canadian wheat and 
grain policies, see Oleson, 1979; McCalla and Schmitz, 1979; IWC 1963/64-
1976/77 various issues; OECD, 1973b; OECD, 1973c; and Meilke, 1976.) 
Supply. The Canadian balance sheet estimates for this study are 
less sophisticated tham some other recent studies (see MacLauren, 1977; 
and Lattimore and Zwart, 1978), but the lack of data and the limited 
marginal value of increased complexity precluded fine tuning the 
Canadian model. On the supply side wheat production was formulated as 
a function of the previous year's producer price and a dummy for Opera-
tion LIFT. The model was not very satisfactory since the dummy was 
significant at only the 10 percent level and the price variable was not 
significant. The direct estimate did not provide very much basis for 
confidence in future projections. 
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TABLE XV 
BALANCE SHEET EQUATIONS ESTIMATED FOR CANADA 
Deeendent Variables 
a 
Statistics PDNC YLDC HHC FOODC FEE DC SEEDC 
Intercept 14921 -.862 4368 973 -996 415 
Regression 
Coefficients 
YR .0363 50.0 
(t) (2.91) (3.06) 
DPPLCC 22.3 
(t) (.73) 
DFO -7193 -5464 
(t) (-1. 79) (-7.15) 
LHHC .607 






(t) (5 .10) 
D69 -495 
(t) (-5.72) 
Mean 16168 1.61 10157 1691 1720 940 
R2 • 25 .36 .87 .88 .47 .83 
DW 1.28 2.30 1. 76 2.61 2.37 2.11 
a See Appendix A for a definition of variables and their units. 
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For Canada, production projections were handled better by breaking 
out the area harvested and yields components and estimating them 
separately. Wheat area harvested in Canada was det"ermined to be a 
function of the previous year's wheat area harvested and a dummy for 
Operation LIFT. The use of the lagged adjustment model to predict wheat 
area is an indication of the consistency of Canadian grain policies and 
the ability of the government to insulate wheat producers from wide 
swings in world markets. 
Canadian wheat yields were projected using a simple trend as a 
proxy for technology. The production estimates generated from the area 
harvested and yield equations tracks better than the equation which 
estimates production directly. From a theoreti.cal point of view, it is 
rather unfortunate that a price variable was not found to be either 
significant or of the right sign in the area harvested equation, but 
by providing a measure of stability and uniformity to wheat marketing, 
Canadian policy has diluted the influence of price. 
Demand. On the demand side, the food use of wheat in Canada was 
defined as a function of per capita income; feed use depended on trend 
and the deflated producer price of wheat; and seed use responded to 
changes in the previous year's seed use and a dummy for Operation LIFT. 
Oceania 
In terms of wheat production and consumption the continent of 
Oceania is dominated by Australia. New Zealand and the other islands 
which complete the make up of the continent are of only minor importance 
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and--for the purposes of this study--are treated as an aggregate called 
the "Rest of Oceania". 
Australia 
Policy and Characteristics. Australia is one of the five major 
wheat exporters of the world. Her exports over the past two decades 
have generally ranked behind the U. S. and Canada and have been in close 
competition with France and Argentina for third in total wheat exports. 
Most of the area devoted to wheat in Australia is on large farms 
that also raise sheep or cattle. Although wheat is the most important 
grain produced, barley, corn and sorghum became increasingly important 
over the past few years. Wheat is grown primarily in the southeast and 
southwest parts of the country--areas that are subject to recurrent 
droughts. 
Like Canada, Australia has a wheat marketing board which purchases 
all wheat destined for national or international commerce. The Australian 
Wheat Board (AWB) makes an initial payment to farmers soon after receiving 
the grain. As the board receives proceeds from the sale of wheat in 
excess of the initial payments it is able to pass along the funds to the 
growers as additional payments. Each grower receives a return based on 
the quantity of wheat delivered and the average selling price realized 
by the AWB for that particular crop. The payments for a particular crop 
often take years to finalize. (For a more detailed discussion of 
Australian agricultural policy as it relates to wheat, see OECD, 1973a 
and OECD, 1973c, pp. 98-102.) 
This payment system is coupled with a Wheat Price Stabilization 
Fund. A guaranteed price is set each year. When the average export 
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price falls below the guaranteed price, an amount is withdrawn from the 
Fund to make up the difference. If the export price exceeds the 
guaranteed price, the surplus is paid into the fund. When the growers' 
money in the Fund is exhausted (as has been the case over the past 20 
years), the government pays into the Fund. In effect, the guaranteed 
price has operated as a subsidy over most of the study period. 
Superimposed on this payment framework is a system of wheat delivery 
quotas enacted beginning in the 1969/70 crop year. The impetus for this 
arrangement was a bumper wheat crop in 1968/69 which created serious 
storage and disposal problems. Even though the quota system has been in 
effect since the 1969/70 crop year, low prices, low yields and temporary 
suspensions of the quota have limited its effectiveness. In fact, a 
study by Fisher concluded in 1975 that, " •.. it would appear that 
1970-71 was the only season in which quotas caused wheat planting to 
fall below the level already established by lower wheat prices ••• " 
p. 87). 
In 1974 the Australian Wheat Growers' Federation adopted a new five 
year stabilization plan beginning with the 1974/75 season. The same 
framework as in previous plans was maintained but changes were made to 
make production more responsive to changes in export prices. (A discus-
sion of the five year stabilization plan beginning in 1974/75 can be 
found on page 67 of IWC, 1973/74a.) 
Supply. The result of this rather complicated Australian wheat 
marketing structure is that, until recently, Australian producers have 
not responded very readily to world prices. This is apparent from the 
area harvested equation in Table XVI. In this equation, the number of 
TABLE XVI 
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TABLE XVI (Continued) 
DeEendent Variables a 
Australia 
Statistics PDNAU YLDAU HHAU FOODAU FEEDAU 
Mean 9663 1.23 7965 1281 521 
R2 .20 .72 .40 .62 
DW 2.39 2.42 1. 79 .81 











hectares harvested are specified as a function of the previous year's 
hectares harvested, a dummy for the 1970/71 quota and the previous 
year's wheat export price. The export price is not significant, but 
since it is of the right sign and since the Australian government has 
instituted measures recently to make wheat production more responsive 
to world prices, it was left in the equation. 
81 
Wheat yields in Australia over the study period were so variable 
that the mean was as accurate as any other prediction. Due to the 
yield variability, the direct estimation of production resulted in only 
a weak positive trend. 
Production estimates based on area harvested and yields were used 
instead of the single equation production esti~ates because the former 
provided at least some opportunity for policy and prices to have an 
impact. Yet this should not obscure the fact that yield variability is 
the single biggest factor affecting Australian wheat supply. 
Demand. Australian utilization of wheat is specified as 
expected given the characteristics of the country and its agriculture. 
However, one factor that was very perplexing was the variability in 
Australian food use. Even though the variability is not very great 
(less than ten percent of the mean), there have been some sharp changes 
from year to year (e.g., 1965/66 and 1972/73) which suggests changes in 
the population or varying accounting procedures. 
As shown in Table XVI, per capita income was used to explain food 
use while a ratio of the wheat to the barley price and a dummy for 
drought years was used to specify the feed use equation. The dummy is 
used because a large number of Australian wheat producers also raise 
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sheep. In very bad drought years, wheat stored on-farm may be the only 
grain available to feed a forage-starved flock. Seed use for Australia 
was determined to be a function of the area harvested. 
Though it appears that Australia's exportable surplus has been 
gradually expanding since the quota restriction of 1970, Australians 
have not taken full advantage of the rapid rise in wheat prices in 1972 
and 1973. This is partly due to weather conditions but also because of 
the marketing arrangement and quota restrictions. Had producers been 
able to receive the income from their crops more quickly (rather than 
over a two and one-half year period), and had they been able to plant a 
larger area, Australian wheat production might have been much larger 
in spite of weather conditions. 
Rest of Oceania 
For the rest of the continent of Oceania, neither wheat production 
nor utilization showed any significant trend. Hence, the respective 
means were used for future projections. 
For the continent as a whole, a net surplus condition prevails with 
respect to wheat. The supply-demand balance for the continent is 
dominated by Australia which, apart from New Zealand, is the only major 
country in the region. 
CHAPTER IV 
BALANCE SHEET PROJECTIONS FOR 1985 
The objective of this chapter will be to obtain a reasonable set of 
wheat supply and demand projections for specified countries and regions 
of the world for 1985 using the balance sheet regression estimates from 
Chapter III. The 1985 projections will be presented as two possible 
long range alternatives. The first will portray the 1985 world wheat 
economy as an extrapolation of the trends represented in the balance 
sheet estimates of Chapter III. It will assume that there will be no 
further major institutional changes which have not already been included 
in the balance sheet model. Since some of the balance sheet projections 
are the result of trends which are unlikely to be sustained, a second, 
more "reasonable" set of conditions is presumed in the baseline predic-
tions of the second alternative. The actual 1985 wheat supplies might 
deviate from the baseline depending on weather conditions or other short 
run aberrations in the international wheat market. These aberrations 
will be presented as two opposing sequences--one which presumes a major 
crop failure in one or more of the major wheat producing regions of the 
world and another which posits an extraordinary harvest in one or more 
of these regions. 
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Balance Sheet Projections 
This section includes 1985 projections that will result when 1985 
values are substituted into the balance sheet equations estimated in 
Chapter III. Since trend and dummy variables were used frequently in 
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the analysis, the 1985 values for independent variables in most cases, 
were not difficult to obtain. Yet there were a number of occasions when 
trend or zero-one values were not sufficient. In the case of variables 
with a strong trend such as population or income, 1985 values were 
obtained by regressing these variables against trend and using the 1985 
projection. For deflated prices and price ratios--variables which have 
no strong trend--a three or five year average of the end of the study 
period was used (e.g., for LDWPLIN, an average of the 1974/75-1976/77 
crop years was used). The criteria for choosing a five~year versus a 
three-year average was based on which average appeared to best represent 
recent events. In general a five year average was used but in cases 
where the last three years indicated a sharp departure from the values 
of previous years (LDWPLIN and RWBARAU), the three-year average was used. 
There are two major exceptions to the general procedures outlined 
above. The first concerns the values to be used for the lagged area 
harvested variables (LHHAU and LHHC) used in the Australian and 
Canadian area harvested equations (HHAU and HHC). An examination of 
recent data would indicate that both LHHAU and LHHC have been gradually 
increasing since 1970. However, if these variables were trended out to 
1985, the results would be extremely high wheat acreages for both 
countries. In 1969 when area harvested approached the level of 12,000 
hectares in Canada and 11,000 hectares in Australia and was coupled with 
a large accumulation of stocks, delivery quotas and other restrictions 
were imposed in both countries which brought about sharp cutbacks in 
production. Therefore a five-year end-of-period average was used for 
LHHAU and LHHC under the assumption that Canada and Australia would 
impose restrictions, before they would allow acreages to reach tradi-
tionally excessive levels. 
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The second major exception is in regard to the dummy variables used 
in projecting the feed use of wheat in EEC countries. It has been assumed 
in this analysis that dummy variables represent the influence of structural 
changes which are not expected to change before 1985. One such structural 
changes occurred in 1973 when world wheat supplies became tight and the 
EEC discontinued the practice of paying a subs~dy--known as the denatur-
ing premium--for the feed use of wheat. This change was accounted for 
in most European feed use equations through the use of a dummy (D7376) 
and a dummy slope (DYR7376). In Italy, a dummy and dummy slope were 
specified for the 1967-1973 period in order to take account of both the 
beginning of the CAP and the end of the denaturing premium. In 1977, 
when wheat supplies had returned to more normal levels, the EEC again 
elected to encourage the feed use of wheat through a scheme which clas-
sifed the grain as either a quality or a feed wheat. Feed wheat prices 
were then set nearly 12 percent below the reference price for quality 
wheat making soft wheat, for which the EEC is a surplus producer, more 
competitive with feed grains (see USDA, 1977c, p. 21). 
Though the new pricing scheme is not the same as the denaturing 
premium, the effect is the same. Therefore when feed projections were 
made for the EEC countries, the dummy which accounted for the discontinued 
denaturing premium was assumed to be zero (in the case of Italy, D6773 
was again assumed to be one). 
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The balance sheet projections are summarized in Tables XVII and 
XVIII. Table XVII gives the actual 1985 projections and Table XVIII 
gives the percentage change of each of the projected variables from 
their average level over the last three years of the study period (i.e., 
1974/75-1976/77). 
It is important to note that the metric ton values in Table XVII 
are nota totally accurate representation of the absolute level of all 
of the country and continent wheat uses and supplies. On an aggregate 
level, it was found that wheri total world wheat utilization was 
subtracted from total world production and account was taken for changes 
in stocks, a positive residual remained which averaged 6.9 million 
metric tons over the study period. This indicates either a net over-
estimation of supply or a net underestimation of total utilization. The 
evidence appears to favor the latter for two reasons. First, production 
data on the world level are probably more accurate than utilization 
data. For a number of countries wheat utilization data do not exist or 
they have been constructed using population and estimated per capita 
consumption levels. Wheat production data, on the other hand, are 
readily available for almost all countries of the world and can now be 
verified with satellite photographs. Hence, the measurement error is 
most likely in the utilization statistics. 
Second, as shown in the first column of a following table, 
the "Potential Import Market" for wheat in the 1974-1976 period was 
36.9 million metric tons. During this same period, the four major wheat 
exporters dispatched a total of 52.6 million tons of wheat exports--15.7 
TABLE XVII 
1985 BALANCE SHEET PROJECTIONS 
Supply-
Area Pro- Food Feed Seed Dom. Demand 
Harvested Yield duct ion Use Use Use Util. Balance 
mha mt/ha mm.t mm.t mm.t mm.t mmt mmt 
Western Europe Total 64.2d 58.2 6.0 
Germany 8.7d 3.9 3.3 .3 7.5 1.2 
Italy 8.9 10.2 .8 .6 11.6 -2.7 
Netherlands .1 6.2 .5 1.0 .6 .1 1.7 -1.2 
France 4.0 4.8 19.4 4.5 3.1 .6 8.2 11.2 
United Kingdom 1.4 4.1 5.8d 5.2 2.3 .3 7.9d -2.0 
Rest of West Europe 20.9 21.4 -.5 
Africa Total 13.2 25.3 -12.1 
Egypt .6 4.6 2.6d 8.4 .1 8.5d -5.9 
Rest of Africa 10.6 16.8 -6.2 
Asia Total 90.8d 101.7 -10.9 
India 45.9d 36.0 .5 2.9 39.4 6.5 
Japan .2d 5.2 .6 5.8d -5.6 
Rest of Asia a 44.7 6.5 -11.8 
Latin America Total 12.9 17.1 -4.2 
Brazil 
b 
5.7 1.5 8.4d 4.5 .8 .4 5.7d 2.7 
Rest of Latin America 4.5 11.4 -6.9 





TABLE XVII (Continued) 
Area Pro-
Harvested Yield duct ion 
mha mt/ha mmt 
Communist Total 205.7d 





Australia 8.5 1.2 10.5 
Canada 9.7 2.2 21.7 
3 Exporters' Total 40.9 
aExcludes People's Republic of China. 
b Excludes Argentina. 
cWorld total less four major exporters. 
dEstimated as an aggregate. 
Food Feed Seed 
Use Use Use 
mmt mmt mmt 
4.4 .3 .7 
1.4 .7 .6 





























PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN THE 1985 PROJECTIONS FROM THE AVERAGE OF 1974-1976 
Supply-
Hectares Pro- Food Feed Seed Dom. Demand 
Harvested Yield duct ion Use Use Use Util. Balance 
Percentage Change 
Western Europe Total 12 6 122 
Germany 22 3 18 20 9 323 
Italy -6 12 237 -12 16 -365 
Netherlands -29 16 -18 1 286 209 47 -132 
France -2 18 15 9 6 11 -8 42 
United Kingdom 20 -6 13 -1 -27 24 -10 42 
Rest of Western Europe 14 11 44 
Africa Total 40 43 -45 
Egypt 3 38 34 56 1 54 -66 
Rest of Africa 42 37 -30 
Asia Totala 51 35 29 
India 83 41 81 47 42 335 
Japan -3 16 3 -25 14 -15 
Rest of Asiaa 29 33 -52 
Latin America Totalb 84 28 34 
Brazil 101 70 260 22 27 72 25 221 
Rest of.Latin America -4 -69 
Rest of Oceania 13 10 0 
00 
\0 
TABLE XVIII (Continued) 
Hectares Pro- Food Feed 
Harvested Yield duct ion Use Use 
Percentage Change 
Communist Total 38 
Eastern Europe 40 
USSR 39 
PRC 33 
Subtotal c 36 
Argentina 2 17 -30 
Australia -2 -10 -9 4 4 
Canada -1 23 22 13 35 
3 Exporters' Total 8 
a Excludes People's Republic of China 
bExcludes Argentina. 
cWorld total less four major exporters. 































million tons more than the balance sheet totals would indicate was 
necessary to fill the needs of the rest of the world. Although a part 
of the discrepancy may be the result of importers' attempts to build 
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up depleted stocks, a large part of the difference has to be attributed 
to a net understatement of utilization (assuming the relative accuracy 
of production statistics). 
An examination of Table XVII and XVIII brings to light a number of 
trends in key areas of the world. One way of analyzing these trends is 
to compare the figures in the right· hand column of each of the two tables. 
In Table XVII this column shows the projected supply demand balance for 
each of the model countries along with the subcontinent and continent 
totals. Note that this balance is simply the difference between total 
production and total utilization. Hence, a negative value indicates a 
deficit and a positive value indicates an exportable surplus. In Table 
XVIII, the right hand column shows the percentage change in the production 
demand balance from the 1974-1976 average to the 1985 projection. For 
the importing countries as a whole, the balance sheet projections indi-
cate that the need to import wheat will decline by 19 percent by 1985. 
In general this results from projected production increases which are 
greater than projected demand increases. Four countries are primarily 
responsible for the shrinking market for wheat imports: France, India, 
Brazil, and the People's Republic of China. 
In Western Europe, French wheat production increased only 15 percent, 
but with the continent's slower growth rate in wheat demand, this increase 
moved Western Europe from a marginal surplus position to a level of a 
large exportable surplus. Given the continuation of the current structure 
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of the Common Agricultural Policy, by 1985 France may be looking beyond 
its traditional regional markets for a place to sell its wheat. 
Of all the countries specified in the model, Brazil and India show 
the most dramatic increases in projected wheat production over the next 
few years. Brazil's production is forecast to increase by 260 percent 
and India's by 83 percent. Both countries are shown to move from a 
position of a net deficit to one of an exportable surplus which, 
altogether, would be an increase of 9.2 million metric tons of wheat 
for sale on the world market. 
Finally, a look at the projections for the People's Republic of 
China reveals a somewhat similar situation. China, in the 1974-1976 
period, had reached a level of self sufficiency in wheat. By 1985 
Table XVII shows the Chinese to have a substantial exportable surplus. 
In contrast, the production increases on the import side of the 
1 market are not projected on the export side. Together, the'three major 
exporters are projected to have an increase in exportable surplus of 
only six percent. In fact, both Argentia and Australia are shown to 
have slight decreases while Canada has an increase in wheat available 
for export of 23 percent. 
Baseline Projections 
A few alterations were made in the balance sheet forecasts to obtain 
a set of baseline projections which would present a more conservative and, 
1This is, in part, due to the method mentioned earlier that was used 
to determine the values of the independent variables in the Australian 
and Canadian areas harvested equations. The projections implicitly 
assume a policy response by Canada and Australia to avoid a build up in 
their respective wheat stocks. 
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perhaps, a more realistic forecast of future production increases in a 
few of the more important importing countries. The supply-demand 
balance for these projections is shown in Table XIX-along with the 
supply-demand balance of the balance sheet projections and the average 
balance for the 1974-1976 period. As is evident from the table, the 
difference between the first and the second alternative is that the 
former assumes, given current trends and prices, that each of these 
three countries--India, Brazil and the People's Republic of China--will 
have a substantial exportable surplus by 1985 while the premise of the 
latter is that there are factors in each of these countries which were 
unobserved or unmeasured in the 1960-1976 time period which will deter 
these countries from reaching the surplus leve+s forecast in the first 
alternative. 
For India, self-sufficiency in grains has been a national goal for 
30 years but it was not until 1968 when new irrigation techniques and 
higher yielding wheat varieties were introduced that this became an 
achievable goal. Though India may be capable of becoming self-sufficient 
or even an exporter of wheat by 1985, government policy appears to be 
directed at maintaining adequate domestic stocks to lessen the strain on 
food supplies during years of poor harvest (see Sarma, 1978). It 
therefore appears likely that upon reaching self-sufficiency in grains, 
India may choose to divert resources to other areas of agriculture and 
the economy. 
In view of the Brazil's rapid entry into the international soybean 
market during the past decade, the assumption that Brazil will not become 
a wheat exporter by 1985 seems rather tenuous. Yet the 260 percent 
increase in Brazilian wheat production predicted for 1985 by the balance 
TABLE XIX 
1985 ALTERNATIVE LCNG RUN PROJECTIONS OF WORLD WHEAT AVAILABILITIES 
1985 Projections 
1974-76 Balance Sheet Projections Baseline Projections 
Percentd Percentd Supply-Demand 
Balance 
mmt 
Western Europe, Africa and 
Rest of Oceania -5.8 
Asia Totala -15.3 
India -2.7 
Latin America Total b -2.2 
Brazil -6.3 
Communist Total -9.4 
Eastern Europe -3.7 
Soviet Union -5.5 
People's Republic of China -.2 
Potential Import Market -36.9 
3 Exporters' Totalf 25.6 
aExcludes People's Republic of China. 
bExcludes Argentina. 
cWorld total less four major exporters. 
dEstimated as an aggregate. 
Supply-Demand Supply-Demand 
Balance Change Balance 
nnnt % mmt 
-6.2 -7 -6.2 
-10.9 29 -17.4 
6.5 335 0 
-4.2 34 -6.9 
2.7 221 0 
-8.5 9 -11.9 
-2.3 38 -2.3 
-9.6 -75 -9.6 
3.4 1681 0 
-29.9 19 -42.4 
27.3 6 27.3 
eA negative sign indicates an increase in demand relative to production. 















sheet equations appears to be far too rapid. This rapid an increase would 
require a substantial effort by the Brazilian government to expand 
acreage and improve yields (which are some of the lowest in the world)--
an effort which has not yet been forthcoming. 
For China, the goals of the ten-year economic plan ending in 1985 
are even more ambitious than the already optimistic forecasts of the 
balance sheet projections. The plan calls for grain production of 
400 million tons by 1985--43 percent above the 1977 level (see USDA, 
1978). If wheat production were to increase by this amount, it would 
be 3.4 million tons above the projected amount in Table XVII. 
For a number of reasons, the Chinese may find it difficult to 
attain this goal or even reach self sufficiency by 1985. Writing in 
theAgricultural Situation of the People's Republic of China, Liu (1978, 
p. 8) points out that, 11 the ten-year economic plan calls for rapid 
growth in every sector in the economy. Each part of the whole scheme 
requires massive infusions of capital, resources, manpower and modern 
technology . II He adds that China will be faced with the problem 
of rationing extremely scarce resources among competing sectors and 
that, 11 ••• the prospects for a significant take-off of Chinese 
(agricultural) exports are not good •.• 11 
Even if China could significantLy increase its production of wheat, 
the International Wheat Council stated recently that it is unlikely that 
Chinese imports of wheat will be discontinued in the near future. 
• . . The reasons for this is that China has no integrated 
market for cereals • • • To move wheat overland would be 
very costly and present logistical difficulties. This situ-
ation is unlikely to change in the near future because the 
Chinese Government has decided to give priority to electricity 
to encourage rural development, instead of transport which 
would have required more investment ••• (IWC, 1976/77a, 
p. 85). 
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The baseline projections assume, therefore, that India, Brazil and 
China are each able to achieve self-sufficiency in wheat by 1985 but 
are not likely to become major exporters. Given self-sufficiency in 
each of these three countries along with the continuation of current 
trends and prices in the rest of the world, the baseline projections 
in Table XIX show a supply-demand balance subtotal for the world 
less the four major exporters to be a -42.4 million metric tons--a 15 
percent decrease from the average level of 1974-1976. In contrast to 
the first balance sheet forecasts, these projections point to an 
increasing market for wheat through 1985 for the four mqjor exporters. 
Though the baseline projections represent a reasonable expectation 
of the international wheat market in an average year for 1985, the 
actual state of the market can vary substantially due to a change in 
weather in one or more important wheat producing countries. Hence, 
two possible sets of weather conditions are postulated for 1985. They 
are depicted in Scenarios I and II representing very unfavorable and 
very favorable production conditions respectively. These two scenarios 
mark the lower and upper limits of the deviations from the long run 
trends embodied in the baseline forecasts. 
Baseline Projections with Abnormal Production 
Scenario I: Unfavorable Production 
Conditions 
In 1975 a dry autumn and winter followed by an extremely hot dry 
summer caused the USSR to suffer a crop shortfall that was 28.5 million 
tons below the predicted level of 94.7 million tons. Severe weather 
conditions in other parts of the world also resulted in short crops in 
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Eastern and Western Europe, Canada, India and Africa. For the world in 
the year 1975, wLeat production was more than 34 million tons below the 
level of the aggregated balance sheet predictions. 
Scenario I, therefore, postulates a 33 million ton shortfall for 
the 1985 world wheat crop. Table XX shows this shortfall as being 
concentrated in the USSR~ Eastern Europe, and one or more of the three 
exporters. Though the geographic areas chosen to experience the shortfall 
were selected primarily for illustrative purposes, there is an historical 
precedent to justify their selection. Note that the effect of this 
extremely poor crop in Scenario I is an increase in the absolute level 
of the import market potential from 42.4 to 72.4 million tons--an increase 
of 71 percent over the baseline projection. 
Scenario II: Very Favorable Production 
Conditions 
In contrast to 1975, there were also some very good harvests--due 
to favorable weather conditions during the study period. The largest 
of these was the 1966 crop year when production was over 25 million 
tons greater than the aggregated balance sheet predictions. Again the 
Soviet Union was the major contributor with a crop that was 23 million 
tons greater than predicted. Other countries with large crops included 
Canada and Australia. 
Based on these historical data, Scenario II posits a long crop for 
the USSR of 21 million tons and similarly favorable crops for one or 
more of the three importers of four million tons. The result is a 
decrease in the absolute size of the potential import market of 50 
percent from a base of 42.4 to a level of 21.4 million tons. In addition 
TABLE XX 
POSSIBLE SHORT RUN VARIATIONS IN 1985 WORLD WHEAT AVAILABILITIES 
Western Europe, Africa, Asia, 





People's Republic of China 
Potential Import Market 











a Excludes People's Republic of China and Argentina. 























to the smaller import market, there is a 15 percent increase in the amount 
available for export in the three exporting countries resulting in a 
relative glut of wheat on world markets. 
The Impact on the U. S. Wheat Export 
Market in 1985 
Up to this point this chapter has focused on projections of the 
1975 world wheat market excluding the United States. Two alternative 
sets of long range trends have been discussed with the most reasonable 
alternative being designated as a set of baseline projections. Next the 
upper and lower short term limits of the deviations from these baseline 
projections were illustrated in Scenarios I and II. Now two further 
suppositions will be made about the international wheat market in 1985, 
but, unlike the earlier discussion, these will deal with the structure 
of the export market rather than with the level of aggregate import 
demand and will thereby posit two different conditions under which the 
u. S. may participate in the world wheat market. 
The first supposition, Situation 1, assumes that in a world market 
of four major exporters, the United States is the residual supplier. 
An alternative market structure, Situation 2, posits a constant market 
share division of the world wheat market based on 1974-1976 average 
shares in which the United States maintained a 54.65 percent share and 
the other three exporters jointly controlled 45.35 percent of the market. 
Table XXI shows the level of exports for the United States and the 
three other exporters taken as a group under each of the two long term 
alternatives and each of the two short term scenarios. The total level 
of exports for all four exporters is shown on the first line of the 
TABLE XXI 
U. S. EXPORTS UNDER ALTERNATIVE MARKET SHARE ASSUMPTIONS FOR DIFFERENT 19.85 PROJECTIONS 
Balance Sheet Baseline Scenario I Scenario II 
Chanse Change Chanse Chanae 
1974-76 fro a froa froa froa 
Average Projected 1974-76 Projected 1974-76 Projected 1974-76 Projected 1974-76 
Adjusted Total 
Imported Demand 48.9 41.9 -7.0 54.4 5.5 84.4 35.5 33.4 -15.5 
Situation 1:· Change Change Change Change 
U.S. as Residual Projected Projected from Projected from Projected from Projected from 
Su22lier ~orts !!J!orts 1974-76 E!J!orts 1974-76 l!l!orts 1974-76 E!~!orts 1974-76 
Three Exporters a 25.6 27.3 1.7 27.3 1.7 24.3 -1.3 31.3 -5.1 
United States 23.3 14.6 -8.7 27.1 3.8 60.lb 36.8 2.1c -21.2 
Situation 2: 
Constant Market Shares 
a Three Exporters (45.35%) 22.2 18.9 -3.3 24.7 2.5 38.3b 16.1 15.1c -7.1 
United States (54.65%) 26.7 23.0 -3.7 29.7 3.0 46.lb 19.4 18.3c -8.4 
8 Argentina, Australia, and canada. 
b The maximum quantity of exports during the 196Q-76 period for the U. s. was 32.0 million metric tons and for 
the other three major exporters was 26.9 million tons. 






table as the "Adjusted Total Import Demand'.'. This adjusted total demand 
is equal to the absolute value of the "Potential Import Market" entries 
in Tables XVII, XIX, and XX plus the estimated average understatement 
of world wheat utilization for the 1974-1976 period (approximately 12 
million tons). The table shows that when the U. S. is strictly a resi-
dual supplier, projected U. S. exports can vary from a high of 60.1 
million tons in Scenario I to a low of 2.1 million tons in Scenario II. 
Under this structure, the other three exporters are able to sell all the 
wheat they have available for export which means that their exports vary 
only with their own levels of production and utilization. 
The second structure, which assumes constant market shares, results 
in each of the four exporters bearing an equal share of the variation in 
the total import demand. Under this structure, the respective exports 
of the U. S. and three other exporters in a year of poor world harvests 
would be 46.1 and 38.3 million tons. If 1985 is a year of good harvests, 
the U. S. and the three other exports will sell only 18.3 and 15.1 
million tons of wheat respectively on the world market. Clearly, the 
constant market share structure results in less variation in U. S. 
exports and a greater variation in the exports of the other three 
exporters relative to the first structure in which the U. S. is a resi-
dual supplier. 
It is worth noting that Scenarios I and II represent relatively 
short term extreme situations that would occur only once every 15 or 20 
years. Yet these extremes, as shown in Table XXI, would severely tax 
the four major exporters' export capacity in the case of Scenario I and 
their storage capacity in Scenario II. Fortunately, there are.three 
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factors which should confine the variation in exports to something less 
than the extreme limits given in Table XXI. 
First, the development and dissemination of better cultivation 
techniques--particularly the increase in the use of fertilizers and 
irrigated acreage--should result in relatively more stable future pro-
duction levels. Second, inventories of wheat will continue to play an 
important role in spreading abundance and scarcity over a number of years. 
Finally, the price system will provide signals to both producers and 
consumers as to the adjustments that need to be made. 
The methodology of this chapter has been one of comparative statis-
tics. Constant prices have been assumed in order to concentrate the 
influence of technological trends, changes in weather and alternative 
market structures upon international wheat trade in 1985. In Chapter V, 
a more dynamic view of the world wheat market will be presented in which 
the sharp broad swings in export demand which were determined in this 
chapter in the absence of price changes will be diminished through the 
interaction of prices and quantities. 
CHAPTER V 
AN ECONOMETRIC MODEL OF THE UNITED STATES 
IN THE WORLD WHEAT MARKET 
In the last chapter, constant average 1972-1976 prices were 
assumed in developing two sets of long range forecasts of the level 
demand for U. S. wheat exports in 1985. It was discovered, however, 
that variations in the weather in a few key wheat producing countries 
could dramatically shift the level of export demand. In this chapter, 
a simultaneous equation model of demand and supply of U. S. exports 
will be used to show how the export variation identified in Chapter IV 
will be mitigated as market forces respond to changes in price. 
The Theoretical Model 
The structure of the econometric model to be estimated in this 
chapter is shown in Figure 6. Note that it is a simple interregional 
trade model [as shown in Figure 1 in Chapter II] for which the world 
less the United States comprises the import or excess demand sector 
with the United States making up the export or excess supply sector. A 
theoretical mathematical model can be constructed using the relation-
ships depicted in Figure 6. This econometric model can be divided into 
two sections--a recursive block and a simultaneous block. The equations 
in the recursive block will be estimated independently with ordinary 












COSTS , ' , ' 
(THE WORLD EXCLUDING THE US.) 
Terms are defined in Table XXII. 
THE UNITED STATES SECTOR 
Figure 6. A Flow Chart of Trade between the Wheat Economy of the United States and the Wheat Economy of 
the Rest of the World 
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variables which are required for the solution of the whole system but 
are not affected by that solution in the current period. The set of 
equations in the simultaneous block represent interdependent relation-
ships for which a simultaneous estimation method must be used. 
For this model, the equations for production, food use and seed 
use of wheat are included in the recursive block. These variables are 
required in the solution of excess supply and excess demand but they 
are not themselves affected by that solution in the current period. 
The mathematical specification of these relationships is as follows: 
PDF = 81o + 811 Pw!-1 + 812 YLDF t t 
PDus. us + 822 YR t 820 + 821 PW t-1 




t 840 + 841 HPLt 
where the "F" superscript denotes the "foreign" sector which includes 
the total for the world excluding the United States and the "US" super-
script refers to United States' variables. The "t" subscripts refer to 
the time period of the variable. A list of all the variables used in 
this model is given in Table XXII along with their definitions and their 
classification within the model as either endogenous or predetermined. 
All of the signs of the coefficients in the recursive block are expected 
to be positive except for the coefficient on income (Yt) in the United 
States' food use equation (FO~s). The coefficient, a31 , can have either 
a positive or negative sign depending on whether wheat is a normal or 
an inferior good in the United States. 
Theoretically, equations for food and seed use for the foreign 







LISTING, CLASSIFICATION AND DEFINITION OF 




Domestic consumption of wheat for the world less the United 
States in 1000 metric tons in crop year t. 
Wheat carry-out stocks for the world less the United States 
in 1000 metric tons in crop year t. 
Feed use of wheat in the United States in 1000 metric tons 
in crop year t. 
Wheat carry-out stocks in the United States in 1000 metric 
tons in crop year t. 
Season average wheat price in the United States in dollars 
per bushel in crop year t. 
Season average import price of wheat in the United Kingdom 
in dollars per metric ton in crop year t. 
United States wheat exports in 1000 metric tons in crop 
year t. 
Predetermined Variables 
Wheat production for the world less the United States in 
1000 metric tons in crop year t. 
Wheat production in the United States in 1000 metric tons 
in crop year t. 
Food use of wheat for the United States in 1000 metric tons 
in crop year t. 
Seed use of wheat for the United States in 1000 metric tons 
in crop year t. 
Average wheat yields for the world excluding China in 
metric tons per hectare in crop year t. 
Trend, equals the last two digits of the year. 
Per capita disposable income in the United States in 












TABLE XXII (Continued) 
Definition 
Wheat area planted in the United States in 1000 hectares in 
crop year t. 
World population in millions of people in calendar year t. 
F 
Equal to COt-l' 
Grain consuming animal units in the United States in 1000 
units in the year beginning October 1. 
A weighted average price of competitive feed grains (barley, 
corn and sorghum) in the United States in dollars per 
bushel in crop year t). 
us 
Equal to COt-l' 
Total domestic demand for wheat in'the United States in 
1000 metric tons in crop year t. 
Season average import price of wheat for the United Kingdom 
in dollars per ton in crop year t-1. 
Season average wheat price in the United States in dollars 
per bushel in crop year t-1. 
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a complete wheat usage breakdown on the world level meant that a total 
domestic utilization relationship had to be used instead. This equation 
appears in the simultaneous block. 
The simultaneous block is a set of equations for which the values 
of seven interdependent endogenous variables are solved simultaneously. 
This block can be specified with five stochastic equations and two 
identities. 
DUF = ll51 pJ' + Bso + Bsl POPW t t t 
COF = ll61 pw! + (360 + (361 CIF + 
F 
t t (362 PDt 
FEUS us + 87o + (3 LVNUS + (3 PCUS t = a71 PWt 71 72 t 
co us us + Bso + 881 crus + s PDUS t "" a81 PWt t 82 t 
PWUS 
t = ll91 
pJ' 
t + Bgo 
EXUS = DUF + COF - PDF - CIF t t t t t 
DUUS = FOUS + FEUS + SEUS + co us t t t t t 
In the first four equations, the expected sign on the price coef-
ficients should be negative since these are all demand relationships. 
The remaining independent variables are expected to have positive signs 
with the exception of carry-in stocks (cr! and CI~S) in the foreign and 
U. S. carry-out equations. In these equations carry-in could have 
either a positive or a negative sign depending on whether beginning 
stocks followed a steady trend or were cyclical from year to year. 
The Estimation Results 
As indicated, the model was estimated in two sections. Estimates 
for the recursive block were obtained using ordinary least squares and 
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the values for the simultaneous block were the result of using a two 
stage least squares procedure. The results for both blocks are given 
below with the students' t statistic in parentheses below the appro-
priate variable and the multiple correlation coefficient and the Durbin-
Watson statistic to the right of the estimated equation when they are 
appropriate. 
Recursive Block: 
PDF ~ -51624 + 61.9 P~ l + 214981 YLDF 
t (1.24) t- (18.39) t 
PDUS = -54897 + 2713 PWUSl + 1322YR 
t (2.97) t- (7.12) 
FOUS = 12599 + .49YUS 
t (7.98)t 
SEUS = -33.52 + .081 APLUS 
t (5.35) t 
Simultaneous Block: 
-205419 - 182 P~ + 144 POPW 
(-2.24) t (12.40) t 
COF = 7067 - 52 P~ + 
t (-1.19)t 
.47 CIF + .076 PDF 
(1.86)t (1.49) t 
= -34177 - 3325 PWUS + .47 LVNUS + 6893 PCUS 
(-3.05) t (3.80) t (3.32) t 
-26339- 2679 PWUS + 1.06 CIUS + .74 PDUS 
(-1.52) t (5.09) t (2.19) t 
PWUS = .0456 + .0199 PW! 
t (13.74) 
R2 = .97 
DW = .80 
R2 = .90 
DW = 1.93 
R2 = .81 
DW = 1.18 
R2 = .66 
DW = 1.74 
Although all the sizes for the estimated coefficients in the model 
meet expectations based on economic theory, a few of the coefficients 
are not different from zero at the ten percent level of significance. 
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F 
These included the coefficient on PWt-l in the foreign production equa-
tion, the coefficients on P~ and PDF in the foreign carry-out 
t t 
us relationship, and the PW coefficient in the U. S. carry-out equation. 
t 
These variables were kept in the model because their presence was 
theoretically sound and because they were extremely desireable in 
maintaining the simultaneity of the model. 
Elasticities 
In order to obtain an idea of the interaction of prices and 
quantities in this model, a set of elasticities was derived using the 
appropriate coefficients and the variable means given in Appendix C. 
They are reported in Table XXIII along with similar elasticities from 
selected other studies. For this model, most of the price elasticities 
tend to have an absolute value less than one for both demand and supply. 
There are two notable exceptions. The first is the elasticity of wheat 
demand for feed use which has an elasticity of -2.41. Since feed use 
makes up less than ten percent of the demand for wheat for all purposes 
in the United States, this figure has relatively little impact on the 
responsiveness of total American wheat demand to a change in price. 
Hence, the price elasticity of domestic demand for wheat for all uses 
is only -. 31. 
A second important exception is the price elasticity of demand for 
American wheat exports. United States' wheat exports are shown to be 
slightly greater than unit elastic (-1.05). As 'Shown in Table XXIII, 
there seems to be substantial disagreement in the literature over the 
price elasticity of American wheat exports. Gallegher et al. (1978) 
estimated an elasticity of only -.41 given the current restrictive 
TABLE XXIII 
A COMPARISON OF MODEL ELASTICITIES WITH THOSE OF PREVIOUS STUDIES 
Similar 
With Elasticities Time Period 
Elasticity Respect from Other and 
of: to: Elasticity Studies Source Comments 
PDUS PWUS .12 .13 Gallagher, et al., 1978 1952-1974 t-1 .06 Lattimore and Zwart, 1978 1950-1976 
FEUS PWUS -2.41 -3.29 Gallagher, et al., 1978 t -1.71 Mo, 1970 
-1.86 Lattimore and Zwart, 1978 
co us PWUS -.26 -1.70 Gallagher, et al., 1978 1956-1974. Privately owned t stocks. 
-.38 Zwart and Lattimore, 1977 1950-1976. Total stocks. 
-.57 Lattimore and Zwart, 1978 1950-1976. Government stocks. 
-1.26 Lattimore and Zwart, 1978 1950-1976. Privately owned 
stocks. 
FOUS yt .11 -.31 Gallagher, et al., 1978 1952-1974 t .35 Hutchison, et al., 1970 1950-1970 
-.35 Schmitz and Bawden, 1973 1950-1962 
PDF pw!-1 • 022 .09 Zwart and Lattimore, 1977 Average of selected country 
and region elasticities. 
COF Pl{ -.13 -.15 Zwart and Lattimore, 1977 Average of stock e~asticities t of other four major exporters. 
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trade policies in the EEC and Japan whereas P. R. Johnson (1977, p. 736) 
calculated an excess demand elasticity for U. S. exports of -6.72. A 
~ajar part of the discrepancy lies in the assumptions regarding supply 
and demand elasticities for individual countries and regions of the 
world. Johnson assumes supply and demand elasticities that are three 
to ten times greater than those generated above. In fact, using the 
elasticities from this model in Johnson's formula yields an elasticity 
of excess demand for U. S. exports of only -1.03. 
Long Run Equilibrium for the 1976 
World Wheat Market 
The trade model developed above can be collapsed into a set of 
wheat price and quantity relatio~ships which can be used to derive a 
long run equilibrium for the system. This long run equilibrium will be 
the point of departure for analyzing the response of the American and 
world wheat markets to changes in supply and demand. The results will 
provide insights into the potential variation of prices and quantities 
of wheat for a given shift in supply or demand. 
The trade model estimated above can be reduced to price and 
quantity relationships by substituting the 1976 values (listed in 
Appendix C) for all the predetermined variables in the system except 
for the lagged u. s. and foreign wheat prices (PWusl and Pw' 1). The t- t-
result is the following set of equations and constant quantities for 
1976: 
u. s. Supply: 




u. S. Demand: 
co us 
t 
~ 33699 - 2679 PWUS 
FEUS = 13154 - 3325 PW~S 
t 
FOUS = 15299 
t 
SEUS 
t = 2599 
Foreign Supply: 
PDF ~ 339641 + 61.9 Pw!-l 
CIF = 44300 
Foreign Demand: 
= 54561 - 52 PW~ 
= 385557 - 182 p~ 
t 
These equations can be aggregated into one supply and one demand 
relationship for both the U. S. and the foreign sectors. 
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If this model has been correctly specified and accurately measured, 
the excess supply of the United States should equal the excess demand of 
the rest of the world which should equal the level of American wheat 
exports--all at 1976 prices. When 1976 prices (see Appendix C) were 
substituted into the excess supply function for the United States, 
excess supply was determined to be 25.7 million metric tons. This com-
pares favorably with actual U. S. wheat exports that year of 26.4 mil-
lion tons. Following the same procedure for the rest of the world, 
excess demand at prevailing world prices was found to be only 10.9 
million tons. Though this figure is far below the actual level of wheat 
imports from the United States, it is consistent with the balance sheet 
results of the previous chapter where it was determined that world 
domestic utilization of wheat had been understated. To compensate for 
this measurement error, the amount by which foreign estimated excess 
demand differs from U. S. exports--14747 thousand tons--is added to 




With this adjustment, a system of equations has been constructed 
which will provide a simple but reasonably realistic model of American 
wheat trade with the rest of the world. A major drawback of this 
model is that its solution, in general, represents only a short run 
equilibrium. In order to be able to analyze the impact of shifts in 
supply and/or demand schedules on wheat prices and exports, a long 
run equilibrium is desireable. Without it, the magnitude and even the 
direction of change that results from a given tshift in supply or demand 
may be obscured by underlying market forces which are causing short run 
equilibrium values to gravitate toward an unknown long run equilibrium. 
Short run equilibrium exists when the quantity supplied equals the 
quantity demanded at the prevailing market price for a given time 
period. Long run equilibrium further requires, ceteris paribus, that 
the quantity supplied equal the quantity demanded at the same market 
price in future periods (i.e. there is no desire or opportunity to 
move away from the established equilibrium prices and quantities). For 
the current model, this means that the price of wheat in the previous 
year (Wt-l) must equal the price of wheat in the current year (PWt). 
In addition, because prices are assumed to remain constant over time, 
there should be no incentive to build or deplete stocks. Hence, in 
long run equilibrium beginning and ending stocks must be equal. 
It is in this latter regard that adjustments need to be made. 
Since the large Russian wheat purchase of 1972, the United States and 
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the world have been rebuilding depleted stocks. In the model, projected 
U. S. carry-out at 1976 prices is 26 million metric tons--eight million 
tons greater than carry-in stocks. Similarly, world carry-out stocks, 
in 1976 were 47 million tons at prevailing prices compared with a 
carry-in of only 44.3 million tons. For long run equilibrium to exist, 
the carry-out equations must be adjusted so that they will be equal to 
the corresponding carry-in stocks at the long run equilibrium price. 
Since the long run equilibrium price is not known, both it and the 
carry-out equations must be determined in an iterative process. The 
first step in this process was to set carry-in stocks for the U. S. and 
the rest of the world at their mean values of 21.0 and 43.2 million tons. 
The intercepts on the carry-out equations are then adjusted downward 
so that, at 1976 prices, ending stocks will be equal to beginning stocks. 
The adjusted carry-out equations are: 
us co = 28.6- 2.7 PWUS t 
and 
COF = 50.7 .... .052 pw! 
The adjustment of these equations and of the carry-in stocks, of course, 
results in a shift of the corresponding aggregated demand and supply 
equation intercepts. 
Given these new demand and supply equations, it is possible to 
solve for a long run equilibrium by deleting the time subscripts on the 
wheat prices and setting United States' excess supply equal to the 
excess demand of the rest of the world. 
ESUS 
EQ 





68.2 - .296 Pr/ 
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Substituting in 
PWUS a .0456 + .0199 PWF, 
the system can be solved for a set of equilibrium prices. 
Since these prices still result in an accumulation of stocks, 
the intercepts of the two carry-out equations are again adjusted downward 
by the rate of stock accumulation and a new set of excess supply and 
excess demand equations are solved for the equilibrium prices of $126.78/ 
mt. at the world level and $2.57/bu. for the U. S. Since the results of 
this second iteration are very close to achieving a constant level of 
stocks, the equation intercepts are assumed to be at their long run 
equilibrium levels. 
The supply, demand, carry-out, excess supp1ly and excess demand 
equations for long run equilibrium are given in Table XXIV below and a 
graph of the equilibrium solution is shown in Figure 7. Observe that 
the one year excess supply and excess demand curves in Figure 7 are 
less elastic than their long run counterparts. This is because supply 
in the short run is assumed to be fixed at its equilibrium value. 
Therefore, any change in quantity in the short run will have to be made 
along the U. S. and foreign aggregate wheat demand schedules. In the 
long run, changes in both the quantity supplied and the quantity 
demanded will occur accounting for the greater elasticity of the long 
run functions. 
The long run equilibrium shown in Figure 7 as depicted by the 
equations in Table XXIV may never be observed in reality and may not 
be at precisely the right level. Yet it is still extremely valuable 
as a benchmark against which shifts in supply and demand can be mea-
sured and a starting point from which the dynamics of the international 
wheat market can be observed. 
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TABLE XXIV 
1976 ORIGINAL AND LONG Rill EQUILIBRIUM EQUATIONS 
1976 Long Run 
Dependent 1976 Original Eguations Egui1ibrium Eguations 
Variable Intercept PWU PWUS pw!:-1 PWF Intercept 
PWUS p~ 
t-1 t t 
SUP US 63.7 2.7 66.6 2.7 
crus 18.1 21.0 
PDUS 45.6 2.7 45.6 2.7 
DMDUS 64.8 -6.0 59.0 -6.0 
FOUS 15.3 15.3 
SEUS 2.6 2.6 
FEUS 13.2 -3.3 13.2 -3.3 
co us 33.7 -2.7 28.0 -2.7 
ESUS -1.1 2.7 6.0 7.5 8.7 
F 383.9 .062 382.8 .062 SUP 
CIF 44.3 43.2 
PDF 339.6 .062 339.6 .062 
DMDF 440.1 -.234 450.3 -.234 
COF 54.6 -.052 50.0 -.052 
DUF 385.6 -.182 400.3 -.182 
EDF 56.2 -.062 -.234 67.4 -.296 
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*Indicates price elasticity of supply equals zero for one year. 
Figure 7. 1976 Long Run Equilibrium 
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Long Run Equilibrium for the 1985 
World Wheat Market 
The primary value of the 1976 long run equilibrium is that it will 
serve as a basis for comparison for the 1985 projected long run equili-
brium. In this section, long run equilibrium conditions for the inter-
national wheat market for 1985 will be developed using the assumptions 
and techniques of this and the previous chapter. The results of this 
section will be comparable with the baseline projections of Chapter IV. 
The 1985 equations for the simultaneous model are derived using 
the 1985 values of the exogenous variables in Appendix C. In general, 
a 1972-1976 five year average was assumed for variables which showed no 
clear trend. Though carry-in (both foreign a~d U. S.) is a constant, 
it is adjusted upward using the product of its ratio to production in 
1976 and the projected 1985 production level. The determination of the 
initial values of the rest of the variables used in the 1985 model is 
F unambiguous except for total foreign wheat demand (DMD ). The location 
of this curve was established by adding the baseline projection of 
foreign demand for American wheat given a constant U. S. market share 
of 54 percent (from Table XXI, Chapter IV) to the projected foreign 
supply at the 1972-1976 average world wheat pri.ce of $163 per metric 
ton. 
Because the foreign demand curve is determined from the baseline 
estimates of Chapter IV in which the change in stocks was assumed to 
be zero, it is presumed to be in its long run equilibrium position. 
Likewise the foreign and U. S. supply functions are assumed to be in 
long run equilibrium but, as in the 1976 equilibrium, carry-out is not 
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equal to carry-in at the still undetermined long run equilibrium price. 
These variables will be determined through an iterative process which 
will adjust the intercepts of the carry-out functions so that they will 
equal their respective carry-in levels at some initial price (in this 
case, the average world or U. S. price for 1972-1976). The U. S. demand 
equation will be adjusted for the change in U. S. carry-out and the 
whole system will be solved for an equilibrium price. 1 If, at the new 
equilibrium price, beginning and ending stocks are still not equal, the 
carry-out intercepts are adjusted again along with the U. S. demand 
function and the system is solved for a new equilibrium price. The 
process continues until the change in stocks is close to zero. 
Beginning with a set of initial prices of $163/mt. at the world 
level and $3.24/bu. for the U. S., it took three iterations to solve 
for the 1985 long run equilibrium. The final set of equations is 
given in Table XXV. The final equilibrium prices--$126.15/mt. for 
the world and $2.56/bu. for the lJ. S.--are remarkably close to the 
1976 long run prices. These prices are in terms of 1976 dollars. Hence, 
with continued inflation, they could be expected to be much higher in 
1985. The quantities, however, are much higher. Equilibrium excess 
demand for American wheat in 1985 is projected to approach 40 million 
tons--an increase of about 33 percent over the 1976 long run equilibrium 
level. 
1rn the determination of the 1976 long run equilibrium, both U. S. 
and foreign demand would shift if the carry-out function shifted but 
for 1985, the foreign long run demand schedule has already been fixed. 
Hence when foreign carry-out shifts, the other compon.ent of foreign de-
mand--foreign domestic utilization (DUF)--must shift by an equal amount 
in the opposite direction. 
TABLE XXV 
1985 PROJECTED AND LONG RUN EQUILIBRIUM EQUATIONS 
1985 Equations 
Dependent Projected 1985 Eguations Adjusted for Long Run Eguilibrium 
Variables Intercept PWUS PWUS pw!-1 pif' Intercept 
PWUS pJ' 
t-1 t t 
SUP US 81.0 2.7 81.0 2.7 
crus 23.6 23.6 
PDUS 57.5 2.7 57.5 2.7 
DMDUS 65.5 -6.0 63.7 -6.0 
FOUS 17.8 17.8 
SEUS 2.8 2.8 
FEUS 12.6 -3.3 12.6 -3.3 
co us 32.3 -2.7 30.4 -2.7 
ESUS 15.6 2.7 6.0 17.4 8.7 
SUPF 428.6 .062 428.6 .062 
CIF 48.1 48.1 
PDF 380.5 .062 380.5 .062 
DMDF 505.6 -.234 505.6 -.234 
COF 56.6 -.052 54.7 -.052 




EDF 77.0 -.062 -.234 77 .o -.296 
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These results can be compared with the baseline projections in 
Table XXI. Of particular interest is the difference between the base-
line projections of the U. S. exports and the excess demand calculation 
of exports in the present model. The latter is ten million tons 
greater than the former. The reason. that the difference is as large 
as it is can be traced to the prices used in the two models. The 
baseline projections assume that wheat and other prices remain at 
their average level for the 1972-1976 period, $163 per metric ton 
for the world and $3.24 per bushel for the U. S. These prices contrast 
sharply with the 1985 long run equilibrium prices of $126 per metric 
ton and $2.56 per bushel. Though the foreign sector of the 1985 simul-
taneous equation model was constructed to mak~ excess demand equal to 
the constant market share baseline production of U. S. exports at 
1972-1976 average prices, the projected high level of American excess 
supply at those prices resulted in a much lower set of long run 
equilibrium prices and, hence, a higher level of exports. 
There is a strong possibility that should these long run equili-
brium conditions exist or threaten to exist in 1985, the United States 
and other major exporting governments might find the $2.56 price for a 
bushel of wheat to be unacceptable. These governments might then 
impose supply controls or strengthen the controls they already have 
which would result in higher world prices. 
An Increase in Long Run Equilibrium Supply 
Up to this point, the long run functions have been assumed to be 
fixed. It should be remembered, however, that the original balance 
sheet projections in Chapter IV predicted that India, Brazil and the 
People's Republic of China would become important exporters of wheat 
by 1985. The objective of this section is to determine the outcome 
should this or a similar set of events come to pass. 
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If the supply-demand balances for India, Brazil and China in 
Table XVII are added together, the total of 12.6 million tons can be 
used as a possible level of increase in long run world supply. This 
amount is added to the intercept term of the foreign long run supply 
function which in turn is used to form a new long run foreign excess 
demand function. Assume that this supply increase is purely a produc-
tion increase and let carry-in remain constant. Thus, after American 
excess supply is equated with the new foreign excess demand, the sys-
tem can be solved for a set of equilibrating prices. If these were 
long run equilibrium prices, carry-out would equal carry-in. In this 
case, the first set of prices resulted in an accumulation of stocks 
over the period. Therefore the carry-out intercepts were adjusted 
downward by an appropriate amount along with the aggregate demand 
schedule for the U. S. The foreign aggregate demand schedule was not 
adjusted because--as mentioned earlier--it is fixed based on balance 
sheet projections. 
When the adjusted system is solved for the equilibrating prices, 
beginning and ending stocks are nearly equal and the results are con-
sidered an equilibrium solution. The set of equations which make up 
this solution are given in Table XXVI. As expected, the increase in 
world supply lowers prices which increases the quantity of wheat 
demanded in both the U. S. and the rest of the world. The excess demand 
for U. S. exports, however, decreases. 
TABlE XXVI 
A 1985 LONG RtN EQUILIBRIUM FOR THE WORLD WHEAT MARKET ASSUMING 
A 12. 6 MILLI<N TOO INCREASE ABOVE BASELlNE PROJECTIONS 
Dependent 
PWUS PWF Variable Intercept Equilibrium Value 
SUP US 81.0 2.7 86.4 
crus 23.6 23.6 
DMDUS 62.2 -6.0 50.4 
co us 29.0 -2.7 23.8 
SUPF 441.2 .062 447.1 
CIF 48.1 48.1 
DMDF 505.6 -.234 483.1 
COF 53.2 -.052 48.2 
ESUS 18.8 8.7 35.9 
EDF 64.4 -.296 35.9 
a These values are determined using the new equilibrium 




This is shown more clearly in Figure 8. The original 1985 long run 
excess demand and excess supply curves are designated as EDr and ES~s 
respectively with an equilibrium price of 126.15 and a quantity exported 
of 39.7 million tons. An increase in world supplies of 12.6 million 
tons will shift the foreign excess demand function to the left causing 
a decrease in prices. At these lower prices, carry-out is greater than 
carry-in which means that United States' excess supply must adjust as 
carry-out is adjusted. A new long run equilibrium is achieved at a 
price of $96.22 per metric ton and a quantity exported of 35.9 million 
tons. 
The balance sheet projections of the previous chapter merely showed 
that given the entrance of India, Brazil and China as exporters into 
the world wheat market, United States' wheat e~ports could decline to a 
level of only 14.6 million tons assuming constant prices. The current 
model allows prices to vary simultaneously with the changes in quantities 
and thereby demonstrates that the percentage variation in prices is 
likely to be much greater than the percentage variation in exports. It 
also brings to light the imperfectly competitive nature of the market. 
Because the aggregate supply and demand curves are very inelastic, the 
entrance into the market of a new major exporter or a permanent increase 
in supply by a major wheat importer or established exporter is likely to 
severely depress prices. 
It was stated earlier that the geographic organization of a given 
shift in supply would have no effect on the model. Though this is true 
for the model itself, it is not necessarily true in the conduct of world 
trade--especially for this long run projected increase in world wheat 
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Figure 8. The Impact of a 12.6 Million Ton Increase in 
the Baseline Equilibrium on 1985 Prices 




a major exporter such as Canada. Canadianwheat is of a high quality; 
the export infrastructure is already in place; and Canada has a compara-
tive advantage in producing wheat. However, an increase by the same 
amount for a lesser exporter of wheat--particularly a new exporter such 
as India or China--would have a much smaller impact on the American 
share of the world market. It is conceivable that increases in supply 
behind tariff barriers within certain importing countries could also 
diminish American wheat exports and suppress prices but it is not 
likely to occur under the current policy framework in most of the major 
importing countries. 
In addition, there does not appear to be any single country capable 
of increasing wheat production by an additional 12.6 million tons except 
I 
the USSR. As pointed out in Chapter III, the weather conditions and the 
current farming practices in the Soviet Union make any large long term 
increase in wheat production beyond that already projected highly 
unlikely. 
CHAPTER VI 
IMPACTS OF WORLD SUPPLY INSTABILITY ON 
THE U. S. WHEAT ECONOMY IN 1985 
The simultaneous equation model developed in Chapter V was used to 
determine prices and quantities for a hypothetical 1985 long run equili-
brium. Though this set of results is instructive of future trends in 
world wheat demand and supply, it fails to consider the impact of short 
run variations in world supplies--an element which has caused wide 
gyrations in world wheat markets in the 1970's. This chapter will fill 
that void by using the model developed in Chapter V to look at the 
effect of short term changes in world supply on the United States and 
world markets in 1985. The analysis will emphasize the magnitude of 
the changes which result from a sharp increase or decrease in supply 
and the stability of the model as it returns to equilibrium. 
The simultaneous equation model is a classic case of what is known 
in the literature as a cobweb model. 1 A cobweb model results when 
demand is a function of the current period's price and supply is a 
function of the previous period's price. A change in price will bring 
an instant response on the demand side but only a lagged response on 
the supply side. Depending on the relative slopes of the supply and 
demand curves, the return to equilibrium following a disturbance can 
1 For a short discussion of a cobweb model, see Allen, 1970, pp. 1-6. 
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take one of three forms: a) the slope of the supply curve is greater 
than the absolute value of the slope of the demand curve, b) the slopes 
are equal, or c) the absolute value of the slope of the demand curve is 
greater than the slope of the supply curve. Any disturbance which 
results in disequilibrium will be followed by further movements away 
from equilibrium in (a) and by no movement either toward or away from 
equilibrium in (b). Only in (c) will the model be'stable and return to 
equilibrium. An initial disturbance in (c) will be followed by alternat-
ing high and low prices with each successive price closer to equilibrium 
in a pattern known as damped oscillation. An examination of the price 
coefficients on supply and demand for both the U. s. and foreign sectors 
shown in Tables XXIV and XXV of Chapter V, reveals that the cobweb 
stability condition is met in both cases. The stability condition is 
also met at the world trade level, that is, the price coefficient of 
United States' excess supply is less than the absolute value of the 
price coefficient of foreign excess demand. The stability of the model 
will be confirmed as the impact of short run changes in world supply 
is analyzed. 
Short Run Deviations from the 
Long Run Equilibrium 
In this section, short run decreases and increases in world supplies 
will be traced through the model to show the response of prices and 
export quantities to these supply changes. The procedure will be similar 
to that followed in the analysis of Scenarios I and II in Chapter IV 
except that the effect of the initial shocks will be carried out over a 
two year period to show how the system responds over time. 
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A Short Run Decrease in World Supplies 
Given the 1985 equilibrium shown in Table XXV, first assume (as in 
Scenario I of the Chapter IV) that there is a major crop shortfall 
totaling 33 million tons in a few of the world's important wheat producing 
countries. The impact of this crop shortfall upon U. S. wheat trade 
with the rest of the world is shown graphically in Figure 9. Initially, 
in frame 9-A, both long and short run equilibrium conditions exist in 
the world wheat market: 1) excess demand equals excess supply, 2) the 
world wheat price is equivalent to the U. S. wheat price plus transfer 
costs OT and 3) there is no incentive for producers or consumers to make 
production or consumption adjustments in subsequent years given their 
i 
current supply and demand schedules. Frame 9-B shows a departure from 
long run equilibrium in the form of a short run decrease in supply in 
the foreign sector. This increases excess demand for wheat which dictates 
an increase in prices. Since foreign and United States' supplies are 
fixed in the short run (having been determined by the previous year's 
price), short run equilibrium can only be attained by decreases in the 
quantity of wheat demanded on both markets. In practice the demand 
adjustments will be made in the areas of feed use and carry-out stocks. 
Users of wheat for feed will substitute other cheaper grains and holders 
of stocks will sell wheat believing that future wheat prices are likely 
to decline. 
Though a short run equilibrium is reached at price P2 in Figure 9-B, 
long run equilibrium does not exist because there is an incentive for 
producers to make adjustments in supply. Therefore, in the following 


























Figure 9. The Two Year Impact of a Single Year Shortfall in World Supply on Wheat Trade and Prices 
133 
quantity supplied to a level that is consistent with price P2• Assuming 
that the world crop shortfall was only a one year departure from the 
F long run supply function S , producers in the foreign sector in Figure 
9-C will harvest an amount of wheat consistent with short run supply 
f . . 
s3--a substantial increase over the previous year. Likewise, American 
producers will increase their quantity supplied from S~s us to s2 • The 
result is a short run increase in supply which causes the price to fall 
below the long run equilibrium level. Price P3 , however, is closer to 
the equilibrium price than was price P2 indicating that there will be a 
gradual but oscillating return to long run equilibrium. 
The process outlined in the graphical exposition can be traced more 
precisely using the set of equations from Table XXV. The U. S. and 
foreign aggregate supply and demand relationships can be substituted 
into: 
SUPUS - DMDUS = DMDF - [SUPF - 33000] 
in which the shortfall is added to excess demand on the right hand side. 
Assuming that the world wheat market is in long run equilibrium when 
this crop shortfall occurred, the supply functions will be determined by 
the long run equilibrium prices of $2.56/bu 
us 
(PWt_1) for the U. S. and 
F 
$126.15/mt (PWt-l) for the world. The relationship will therefore 
reduce to: 
24339 + 6004 PW~S = 102194 - 234.3 PW! 
US F Substituting PWt m .0456 + .0199 PW into the United States' excess 




Table XXVII shows the effect of a shortfall on world wheat market 
prices and quantities over a period of two years for 1985. The 1976 
values are also given as a basis for comparison. The initial impact of 
the shortfall is to cause a sharp increase in prices (from $126 to $229 
a metric ton on the world level) and to sharply reduce U. S. and world 
2 demand for wheat. 
In the United States, these changes are viewed as a shift in export 
demand. As shown in the table, only a portion of the total change in 
world supply is translated into a change in U. S. exports because the 
resulting change in prices will bring about changes in the quantity of 
wheat demanded for both the United States and the rest of the world. 
The 33 million ton world supply shortfall will ,increase American wheat 
exports by 8.9 million tons in the year of the shortfall. The additional 
U. S. exports are obtained from a decrease in feed use (3.3 mmt) and a 
3 decrease in normal carry-out stocks (5.5 mmt). The other 24.1 million 
tons of the shortfall is made up by decreases in world consumption of 
wheat (18.6 mmt) and a decrease in world stocks (5.4 mmt). Presumably, 
the largest part of the decrease in stocks from the rest of the world 
would come from the other major world wheat exporters as they increase 
exports to meet the demand. 
In keeping with the assumption of fixed supply in the short run, all 
the adjustments to the 33 million ton world supply shortfall in the first 
year are made on the demand side. In the second year, the production of 
2At prices above $3.55 per bushel in 1985 and $3.72 per bushel in 
1976, American feed use of wheat (FEUS) is assumed to become price 
inelastic at a level of 800 thousand metric tons--the minimum amount of 
wheat used for feed over the 17 year study period. 
3 Due to round-off error, the sum of the elements may not equal the 
total in some cases. 
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TABLE XXVII 
A SHORT RUN DECREASE IN WORLD SUPPLY OF 33 MILLION METRIC TONS 
1985 1976 
Equili- First Second Equili-' First Second 
Units brium Year Year brium Year Year 
SUP US mmt 88.0 88.0 88.1 73.5 73.5 73.8 
crus mmt 23.6 23.6 18.1 21.0 21.0 15.8 
. PDUS mmt 64.4 64.4 70.0 52.5 52.5 58.0 
DMDUS mmt 48.3 39.5 48.7 43.7 34.5 45.8 
FOUS mmt 17.8 15.3 
ffi us mmt 2.8 20.8 20.8 2.6 17.9 17.9 
FEUS mmt 4.1 .8 4.3 4.6 .8 5.8 
co us mmt 23.6 18.1 23.7 21.1 15.8 22.1 
EXUS(=EDF) mmt 39.7 48.6 39.4 29.9 39.1 27.9 
PWUS $/bu. 2.56 4.60 2.50 2.57 4.59 2.20 
SUPF mmt 436.4 403.4 442.7 390.7 357.7 391.8 
CIF mmt 48.1 48.1 42.7 43.2 43.2 38.0 
PDF mmt 388.3 355.3 400.0 347.5 341.6 353.8 
DMDF mmt 476.0 452.0 476.7 420.6 396.8 424.9 
COF mmt 48.1 42.7 48.2 43.3 38.0 44.3 
DUF mrnt 427.9 409.3 428.5 377.3 358.8 380.6 
PWF $/mt. 126.15 228.86 123.11 126.78 228.36 108.26 
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wheat in the United States and abroad increases in response to the 
previous year's high prices. U.s. production increases by 5.6 million 
tons while foreign producers recover from the previous year's disasterous 
crop and push their output to 11.7 million tons above equilibrium. 
Under normal circumstances, this qig an increase in world production 
would cause prices to drop sharply below equilibrium but the rebuilding 
of depleted stocks absorbs most of additional output. As a result, the 
U. S. price is only seven cents below its' equilibrium level (though it 
is less than half of what it was only one year earlier). 
Observe that the change in U. S. carry-out stocks is the same as 
the change in stocks for the rest of the world. This indicates the 
importance of the United States as the world'slmajor wheat reserve and 
as the primary wheat exporter. 
The variation in American exports follows closely the variation in 
prices. The abnormally high level of exports in the first year when the 
shortfall occurred are succeeded by exports below equilibrium in the 
second year as foreign countries are able to meet more of their needs 
for wheat from within or from more proximate sources. Though exports 
are lower, the lower prices make American wheat consumption as feed more 
attractive. The additional feed use and the accumulation of stocks 
partly make up for the fall in export demand but only at lower prices. 
A Short Run Increase in World Supplies 
The effects of extremely good crops in a few of the major world 
wheat producers can also be traced using the same technique and are 
shown in Table XXIII. Beginning with a state of long run equilibrium, 
assume--as in Chapter IV--that world wheat production is 25 million 
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TABLE XXVIII 
A SHORT RUN INCREASE IN WORLD SUPPLY OF 25 MILLICN METRIC TONS 
1985 1976 
Equili- First Second Equili- First Second 
Units brium Year Year brium Year Year 
SUP US nunt 88.0 87.9 87.9 73.5 73.5 73.5 
crus nnnt 23.6 23.6 27.4 21.0 21.0 24.9 
PDUS mmt 64.4 64.4 60.5 52.5 52.5 48.7 
DMDUS nnnt 48.3 56.7 48.1 43.7 52.1 42.3 
FOUS nunt 17.8 20.6 20.6 15.3 17.9 17.9 
SEUS mmt 2.8 2.6 
FEUS mmt 4.1 8.8 4.0 4.6 9.3 3.8 
co us mmt 23.6 27.4 23.5 21.1 24.9 20.5 
EXUS(•EDF) nunt 39.7 31.2 39.9 29.9 21.5 31.5 
PWUS $/bu. 2.56 1.15 2.59 2.57 1.15 2.59 
SUPF mmt 436.4 461.4 435.7 390.7 415.7 390.2 
CIF mmt 48.1 48.1 51.8 43.2 43.2 47.0 
PDF nnnt 388.3 413.3 383.9 347.5 372.5 343.2 
DMDF mmt 476.0 492.6 475.6 420.6 437.1 420.2 
COF nnnt 48.1 51.8 48.0 43.3 47.0 43.3 
DUF $/mt. 427.9 427.9 427.6 377.3 390.1 376.9 
p~ $/mt. 126.15 55.40 128.11 126.78 56.11 127.99 
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tons above normal. Foreign excess demand for American wheat will 
decline (a shift of the excess demand curve) forcing prices down. The 
lower prices will stimulate an increase in the quantity of wheat demanded 
(a movement along both the excess supply and excess demand curves) and, 
at some price below long run equilibrium, short run excess demand will 
be equated with short run excess supply. 
For the United States, the world supply increase causes exports to 
fall by 8.5 million tons as the price of wheat drops to $1.15 per bushel. 
American feed use of wheat more than doubles as carry-out increases by 
3.8 million tons. Consumption of wheat in the rest of the world increases 
with the lower prices and foreign wheat stocks rise to 3.7 million tons 
above equilibrium at the end of the year. Again, the change in American 
wheat stocks is comparable to the total change,in stocks for the rest of 
the world. 
There is one important difference between the shortfall and the 
increase in world supplies in the second year: the return to equilibrium 
is slower in the case of the world supply shortfall than for the case 
of the extra-large world wheat crop. This results because the feed use 
of wheat in the United States is restricted on the downside to a minimum 
of 800 thousand tons. Without this restriction, feed use would take on 
negative values at very high prices. 
The Impact of Model Assumptions on 
Price Variability 
The simultaneous equation model developed in Chapter V is a very 
useful analytical tool for determining the j o:f.nt response of the 
international and American wheat markets to short term shifts in 
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important variables. Yet this model, like any other, is a mathematical 
abstraction of reality. For values in the neighborhood of the equilibrium 
prices and quantities, it may be a fairly accurate abstraction but as 
the deviations from equilibrium become greater and greater, forces which 
were not important in the estimation of the model may become very signifi-
cant. 
It is apparent from Tables XXVII and XXVIII that there is a high degree 
of variability present in the world wheat market. A decrease in supply 
of seven percent (33 mmt) in 1985 can cause prices to increase by nearly 
80 percent while a five percent increase in supply (25 mmt) will result 
in a 55 percent decline in prices. It is therefore worthwhile to identify 
some of the forces which lay outside explicit specifications of the model 
but which are likely to have a significant impact.on the actual level of 
wheat quantity and price variability. These forces will be divided into 
two sections--those which account for greater price variability than has 
shown up in the model and those which will result in a smaller range of 
price variations than specified in the model. 
Forces Which Increase Price Variability 
Primary among the forces which are likely to account for greater 
world price variability are attempts by governments to thwart the opera-
tion of the internal price system. The policies vary from price supports 
to increase producers' income in major producing countries to price 
ceilings to insure a cheap food supply in some developing countries. 
Many of these policies have been implicitly included in the model 
already since they have influenced the actual levels of supply and demand 
from which the model was estimated. Yet a wide departure from normal 
market conditions, will catalyze a number of new policy responses. 
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For example, the major exporters--particularly the United States, 
Canada, and Australia--all have policies designed to prevent prices 
from falling below a set minimum level. Given a 25 million ton increase 
in world supplies, these policies would take effect. By supporting a 
minimum level of prices, these governments encourage a greater accumula-
tion of stocks than would occur under the "normal" conditions shown in 
Table XXVIII. In addition, the minimum prices will also prevent pro-
ducers from decreasing production by a sufficient amount in the first 
year which means that the return to equilibrium will take longer. 
Producers will also have to accept lower than equilibrium prices in the 
second year in order to allow the market to clear the additional supplies 
which have resulted from government price supports. 
Likewise, for a sharp decrease in world supplies, the policy 
response of some countries might be to impose an embargo on wheat exports 
as the EEC did in 1973. This policy would further increase the price 
of wheat and shift a greater proportion of the burden of the shortfall 
onto the exporting countries without embargoes. 
It would be possible to assume the activation of some of these 
policy responses for wide variations in world wheat prices as part of 
the model, but the exact nature of these policies cannot be known. 
Without going through the mechanics of imposing restrictions on the 
model and deriving the impact of a supply shift, it is possible to see 
that any effective attempt to inhibit the functioning of the price 
system by any one country will prolong the return to equilibrium and 
increase the level of variability for the other market participants. 
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A second set of -facto-rs which may result in greater price variability 
than that predicted by the model are the physical limitations of the world 
wheat marketing system. A major crop failure in one part of the world, 
for example, may heavily tax the shipping and terminal capacity of the 
countries involved. Transportation costs may increase sharply resulting 
in a very large price difference between exporting and importing regions. 
Producer prices in major exporting countries will not increase as rapidly 
as they do in the model which will delay the supply response and lengthen 
the time required to return to equilibrium. 
In the same way, a large crop in a major producing country may 
result in extremely low wheat prices in that country for a longer period 
of time than implicitly assumed in the model b~cause the surplus cannot 
be exported or consumed quickly. Inadequate storage facilities may limit 
the amount of carry-over stocks which--as specified in the statistical 
model--have been a key element in bringing a rapid return to equilibrium. 
Finally, even if the marketing system did not have any capacity or 
transportation limitations, it is not likely that the economic agents in 
the system--consumers, wholesalers, producers, feed users, and others--
could all respond to major price changes as rapidly as portrayed in the 
model. In other words, the demand and supply curves probably tend to 
become much more price inelastic in the short run for large price 
movements. This tendency alone will prolong the return to equilibrium 
and widen the variation in prices. 
Forces Which Tend to Diminish Price 
Variability 
There are at least two major reasons the model may understate the 
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true magnitude of price variability for large shifts in world supply. 
The first is the assumption that the prices of wheat substitutes in con-
sumption and production remain constant. As with a number of other 
assumptions, this one is valid for wheat prices near equilibrium but as 
prices begin to deviate by large amounts, price changes will spread out 
to other grains and foodstuffs. 
If, as shown in Table XXVII, the price of wheat were to rise 
sharply because of a major wheat crop failure, the full force of the 
shortfall would be cushioned by the substitution of rice, coarse grains, 
potatoes and other foods for wheat by the worlds' populations. Likewise, 
an extra large world wheat crop would result in the substitution of 
wheat for other grains, particularly in feed use, thus transmitting 
some of the impetus for a wheat price decline to those grains. 
Of course wheat prices are also a function of the supplies of other 
grains. A major change in the supply of rice irt Asia, for example, will 
have a direct impact on wheat exports and prices. Hence ~o a certain 
extent, wheat price variability is also increased as a result of wheat's 
substitutability. Yet unless there are concurrent disruptions in a 
number of grain markets, the frequency of wheat price fluctuations may 
increase but the magnitude of those fluctuations should be lessened by 
the interaction of the various grain markets. 
A final abstraction which tends to overstate the variability of the 
model is the assumption of fixed short run supply. With different 
harvest times for different !attitudes, only a certain percentage of the 
world wheat supply is fixed at any given time of the year. For this 
reason, total world wheat supplies are never perfectly inelastic for a 
year's time. 
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If the forces which contribute to price variability were weighed 
against those which diminish it, the former would appear to be more 
dominant. Rigidities in the marketing system and the reluctance of 
policy-makers to accept the consequences of extremely low or extremely 
high prices would tend to cancel out the market forces which might 
help dissipate major price movements over other grains. Hence, the 
simultaneous equation model which has been used in this and the previous 
chapter to show how small changes in supplies will result very wide 
price movements, probably understates the full impact on prices. 
Model Conclusions 
The simultaneous equation model estimated and discussed in these 
last two chapters has provided an insight into 1the economic framework 
within which American wheat is exchanged on international markets. 
Though this model may have oversimplified a very intricate and compli-
cated system of trade patterns and economic relationships, the basic 
conclusions should remain intact even with the use of more sophisticated 
models and techniques. These conclusions are: 1) small percentage 
changes in supply can have a very large impact on prices; 2) given a 
short term change in supply, the return to equilibrium, ceteris paribus, 
will occur very rapidly; and 3) more than any other single country, 
the supplies, exports and carry-over stocks of the United States are 
essential in providing a measure of stability in international wheat 
trade. 
CHAPTER VII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Summary 
The central purpose of this study was to analyze the supply and 
demand relationships in the world wheat market and to develop models to 
assist inforecasting the future price of American wheat. This was 
accomplished by first dividing the world into major importing and 
exporting countries and regions. For the 12 countries chosen for 
individual analysis, data were collected and balance sheet estimates 
were made of their production, feed use, food use, and seed use of wheat. 
The Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China merited a balance 
sheet analysis, but the data were not available. Instead, only aggre-
gate production and domestic utilization functions were estimated for 
these two countries. The other countries of the world were combined into 
six regional groupings for which production and utilization relationships 
were also estimated. 
Next, projected 1985 values for the independent variables in each of 
the country and region equations were used to obtain 1985 projections for 
all of the supply and demand relationships. In general, variables such 
as income or population were trended out to 1985. For variables such as 
prices, a 1972-1976 five year average was usually used. 
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The balance sheet projections for the 12 individual countries were 
then aggregated into production and domestic utilization and the 
difference between these two relationships (for both countries and 
regions) was used as an estimate of a particular country's or region's 
net import demand. The sum of these net import demands, excluding the 
United States, provided an estimate of the excess demand for American 
wheat exports. 
Two alternative excess demands were considered. The first assumed 
that current trends in Brazil, India and China would continue and that 
each would be important wheat exporters in 1985. The second more plaus-
ible alternative--denoted as the "baseline" projection--assumed that 
these three countries would become self-suffic~ent in wheat by 1985 but 
would not become wheat exporters. Possible short run deviations from 
the baseline, based on study period data, were examined in Scenarios I 
and II as a way of illustrating the relative extremes in export demand 
for U. S. wheat. Wide variations were shown to be possible but the 
influence on prices was not explicitly determined. 
To remedy this lack of price and quantity interaction, a simultaneous 
equation model was developed in which the wheat economy of the United 
States was linked to the wheat economy of the rest of the world. The 
components of the U. S. sector of the model were projected out to 1985 
while the baseline projections developed previously were used in the 
rest of the world or foreign sector. After the model was collapsed into 
simple price-quantity relationships (by fixing the values of nonprice 
independent variables) and after adjustments were made in the carry-out 
functions, a 1985 long run equilibrium was determined. An alternative 
long run equilibrium was developed to take account of the possible 
emergence of Brazil, India and China as exporters of wheat. 
The baseline 1985 long run equilibrium pointed to an increase in 
American wheat exports but at a price of about $2.56 per bushel in 
146 
1976 dollars. If world supplies increase by 12.6 million tons as a 
result of Brazil, India and China entering the wheat export market, 
American wheat exports would be ten percent less than the baseline pro-
jections while prices would drop to $1.96 per bushel. 
The interaction of prices and quantities in the United States and 
the rest of the world was even more apparent in the analysis the impact 
of short run shifts in world wheat production. A comparative statics 
approach was used to demonstrate the effect of a 33 million metric ton 
decrease and a 25 million ton increase in world supplies. These changes 
in supplies corresponded to the maximum deviations to occur on either 
side of the aggregated predicted levels. of world production during the 
1960-1976 study period and they are the same deviations posited in 
Scenarios I and II. 
The model showed that a shortfall in world production would cause 
U. S. prices in 1976 dollars to rise to $4.60 a bushel and that a world 
bumper crop would depress prices to $1.15 a bushel in 1976 dollars. In 
both cases the return to equilibrium was rapid with prices only slightly 
below or above the long run equilibrium level in the year following the 
initial change. 
Conclusions 
In the major findings of this study, a number of significant trends 
and relationships have been revealed and quantified. Through the use of 
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the geographic and balance sheet breakdowns it was determined that 
Europe was a shrinking market for U. S. wheat exports. The Common 
Agricultural Policy of the EEC has closed Community wheat markets to 
competition from abroad (except for some qualities of wheat not produced 
in the EEC) and stimulated production to the extent that the area is 
projected to have a surplus of six million tons by 1985~ 
The developing countries and regions, on the other hand, were 
projected to be expanding markets for wheat exports. Egypt, the Rest 
of Africa, the Rest of Asia, and the Rest of Latin America had especially 
fast growing markets spurred by increasing incomes, population and 
urbanization. 
There were three notable exceptions among the developing countries: 
Brazil, India and the People's Republic of China. In each of these 
countries, production on the basis of current and past trends was pro-
jected to outstrip demand by 1985. For Brazil and India, these produc-
tion increases are the result of government agricultural policies and 
the introduction of new high-yielding wheat varieties suitable to the 
region. For the People's Republic of China, little is known about the 
factors which affect Chinese wheat consumption and production. 
The three major exporting countries excluding the United States--
Argentina, Australia and Canada--were projected to have very little 
change in their exportable surplus between 1976 and 1985. The govern-
ments of Australia and Canada, especially, have policies designed to 
restrict production in the event of a build up of wheat inventories. 
Given the projected long run equilibrium price of $2.56 per bushel, it 
is not likely that these countries will have the incentive to sharply 
expand their wheat output. 
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One of the most significant and perhaps the most expected result of 
this study was the pivotal role of the Soviet Union in the international 
~heat market. As the world's largest producer of wheat, the effects of 
Russian agricultural policies and variable yields can have a very large 
impact on world demand and supply. 
The simultaneous equation model which was developed to measure the 
interaction between the United States wheat economy and the international 
market quantified many relationships which were understood but not 
clearly defined. The projection and construction of the 1985 long run 
equilibrium shows an increase in United States' wheat exports with 
almost no change in prices. 
The model's most important findings, however, were in the area of 
the impact of short run changes in supply on the world and U. S. wheat 
markets. Wide variations in prices resulted from relatively small 
shifts in world supply. If the model is an accurate representation of 
the dynamics of the world wheat market, these price variations should be 
short-lived. In the year following the initial shock, prices were 
shown to have almost returned to equilibrium, given no restrictions on 
the estimated market relationships. 
This model illustrated the central role of the United States in 
providing stability to world wheat markets. The variations in carry-out 
stocks were the key to a quick return to equilibrium since the change in 
American stocks equalled the change in stocks for the rest of the world 
combined. To provide this stability to world wheat markets, the model 
assumes that the United States is willing to accept wide variations in 
prices, stocks, feed use, and exports. For a certain range of price 
variations, this may be a valid assumption, but for the extreme deviations 
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depicted in Chapter VI, American policy makers are likely to take action 
to mitigate the effects on producers and/or consumers. 
Limitations and Need for Further Study 
This study suffers from a number of limitations and shortcomings, 
some of which could not be avoided. Primary among these was the failure 
to adequately explain and predict the future trends in wheat production 
and utilization in the USSR and the People's Republic of China. This 
shortcoming is not unique to this study but since 1972 (and earlier) has 
been the concern of researchers and policy makers alike. Any method or 
information which will improve the forecasts of the wheat export demands 
of these two Communist countries would be of g~eat value in improving the 
forecast of world wheat prices. 
A second major shortcoming of the study is that the simultaneous 
equation model does not anticipate major policy changes in important 
importing or exporting countries in response to wide price variations. 
As a result, world wheat markets are portrayed as being much more stable 
and price responsive that they really are. Without much difficulty, a 
few hypothesized policy responses could be easily incorporated into the 
model and the impact on prices and trade could be determined, but it. 
would be difficult to incorporate all the restrictions likely to occur. 
The model, as mentioned in the previous chapter, also ignores the 
substitutability of wheat for other food and feed grains. It would have 
been desirable to link the wheat, rice, and feed grain economies of all 
the countries and regions of the world into one large grain model had 
time and resources permitted. 
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In addition, the study of the influence of different crop harvest 
times on the marketing of wheat is still a valid endeavor if and when 
quarterly data should become available. This type of study could reveal 
very important insights into the comparative advantage of southern hemi-
sphere wheat exporters relative to northern hemisphere exporters. 
Finally and, perhaps, most significant, this study does not estimate 
or predict trade flows. An increase in world export demand may or may 
not be advantageous to the United States. The ability of U. S. wheat to 
compete with the wheat of the other major exporters has not been analyzed 
explicitly. Implicitly, it is included in the simultaneous equation 
model as an increase in demand for American exports resulting from aggre-
gate world supply shift but quality differences, geographic location and 
harvest year can play an important role in determining which exporting 
country will benefit from an increase in demand in a given importing country. 
An analysis of future wheat trade flow patterns would help clarify the 
structure of the world wheat market and define the competitive relation-
ship of the major exporters. 
At the beginning of this study the question was asked whether the 
price movements on the world wheat market since 1972 reflected a funda-
mental change in institutions or economic relationships or whether the 
price fluctuations were merely the result of short term aberrations in 
the market. This question has not been addressed directly but it 
appears--given the projections and the analysis of the variations in 
the world market--that the evidence weighs more heavily on the side of 
short term aberrations. The models developed have shown that trends 
are currently present which will bring about a long term equilibrium 
price which will be well below the high prices of 1973 and 1974. They 
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have also shown that short term aberrations in world supplies can cause 
the disruptions similar to those experienced on world grain markets in 
the first half of the seventies. By allowing for a few rigidities in 
the pricing and marketing system, it is not surprising that a one year 
supply shortfall could sustain higher wheat prices over two or three 
years. 
Much has been learned about the atmosphere in which world wheat 
commerce is conducted. It is hoped that the analysis developed in this 
study will provide a foundation for future study of the United States' 
role in the world wheat economy. 
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DEFINITION OF VARIABLES USED IN THE ESTIMATION 
OF THE BALANCE SHEET EQUATIONS OF CHAPTER III 
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DEFINITION OF BALANCE SHEET VARIABLES 
Dependent Variable Prefixes, Definitions and Units 
DU-
HH- YLD- PDN- FOOD- FEED- SEED- Domestic 
~fueat Hectares Wheat Wheat Food Use Feed Use Seed Use Utilization 
Country Harvested Yields Production of Wheat of Wheat of Wheat of Wheat 
Country Suffix 1000 ha mt/ha 1000 mt 1000 mt 1000 mt 1000 mt 1000 mt 
Germany -G HHG YLDG PDNG FOODG FEEDG SEEDG 
Italy -I HHI YLDI PDNI FOOD I FEED I SEED I 
Netherlands -N HHN YLDN PDNN FOODN FEEDN SEEDN 
France -F HHF YLDF PDNF FOODF FEEDF SEEDF 
United Kingdom -UK HHUK. YLDUK PDNUK FOOD UK FEED UK SEED UK 
Rest of Western 
Europe -RWEU PDNRWEU DURWEU 
Egypt -E HHE YLDE PDNE FOODE FEEDE SEEDE 
Rest of Africa -RAF PDNRAF DURAF 
India -IN HHIN YLDIN PDNIN FOOD IN FEED IN SEED IN 
Japan -J HHJ YLDJ PDNJ FOODJ FEEDJ SEEDJ 
Rest of Asia -RAS PDNRAS DURAS 
Brazil -B HHB YLDB PDNB FOODB FEEDB SEEDB 
Argentina -AR HHAR YLDAR PDNAR FOODAR FEEDAR SEEDAR 
Rest of Latin 
America -RSA PDNRSA DURSA 
Canada -c HHC YLDC PDNC FOODC FEEDC SEEDC 
Australia -AU HHAU YLDAU PDNAU FOODAU FEED AU SEEDAU 
Rest of Oceania -ROC PDNROC DUROC 
USSR -CCP PDNCCP DUCCP 
People's Republic 
of China -PRC PDNPRC DUPRC 






















DEFINITION OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Definition 
Trend--Last two digits of the year. 
Dummy variables = 1 from 1967-1976 (Period of the 
Common Agricultural Policy) 
= 0 otherwise 
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Dummy slopea = YR from 1967-1976 (Period of the CAP) 
= 0 otherwise 
Deflated producer price of wheat in Germany, marcs/mt 
Dummy variable = 1 from 1974-1976 (Period following 
discontinuation of the EEC denaturing 
premium) 
= 0 otherwise 
Dummy slope = YR from 1974-1976 (Period following 
discontinuation of the EEC denaturing 
premium) 
= 0 otherwise 
Ratio of producer price of wheat to produ~er price of 
corn, Italy 
Population of Italy, millions 
Dummy variable = 1 from 1967-1973 (Period of EEC 
· denaturing premium) 
= 0 otherwise 
Dummy slope = YR from 1967-1973 (Period of EEC 
denaturing premium) 
= 0 otherwise 
Dummy variable = 1 from 1971-1976 (Period of UK 
adoption of CAP) 
= 0 otherwise 
Dummy slope = YR from 1971-1976 (Period of UK adoption 
of the CAP) 
= 0 otherwise 
Dummy variable = 1 for 1973 (Year of EEC embargo on 
wheat exports) 
= 0 otherwise 
Lagged deflated producer price of wheat, Egypt, 
piasters/mt 
Dummy variable = 1 for 1969-1976 (Period of a new 
wheat pricing policy) 
= 0 otherwise 
Dummy slope = YR for 1969-1976 (Period of a new wheat 
pricing policy) 
= 0 otherwise 
Dummy variable z 1 from 1968-1976 (Period of green 
revolution and a new Indian agricul-
tural policy) 
0 otherwise 
Dummy slope YR from 1968-1976 (Period of green 
revolution and a new Indian agricul-
tural policy) 





























Deflated wholesale price of wheat, India, rupees/rot, 
January/December crop year 
Same as DWPLCIN2 but lagged one year. 
Deflated producer price of rice, Japan, 1000 yen/mt 
Deflated average wheat import price, lagged one year 
and adjusted for changes in the U. S. exchange rate, 
Japan, yen/mt 
Dummy variableb = 1 from 1967-1976 (Period of new 
Brazilian agricultural policy) 
0 otherwise 
Dummy slopeb = YR from 1967-1976 (Period of new 
Brazilian agricultural policy) 
= 0 otherwise 
Deflated producer price of wheat, Brazil, cruz/60 kg 
Same as DPPLCB but lagged one year 
Real per capita income, Brazil, cruz/person 
Dummy variable = 1 in 1963, 1964 and 1976 (Good 
weather years, Argentina) 
= 0 otherwise 
Population, Argentina, milltons 
Ratio of wheat price lagged one year to corn price, 
Argentina 
Deflated producer price of wheat, Canada, Canadian 
$/mt 
Dummy variablec 1 in 1970 (Year of Operation LIFT) 
= 0 otherwise 
Hectares harvested lagged one year, Canada, 1000 ha 
Real per capita income, Canada, 1975 Canadian $ per 
person 
Seed use of wheat lagged one year, Canada, 1000 mt 
Dummy variable = 1 in 1969 (Year prior to Operation 
LIFT) 
"" 0 otherwise 
Hectares harvested lagged one year, Australia, 
1000 ha d 
Dummy variable = 1 in 1970 (Year of effective 
Australian production quotas on 
wheat) 
= 0 otherwise 
Deflated producer price of faq wheat, Australia, 
US $/mt 
Real per capita income, Australia, Australian $/pers·on 
Ratio of producer wheat price to barley export price, 
Australia 
Dummy variable = 1 in 1965, 1967 and 1972 (Bad weather 
years, Australia) 
= 0 otherwise 
a Definition applies only to Western European country and regional 
equations. 
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b Definition applies only to Brazil. 
cDefinition applies only to Canada. 
d Definition applies only to Australia. 
APPENDIX B 
BALANCE SHEETS FOR COUNTRIES AND 
REGIONS OF THE WORLD 
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8ALANCI! ~ETZ tiii!ST c;eRJIAtcy u:as FRIDAY• oecett.• ., •. ''" I 
CBS CIG PONG SUP4i ~ODfi FI!ED4i SEED4i DMDG IIALG II!IP4i EJlPG COG YR1 ERG 
l 2322 4964 7286 3940 1603 237 5780 1506 2204 825 2737 60 -148 
z 2737 4039 6776 3876 1834 272 5982 794 3515 1179 3019 61 111 
3 3019 4591 7610 ~1!20 1619 241 5680 1930 1870 629 3021 62 1!50 
• 3021 4855 7876 3771 - 1755 245 5771 2105 1889 1156 2723 63 115 
5 2723 5046 7769 3794 1663 242 !5699 2070 1484 656 2770 64 128 
6 2770 4349 7119 3833 1603 235 5671 1448 1623 659 2316 65 SE 
7 2316 6534 6850 3723 1704 c40 5667 1183 1551 627 2185 66 -78 
8 2185 5819 8004 3707 2191 248 6146 18!58 1835 566 2488 67 63'i 
9 2488 6197 861!5 3680 2632 254 6566 2119 2543 765 3578 68 319 
10 3578 6001 9579 3560 3418 2!58 7236 2343 1802 2216 - 1616 69 313 u.- 1616 5661 7277 3489 30!59 258 6806 471 2539 913 1809 70 288 
12 1809 7141 8950 3572 3024 286 6882 2068 2737 898 2658 71 : 1249 
13 2658 6608 9266 3769 3715 266 7750 1516 2767 1186 2312 72 785 
14 2312 7134 9446 3694 :3129 288 7111 2335 use 1182 2433 73 978 
15 2433 7724 10157 3753 2259 283 629!5 3862 -1446 1156 2992 74 1160 
16 2992 7014 10006 3743 3053 308 7104 2902 1676 - 1521 2789 75 268 
17 2789 6701 9490 3764 31fi0 z.s• 7208 2282 1418 1::186 . - 76 -· 
BALANCE St-EI!TI ITALY 22:25 FRIDAy• OECENSI!R .,. 1979 a 
oes YR Cll PONI SUP I FOOD I FEED I SEED I ONDI BALl IMP I EXPI COl YR1 EAl 
I 60 860 6804 71!64 7'i~O 120 777 8!47 -1183" 2370 67 1000 60 120 
2 61 1000 8301 9301 8175 70 738 8983 318 902 129 1060 61 31 
3 62 1060 9496 1C:558 8232 75 779 9086 1472 276 191 1535 62 22 
4 63 1535 9127 9662 8406 65 751 9222 440 485 213 751 63 -39 
5 64 751 8586 9337 8475 74 755 9304 33 712 270 400 ... 75 
6 6!5 400 9776 10176 1!648 96 736 9480 696 1046 409 1200 65 133 
7 66 1200 9400 10600 8668 90 746 9504 1096 1031 771 U60 66 •196 
a 67 1160 9596 10756 8300 100 700 9100 - 1656 941 219 1096 67 1282 
9 68 1096 9655 10751 9134 264 720 I 0118 633 1574 400 1631 68 176 
10 69 1631 9585 11216 8870 270 736 9876 - 1340 1290 586 1318 69 726 
11 70 1318 9689 11007 84!54 149 720 9323 1684 1440 763 - 1074 70 - 1287. 
12 71. 1074. 9994 11068 9612 355 6E4 10651 417 1379 594 - 1104 71 98 
13 72 1104 9421 10~2!5 9334 200 645 10179 346 . 1211 693 375 72 489-
14 73 375 8920 92'i5 9713 400 6415 10758 -1463 3088 :316 1281 73 28 
15 74- 1281 9690 10971 9180 350 620 10150 821 -1636 459 1211 74 7&7 1-' 
16 -75 uu 9480 10691 9300 300 710 10310 381 ·1910 636 1444 75 au 0\ Vl 
17 7. 1444· 9133 10577 aaoo 100 614· 9584 993 2428 830 •· 76 • 
IIAL.ANCI! ShEET: NETHERLANDS az:as I"RlOAYe DI!CEM8ER 7 • 19'19 ~ 
.. s YR CIN PoNN SUPN FOCDN FEEDtt SEEDH OMDN IIJII..N JMPN EXPN CoN YR ERN 
1 60 lU 591 732 1072 358 . 19 1449 -717 940 12 143 60 68 
2 61 143 482 625 - 1099 479 20 1598 -973 . 1360 12 272 61 103 
3 62 272 604 E76 1027 170 -19 1216 -340 544 21 123 62 60 
• 63 123 536 659 1043 : 128 23 -1194 -535 795 51 172 63 37 
5 64 172 738 910 . 1007 96 24 1127 -217 710 304 - 165 64 24 
6 65 165 691. 1:56 . 1000 47 25 1072 -216 740 186 251 65 87 
7 66 251 596 847 998 81 26 uos -258 6U 141 ·tao 6E 32 
8 67 180 740 920 954 46 26 1026 -106 94-2 371 88 67 377 
9 6S 88 673 761 967 282 21i 1278 -517 1279 567 169 68 26 
10 69 169 697 866 - 1050 623 24 1697 -e.:u 1618 741. 101 69 -55 
II 7Q 101 645 746 924 305 24 -1253 -507 - 1310 637 83 70 83 
12 71 83 705 788 935 332 24- . 1291 -503 1482 670 -194 71 -115 
13 72 194 672 eEe 930 920 24- - 1874 -1oo8· 2049 771 ·186 72 84 
14 T.J 186 725 'lOll S61 437 22 - 14-20 -509 1526 508 324 73 185 
15 74 324 746 1070 973 297 . 18 -1288 .-218 -16k 1039 463 74 -36 
16 75 463 528 991 954 86 22 1062 -71. 2152 1842 261 75 -22 
17 76 261- 710 971 990 ·120 30 . 1140 -169 - 1401 1012 ·- 76 - . 
BALANCE SHEET: UNITED KtNGoDM 22:25 FRIDA\"o DEC,EJCSER 7• 1979 ... 
OlliS YR CIUK PONUIC SUP UK FOOD UK FEED UK SEEDUIC OICDUK BAWK IMPU( EXPUK COUK YR1 I!RUIC. 
I 60 1106 3040 4146 534-5 1681 . 1~2 7178 -3032 4-711 8 1177 60 ..... 
2 61 1177 2615 3792 5036 14-82 178 6696 -2904 4692 9 . 1206 61 573 
3 62 1206 3973 5179 5167 2294 1~2 7613 .-2434 4258 14-3 1204 62 4-77 
4 63 1204 3263 4467 5121 1811 . 173 7105 -2638 4-605 19 . 1235 63 713 
5 64 1235 3688 4923 5C89 24-17 197 7703 -2780 4-190 ,. 1125 64 271 
6 65 1125 4172 5297 5282 2932 . 176 8390 -3093 4664 . 13 ·1287 65 . 271 
7 66 1287 3475 .. 762 5122 2242 - 184- 7548 -2786 4176 - 16 . 1205 66 169 
a 67 1205 3900 5105 5194 2369 . 190 7753 -2648 4077 16 1286 67 127 
9 68 1286 3470 4756 5380 2563 163 8106 -3350 4576 12 - 1258 68 .-4-4 
10 69 1258 3364 4622 ~332 2732 196 8260 -3638 4781 21 1129 69 -7 
11 70 1129 4235 5364 5045 4083 212 9340 -3976 5359 21 1174 70 188 
12 71 1174 4-814 SS88 5061 3156 219 8436 -2448 3829 13 . 1004 71 364 
13 72 too• 4779 5783 5043 3708 222 8n3 . -:3190 4535 25 1162 72 158 
14 73 1162 5008 6170 5062 2601 240 7903 --1733. 3114- 51 1139 73.- 191 
15 74- U39 6022 7161• 5104 3706 200 9010 :-1849 2935 63 ··14-75 74- -4-52 !-' 
16 75 1475 4-488 5963 Slll 2889 241 8241 -2278 4-264 305 1368 75 313 0'\ 
17 76 1368 474-0 "08 5394 2915 251 8564 -2456 3422 271 • 76 • 0\ 
IIA&,.A,.C:& Stti!ET: I'RANCE 2z:z5 FRIDAY• DECI!IiiiiU .,. 1979 • 
DeS YR CIF POtF SUPF FOODF I'UDF SI!EDF OMDF ULF , ...... IEJC .... COF Yilt ERF 
I 60 1508 U014 12522 5998 2715 713 'i426 3096 401 . 1559 1906 60 32 
2 61; 1906 9492 11398 5'i18 2o46 814 8178 2620 360 1833 1687 61 -540 
3 62 1687 14053 15740 5952 :!183 ee9 10024 5716 596 2978 3248 62 86 
4 63 324-8 10249 134'i7 5767 2703 794. 9264 4233 769 2681 22~2 63 69 
5 64 2252 13838 16090 !5~96 3660 815 10071 6019 709 4607 2000 64 121 . 
6 6!:> 2000 14349 16349 5673 3587 ne 9976 6373 748 4782 2660 65 -321 ., 66 2660 &1297 13957 54~4 3608 716 9778 4179 687 3018 . 1706 66 142 
8 67 1706 14-288 15994 5284 3545 746 9575 6419 460 4320 1230 67 1329 
9 68 1230 14985 16215 5168 33t.t9 729 9286 6929 600 6048 1286 68 195 
10 69 1286 14459 15745 !5150 4010 675 9835 5910 475 6125 834 69 -574 
ll 70 834 12922 13756 4897 4163 726 ne6 3970 358 3308 992 70 28 
12 71 992 15482 16474 48ES 3792 712 9369 7105 . 191 5SS5 1447 7l 264 
13 72. 1447 18046 19493 4e43 4390 711 9944 9549 332 8039 1487 72 355 
14 73 1487 17792 19279 4791 3791. 742 9324 9955 246 8859 1389 73 -47. 
IS 74- 1389 19141 20!530 48!11 3771. 612 9234 11296 371 8ll9 2827. 74 721 
16 75 2827 15841 17868 4898 2552 640 8090 9778 414 9178 1974 75 -960 
17 76 1974 16150 18124 4960 3660 688 9308 8816 -184 6811 .. 76 • 
BALANCE Sl-EET: THE REMAihDER of WESTERN EUROPE 22:2S FRIDAYo DECEMBER 7o 1979 7 
085 YR CIRWEU PDNRWEU SUPIUIEU OUR liEU 8ALR-U IMPRWEU I!XPRWEU COR liEU YR1 ERRWEU 
1 60 4428 . 13287 17ll!5 16927 788 3454 509 3565 60 168 
2 61. 3565 12871 1E436 1680S -372 4493 554 3177 61 390 
3 62 3177 14981 IelSS 17624 !34 3850 523 3S15 62 46 
• 63 3815 14770 asses 17522 1063 3053 596 3326 63 194 5 64 3326 14104 17430 16879 551 3E35 662 3&42 64 -318 
6 65 3842 15363 19205 17032 2173 3961 713 4963 65 4se 
7 66 4963 1~298 20261 17011 3250 2913. 947 4531 66 685 
8 67 4531 17557 22088 17o446 4642 2310 1S37 4919 67 196 
9 68 4919 16'i20 21839 17809 4030 2220 1569 4452 68 229 
10 69 4452 15794 20246 17815 ·2431 2819 134S 4081. 69 -179 
11 70 o408l 1434S 18429 18298 131 3164 758 2890 70 -353 
12 71 2890 1S4e4 213!4 18881 2473 2711 .· 1157 3999 71 28 
. 13 72 3999 16674- 20673 18568 2105 :!192 1886 3740 72 -329 
14 73 3740 15821 19561 17584 1977 3688 . 1217 4513 73 -65 
IS 74 4513 19577 240SO 19239 4851 3089 2196 5733 74 11 1-' 
16 7S 5733 16249 21982 19424 ass8 2904 24&9 4136 75 -1133 0'> 
17 76 4136 ·19266 23402 . 19169 4D:S 2447 21M • 76 ·•. ....... 
BA.ANCE SleET: GYI'T u=2s ,..,oAY. DECEMBER 7. 19?9 ,. 
•s YR CIE PO Ill! SUPE FOODE SEEDE DMDE BALE E.IIPE liFE CCE YAI ERE 
I 60 412 1590. l'i12 2379 111 2490 -578 8 994 519 60 -111 
2 61' 519 1437 1956 3034 . 105 3139 -1183 4 1709 547 61 ,_2s 
3 62 547 1606 21:03 3197 111 3308 -1155 15 1721 563 62 -12 
4 63 563 1494 2057 3304 103 34C7 -1350 19 1917 573 63 ..:as 
5 64 573 1.500. 2073 3367 98 346!5 -1392 . u. 1929 5'i4 64 -69 
• 65 594 1'271 lEES 3491 104 3595 -1730 20 2498 650 65 98 ., 66 650 1467· 2117 3835 <;t9 3934 -1et7 29 2498 673 66 -21 
• 67 673 1291 :1:192 3574 95 4069 -1877 0 2782 573 67 332 9 68 573 1519 2C<»2 3359 107 3466 -1374 0 1945 578 68 -7 
10 69 578 1269. 1752 3.03 95 3498 -1706 0 2220 665 69 .-155 
11 .70 669 1516 2185 3S47 99 4046 -1861 0 2835 727 70 247 
12 71 727 1728 2455 4299 100 4399 -1544 0 2591- 770 71 -123 
13 72 770 1617 2387 •ss6 100 4656 -2269 0 3040 824 72 -53 
14 73 824 1837 2E6t 4887 100 4987 -2326 0 3180 858 73 -4 
15 74 858 1884 2742 5090 100 5190 -2448 0 3489 876 74 ·165 
16 75 . 876 1933 zec9 5200 100 5300 '-2491C 0 35a8 886 75 211 
17 76 886 1960 2646 5520 · IOO 6020 -3174 0 3956 • 76 • 
BALANCE SHEET: THE AEMAINOEil OF ~FAICA 22:25 FRIDAYo DECEMBER 7.·1979 u 
OBS YR CIRAF FOM<AF SUPilAF CURAF BALRAF EliPRAp IMPRAF C£1RAF YRl ERRAF 
1 60 948 4200 5148 5929 -781 . 172 1706 950 60 -197 
·2 61 950 28113 3813 5944' -2131 76 2581 1020 61 -646 
3 62 1020 43'>4 5414 6380 -966 zos 1 B69 1079 62 -381 
4 63 1079 5606 6685 6749 -64 201 1533 1090 63 178 
5 64 1090 5100 6190 6816 -626 88 1971 1180 64 77 
6 65 1180 S229 6409 7380 -'i71 130 2152 1316 65 . -265 
7 66 1316 4433 5749 8228 . -2479 104 .4502 1393 66 526 
8 67 1393 !!2El . 6674 8712 -2038 65 3493 1535 67 -14:5 
9 68 1535 7081 EE16 9598 -982 . 151 26<;5 1472 68 90 
10 69 1472 6186 7658 9207 .•1549 . 105 2420 1647 69 -eel 
11 70 1647 6864 E53l 10298 .-1767 77 3665 17e7 70 34 
12 71 1787. 7172 8959 11178 .-2219 9 4175 1719 71 228 
13 72 1719 8283 . 10002 10748 -746 309 3707 1796 72 856 
14 73 1796 70E3 8859 11234 -2375 511 5146 1843 73 417 
15 74. 18~ 6616 8459 11:525 -3066 59 5161 2015 74 21 1-' 
16 75 2015 71117 9U12 12601. . -3419 44 5552 2022 75 67 a-, 
17 76 2022 8640 10662 12648 -1986 ao• s7e9 76 .. 00 
IUI~ .. ANC1! Stet! T: r"oaA zz:zs PRIDAY. DI!CEMIII!R 7 • 1 • .,. l:S 
08$ Ylt CIIN ~DNIN SUP IN I'OODIN PEeDIN SEt!IDIN DIIDIN ISM.JN IIIPIN I!XPIN COIN YRl. PIN 
1 60 2525 10252 12777 - 12682 - 128 -1327 14137 -1300 3820 0 2875 oO -409 
2 61 2875 10992 13867 - 12614 - 128 1383 14125 -258 2872 0 3000 61 -3a6 
3 62 3000 12040 1so•o 1360!! 128 . 12!<;7 1 !5130 -90 3876 0 3350 62 436 
4 63 3350 10829 14179 14664 . 128 1381 16173 -1994 4276 0 2425 63 -143 
5 64 2425 9861 . 12286 -1~3e4 166 1377 16927 -4641 5741. 0 2225 64 -112!5 
6 65 2225 12291 . 14516 16956 166 12'i5 18417 -3901 7645 0 2975 65 769 
7 66 2975 10424 13399 17422 137 . 1313 18872 -5-73 634 • 0 :uoo 66 -1•29 
a 67 2300 11392 13692 1E430 199 . 1534 18163 -4471 6697 0 2700 67 -·74 
9 68 27:>0 1653~ 19239 18046 223 1633 19902 -663 3563 0 3925 68 -1025 
10 69 3925 18E51 22576 1'i8!5::! 242 1701 21796 780 3031 0 4250 69 -439 
l1 70 42.50 20039 24289 20247 286 - 1866 22399 1890 2377 0 3500 70 767 
12 71 3500 23833 27333 22339 318 2086 24743 2590 1553 230 6500 71 -2587 
13 72 6500 26410 32910 2E462 297 1969 28728 •U82 1000 ••2 44SO 72 290 
14 73 4450 2"735 29185 27130 297 1969 29396 -211 3571 0 2725 73 635 
IS 7. 2725 22073 24798 25077 251 1720 270"8 -2250 5392 0 3275 7. -133 
16 75 3275 2•235 27!510 25711 289 1904 27904 -394 6427 0 6875 75 -842 
17 76 6875 28846 35721 25611 346 2279 28436 7285 3859 0 .. 76 
8ALANC:t! Ste:ET: .lAPAN 22:25 I"RlDAl'e DECEMBER 7· 1979 14 
OBS 'I'R CI.I PON.I SUp .I FOOD.J FEI!D.J SEED.J DMC.J BAL.I JMP.J, ExP.I CD.J YRl ER.J 
1 60 650 1532 2182 312!5 468 40 3633 -1451 283. 52 775 60 556 
a 61 775 . 1780 2555 :!207 616 43 3866 -1311 2773 84 1080 61 298 
3 62 108G 1630 2710 3253 646 38 3937 -1227 2663 84. 900 62 452 
4 63 900 716 1616 3404 !520 31 3955 -2339 3919 68 1000 63 .512 
5 64 1000 1244 2244 3!93 534 27 4154 -1910 3546 80 1000 64 556 
6 65 1000 1287 2287 3700 530 26 4256 -1969 3553 134 975 65 475 
7 66 975 1023 1998 4C25 543 22 4590 -2592 4260 77 1215 66 376 
8 67 1215 969 2te4 4106 592 24 4722 -2538 4028 122 1050 67 318 
9 68 1050 1012 20E2 4119 567 22 4708 -2646 3544 83 1000 68 -185 
10 69 1000 759 1759 4168 667 17 4852 -3093 4425 56 860 69 416 
11 70 860 474 1334 4092 701 ll •eo4 -3470 4834 35 950 70 379 
12 71 950 440 1390 4169 632 9 4810 -3420 4965 43 1000 71 502 
13 72 1000 264- 1284 4250 713 6 4969 -3685 5466 49 1170 72 582 
14 73 1170 202 1372 4316 708 !5 5029 -3657 5353 30 1110 73 556 
15 74 1110 232 1342 .409 619 8 5036 -3694 5404 31 1150 74 529 1-' 16 75 1150 2•1- 1391 4522 590 9 5121 -3730 5923 38 1200 75 955 0'> 
17 76 1200 222 1422 4521 590 a. 5119 -3697 5522 3a • 76 "' 
BALAHCE Ste:ET: THI! AEMAJNDI!R 01" ASIA 22:25 I"RIOAYe DECEMBER 7. 1979 ,. 
ass YR CIRAS PONRAS 'SUPRAS DURIIS 811LRAS t•PRAS EXPRAS COR AS YRI ERRAS 
1 61J 2512 19216 21728 23878 -2150 5870 88 2498 60 '1134 
2 61 2498 18E28 21126 23743 -2617 5985 156 2644 61 568 
3 62 2644 21330 23974 25134 -1160 6161 396 2671 62 '1934 
4 63 2671 22155 24826 25394 -568 6165 287 2811 63 24'i9 
s 64 2811 207~!! 236G6 26723 -3117 6313 408 2798 64 -to 
6 65 2798 21022 23820 26595 -2775 5762 '147' 2947 65 -107 
7 66 2947 231!!3 26100 28010 -1910 7087 233 3168 66 1776 
8 67 3168 25739 28907 30115 -1208 7449 138 3434 67 2669 
9 68 3434 27149 30583 32645 -2011S2 8005 364 3742 68 1837 
10 69 3742 280~0 31832 35567 -3735 '10089 264 3791 69 2299 
11 70 3791' 27687 31478 36038 -4560 '11344 40 3885 70 2859 
12 71 3885 29427 33312 36935 -3623 12110 -128 4295 71 4064 
13 72 4295 32506 36eot 40832 -4031 12637 '1167 4185 72 3254 
14 73 4185 28263 32448 39787 -7339 '13659 157 4315 73 1848 
15 74 4315 30395 34710 41014 -6304 15815 25 4462 74 5024 
16 75 4462 34824 39286 42417 -3131 . 117$2 5 4621. 75 3995 
17 76 4621 38832 43453 43929 -476 16519 290- ·- 76 ·-
. &ALAN C E SHEET: BRAZIL 22:25 FRIOA'r. OECEN8ER 7.-1979 20 
QBS YR eta PONS SUFB FOOOB FEECB SEEOB OMOB BALB lNPB COB YRl ERe 
1 60 200 354 !54 2053 451 '106 2610 -2056 2011 200 60 -245 
2 61. 200 275 475 2033 488 75 2596 -21Zl 2283 200 61: -38 
3 62 200 302 502 1968 516 80 2564 -Z062 2402 200 62 · Ho 
4 63 200 136 :!:36 2024' 390 33 2447 '-2111 1910 275 63 -476 
s 64 275 256 531 2036 486 36 2558 -2027 2292 346 64 -81 
6 65 346 237 f83 aeso 488 35 2373 -1790 2321. 407 65 ·124 
7 66 407 199 606 2043 778 46 2e67 -2261 2637 496 -66 -120' 
e 67 496 365 861 2071 584 78 2733 -1872 2485 602 67 11 
9 68 602 699 1301 2236 630 119 2<;85 -1684 2425 681 68 60 
10 69 681 1100 1781 2268 640 174 3082 .-1301 2081 628 69 '152 
11 70 628 1731. 2359 2523 711' 215 3449 '-1090 1855 444 70 321. 
12 ·71 44.Q. 2028 2472 2366 667 '166 3199. -727 1475 223 71' 525 
13 72 223 680 903 2634 734 152 3f20 -2617 2950 136 72 197 
14 73 136 1800 . 1936 2924 824. 218 3966 '-2030 2440. 285 73 '125.-
15 74- 285 2500 2785 3232 586 287 2813 -28 '1663 . 422 74 1213 . ~ 
16 75 422. 1510 '1932 3689 680 1154 3847 -1915 3755 376 75 . 1464 "-..! 
17 76 376 3120 34~6 41215 680 318 4707 -12U- 350 ... .. 76 .. 0 
ISALANcE SHEET:Z ~Nt'tNA az: 25 I'R IDAY• DI!CI!MIIER 7.- 1979 .. 
cas YR CU.R P[)NAR SUPIR f'OQ[jiR PEl CAR SEE CAR OM DAR BALAR INPAR EXPAR COAR YRI ERAR 
I 60 1289 3960 5249 .· 2906 1:!5 s•e 4148 1101 0 1946 942 60 -1787 
2 61. 942 5100 6042 2902 1:!4 44~ 4001 2041 0 2352 460 61 -771 
3 62 460 5021. 54El 2<;C6 136 741 4267 1214 0 1806 395 62 -987 
4 63 395 894) 9335 2910 141 eot 4303 5032 0 2777 1501 63 754 
5 64 1501 11240 '12741 .• 3009 145 601 3990 8751 0 4443 2870 64 1438 
6 65 2d70 6080 8'i50 3109 I 42 681 4170 4780 0 7948 1494 65 -4~62 
T 66 1494 6246 7740 3184 148 75~ 4323 3417 0 3059 460 66 -102 
a 67 460 732l 7781 3281 164 762 4424 3357 0 1370 690 67 1297 
9 68 690 5740 6430 3231 . 154 e1e 4407 2023 0 2785 603 68 -1365 
10 69 603 701i 7622 "3343 166 483 4349 3273 527 2108 584 69 1108 
11 70 584 4921. sscs 362:! <;3 561. 4305 . 1200 0 1704 719 70 -1223 
12 71. 719 5680 6399 3693 29 51!! 4:!20 2079 0 1328 565 71 ·186 
13 72 565 7901" 8466 3609 44 426 •U!53 4313 0 3!10 247 72 556 
14 73 247 6560 6807 354<; '· 51 570 4343 2464 493 . 1106 631 73 1220 15 74 631. 5970 6601 3633 138 720 4876 . 1725 0 2178 845 74 -1298 
16 75 845 8570 9415 3897 !526 930 !5353 4062 0 3111 730 75 221 
17 76 730 11000 11730 3774 645 600 5019 6711: 0 5584 .. 76 • 
BALAHCE st2 Er: THE REMAINDER OP LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARt88£AN az 
22:25 FAIDAYe DECIEMBER 7.·1979 
OBS YR CIRSA PON.-sA SUPRSA OURS A 8ALRSA EXPRSA IIIIPRSA COR$ A YRI: ERRS A 
1 60 320 3309 2406 4936 -584 4 . 1209 313 60 308. 
2 61 ~ 313 3873 2738 5226 -183 8 ·1437 317 61 929 
3 62 317 42ti6 30<;4 5462 134 4 1308 306 62 1132 
4 63 306 3!23 2030 5688 -827 55 1570 329 63 359. 
5 64 329 4027 2533 6063 -543 13 . 1738 375 64 807 
6 65 375 41 C4 2858 6772 -642 142 1929 394 65 751 
7 66 394 3E25 2449 6792 -1230 78 2243 378 66 557 
a 67 378 3947 2192 6832 -1341 1 2754 374 67 1038 
9 68 374 3910 2435 676C5 -1058 46 2345 386 68 855 
10 69 386 4295 2467 7268 -1136 30 2222 408 69 648 
II 70 408 4243 2456 7524 :-1352 20 2485 419 70 694 
12 71 . 419 4141 2511 7943 -1402 0 2665 439 71' 824 
13 72 439 3159 1758 8149 -2346 1. 3222 443 72 432 
14 73 4o43 3773 2oe3 8403 . -2056 0 3!512 429 73 . 1027 
IS 74. 429 4223 2659 e465 -1346 50 3090 437. 74. 1257 1-' 16 75 437 4378 21157 8756 :-1929 50 3133 516 7!5 e:sa " 1-7 76 516 5487 zsg6 9068 .-1647 70 3257 ... 76 .. 1-' 
eALANc:E 5 HI!Ey: ~.-'a.. I A 22:2S f'RJDAY• OECEIIUR 7 • 1 9 79 17 
OilS- l'R cu.u PONAU SUP AU I'OODAU FEED AU SEED AU DMDAU BALAU EXPAU COAU YRl EAAU 
1 60 1703 7449 ~H2 12:!2 400 384 2016 7136 4999 1078 60 1059 
2 61 1078 6728 7806 1308 359 431 2098 5708 6277 569 61 -1138-
3 62 569 8352 8921 1258 272 431 1'661 6960 4788 572 62 16CO-
4 63 572 8927 ~4'i9 1238 248 "-69 -1955 75.4 7813 583 63 -852 
5 6 .. 583 10037 10620 1225 :!27 "-S!ii 2011 8609 6469 617 64 1523 
6 65 617 7068 761!5 1303 781 545 2629 5056 5681 541 65 -1166 
7 66 541 12699 1:!240 1156 413 588 2157 11083 698. 1467 66 2632 
a 67 1467 751>7 9014 1255 671 7o2 2628 6386 7011 1731 67 -2356 
9 68 1731 14805 lf!!3E 1241 286 71. 22•1 - 1•295 5369 •818 68 4108 
10 69 4818 10546 1l;3t4 127• 321 •19 2014 13350 7250 723·- 69 -113• 
II 70 7234 7890 15124 1285 395 •62 2142 12'i82 9•92 .993 70 -1503 
12 71 4993 8510 13503 1276 534 544 2354 11149 8736 2263 71 150 
13 72 2263 6442- 8705 1272 934 620 2826 5879 5562 886 72 -569 
14 73 866 121)9• 12980 1408 911 506 2825 10155 5509 . 1300 73 .;ss.o 
15 74 1300 usoo 12800 1389 . 1000 529 2918 9882 8049 1751 74 82 
16 75 17~U: 11980 137:!1 1354- 628 539 2521 -11210 8072 2251 75 887 
17 76 2251- 11713 - 139f!4 1316 380 621 2317 11647 8357 • 76 
BALANCE SHEET: THE REMAINDER OF OCEANIA 22:25 FRIDAY• DECEMBER 7.- 1979 1a 
085 l'R CIROC PCNI'OC SUP ROC DUROC SAL ROC EXPROC INPRQC COROc l'Rl ER!lOC 
1 60 66 2!!1 317 289 28 0 240 125 60 - 143 
2 61 125 172 297 397 -100 0 260 113 61 47 
3 62 113 248 361 439 -78 0 260 · lOS 62 77 
4 63 105 273 378 443 -65 0 300 113 63 . 122 
5 64 113 263 376 418 -42 0 330 111 64 . 177 
6 65 111 332 443 446 -3 0 290 106 65 181 
7 66 106 301 407 462 -55 0 195 92 66 48 
8 67 92 453 545 493 52 0 ·1•o 89 67 103 
9 68 89 3'05 484 419 65 31 80 101 68 13 
to 69 101 254 355 207 148 . 124 - 100 72 69 52 
11 70 72 310 382 390 -a 0 215 89 70 118 
12 71 89 3!00 . 479 446 33 0 180 78 71 135 
13 72 78 358 436 400 36 0 143 56 72 ·123 
14 73 56 206 262 389 . -127 0 185 25 73 33 
15 7 .. 25 0 25 337 :-312 0 252 41:: .74 ... 101 
16 75 41. 420 461 345 ·116 0 217 66 .75 . 267 1--' 
17 76 66 387 453 395 58 . 1 .• - 133 .. 76 ..... N 
BALANCE SlEET: THE SOVIET UliiiOit 22:25 FRIDAY• OECI!JIIIER 7w 1979 245 
08$ YR FD ... CCP OUCCP NDIIICCCP liiiPCcP EXPCCP ESCOCCP YlU 
I 60 64300 58864 !54::!6 204 5058 582 60 
2 61 66500 64384 2116 0 5052 -2936 61 
3 62 70800 63276 7!524 0 5330 2194 62 
4 63 49700 55779 -6079 8859 1282 1498 63 
5 64 14400 E2424 11976 2656 1159 13473 64 
6 65 5<;700 74804 -1!5104 9187 2201 -8118 65 
7 66 100!500 75194 2!5306 4683 4126 25863 66 
8 67 71300 77E33 -3::!3 1534 5084 -3883 67 
9 68 9::!400 84719 e621 147 5397 3371 68 
10 69 7'i900 89623 -9723 1105 !5887 -14505 69 
11 70 <;9700 99015 61!5 315 7072 -6072 70 
12 71 <;8800 98374 426 3409 5478 -1643 71 
13 72 I!!!EOO 99593 -137'i3 15000 1303 -96 72 
14 73 109700 1002~0 <;470 4389 5035 8824 73 
15 74 83900 89349 -5449 2934 4000 -6515 74 
16 75 6E200 81E44 -15444 10096 . 1000 -6348 75 
17 76 96900 92482 4418 4559 1400 7577 76 
BALANCE SHEET: THE PEOPLE• 5 REPUBLIC OF CHINA 22=25 FRJCAy• OECE1118ER 7 • 1979 27 
OBS yR PONPRC CUPRC NDMOPRC IMPPRC ESCOPRC YRI 
1. 60 21000 22907 -1907 1980 73 60 
2 E1 16000 20811 . -4811 4746 -65 61 
3 E2 21000 25303 -4303 41!71 568 62 
4 63 22000 27545 -5!545 !5198 -347 63 
5 t4 2!!000 30177 -!5177 5046 -131 64 
6 65 26000 32578 -6578 6:'125 -253 65 
7 66 26000 31595 -!5!595 5124 -471 66 
8 67 28000 31053 ·-3053 41!56 1103 67. 
9 68 27000 28716 -1716 3563 1847 68 
. 10 E'i 2'i000 31394 -2394 5040 26"-6 69 
u 70 31000 32458 -1458 3660 2202 70 
12 11 33000 31403 1!597 2<;67 4!564 71 
13 12 35000 36885 -1885 5289 3404 72 
1"- 73 36000 35790 210 SE31 · 6041 73 
IS 74 37000 38195 -1195 5675 4480 74 f--' 
16 15 41000 36450 4550 2287 6837 75 ..__, 
17 76 "-3000 47000 -4000 0 -•ooo 76 \,;.) 
BALANCE SHEEr: EASTERN BIROPt! ZZ:ZS .. RIOAYe OECEMIIEA 7e· 1979 9 
CBS YR CIEEU PDNEI!U SUPEEU OUE£U ULI!EU IMPEEU OPEEU COEEU YRI I!III!Eu 
1 60 24,92 l2'iCO 1!!392 18597 -3205 •ate ·lOt 2386 60 -874 
2 61 2386 13600 15986 17805 -1819 4520 240 2580 61 -119 
3 62 2580 13'i00 16480 19256 -2776 "'692 51 247. 62 -609 
4 63 2474 13400 15874 18462 -2sae 5999 495 2817- 63 99 
5 64 2817 14400 17217 21025 -3808 5198 87 2882 M -1579 
65 2882 • teEOO 21482 21509 -27 5373 597 2821 65 1928 
7 66 2821 18100 209c1 21055 -134 5051 1053 31~ 66 760 
8 67 3104 20700 23804 23162 642 4287 1652 3075 67 202 
9 68 3075 20600 23675 22945 730 •o65 917 3177 68 701 
IO 69 3177 20700 23877 23711 166 4476 505 3274 69 863 
11 70 3274 19200 22474 24432 . -1958 5778 249 3991 70 -420 
12 71 3991 24600 zes9t 29784, -1193 4-985 566 3936 71. -·uo 
13 72 3936 25800 29736 29375 361 3592 910 3924 72 .-881 
14 73 3924 26800 30724 29285 1439 4707 1836 4060 73 250 
15 74 4060 27800 31&60 30297 - 1563 3682 1201: 3863 74 181 
16 75 3863 2•ooo 27863 28828 .-965 4119 . 1865 4347 75 -3058 
17 76 4347 28600 32947 32.38 509 5900 1200. 76 •· 
8At._ANCE sHEEy: CANADA 22:25 FRIOAY 0 DECEMBER 7• 1979 25 
085 YR CIC PDNC SI.IPC FOODC FEE" DC SEE DC DMDC BALC EXPC coc YR1 ERC 
1 60 16291 l•U08 30399 1509 1721 '078 4208 26191 9307 16 524 60 360 
2 61 1652. 7713 24237 1582 1199 . 1027 3808 20429 9938 11134 61 -643 
3 62 11134 15393 26!27 1420 1207 . 1064 3691 22836 9015 13o42 62 779 
4 63 13042 19690 ~2732 1588 1470 1145 4203 28529 15088 12567 63 874, 
5 64 12567 16349 28'il6 1554 1250 1091 3895 25021 . 11909 13841 64 -729 
6 65 13841 1767. :!1515 1639 1421 . 1142 4,202 27313 14833 11645 65 835 
7 66 11645 22516 34161 1606 ·1459 1099 4164 29997 . 14833 15341 66 -177 
8 67 15341 16137 31478 1647 1794 1072 4513 26965 8902 17911 67 ·1~2 
9 68 17911. 17686 35597 1690 1227 910 3627 31770 8700 22760 68 310 
10 69 22760 18623 41383 1758 2694, 457 4909 36474 8999 27096 69 379 
II 70 27096 9022 36118 1755 2168 710 4633 31485 11561 2060. 70 -680 
12 71 20604 Hl22 34726 1775 2213 778 4766 29960 13716 16229 71 15 
13 72 16229 14514- 3C743 1760 2045 890 4695 26048 15648 1044-0 72 -•o 
14 "73 10440 16460 26900 1818 . 1915 795 4528 22372 11737 10076 73 559 
15 74 . 10076 14200 24276 1904 1699 906 4509 19767 . 11168 8208 74 391 1-' 
16 715 8208 17078 2!286 1917 ·1770 10159 4746 20540 12136 7984 75 420 -....! +>-17 76 7984 23587 31571 se2• 1990 922 4'136 26835 . 1290• 76 • 
BALANCE S~EET: uNITED STATES 22125 FRIOAYo DECEMBER 7• J979 •• 
oes YR ClUS PDHUS SUPUS FCODUS FEEDUS SEECUS OMDI.lS BALUS IMPUS EXPUS CDUS YRl ERUS 
I 60 35748 36869 72617 13308 -163 1747 15218 57399 221 17986 38406 60 1228 
2 61 38406 33539 71945 13472 980 1!1:!5 15987 55958 158 . 19536 35975 61 605 
3 62 35975 29716 65693 1~21!1 2096 1671 17048 4!1645 140 17332 ~2!529 62 -to76 
• 63 32529 31211 63740 13581 E16 17E'i 16166 47574 112 23099 24532 63 55 
5 64 24532 34928 59460 13744 463 -1785 159'>2 43468 23 19607 22242 64 1642 
6 65 22242 35805 58047 13934 3429 1685 19048 38999 15 23398 14565 65 1051 
T 66 14565 35514. 5007.9 13817 3293 21:!4 19244 30835 35 19978 11551 66 -659 
8 67 11551 41030 52581 14129 1851 ·1946 17926 34655 u 20198 . 14657 67 -179 
9 68 14657 42365 57022 14145 3347 lii!ES 19160 37862 13 14693 22226 68 956 
10 69 22226 39263 61489 . 14168 4763 1546 20477 41012 71 16480 24086 69 517 
11 70 24086 36783 60869 14139 5144 1720 21003 39866 7 19821 19894 70 158 
IZ 71 19894 44029 63923 14315 6640 17~0 22675 41248 7 16907 23487 71 861 
13 72 23487 42046 65533 14370 7158 1807 23335 42198 2 31992 11920 72 -1712 
14 73 11920 46407. 58327 1437C 4166 221!8 20824 37503 80 31068 6722 73 -207 
15 74 6722 48807 55529 -14288 1252 2504 18044 37485 10 28325 8899 74 271 
16 75 8&99 57764 66663 - 15213 2585 2068 19866 46797 25 31522 18098 75 -2798 
17 76 18098 58306 76404 . l$050 2900 2400 20350 560S. 36 26395 • 76 • 
APPENDIX C 
THE VALUES OF VARIABLES USED IN 




Names Units Mean 1976 Value 1985 Value 
PDF mmt 270.0 359.0 390.4 
YLDF mt/ha 1.48 1. 82 2.01 
PDUS mmt 40.8 58.3 65.4 
YR last two digits 68 76 85 
of year 
FOUS mmt 14.2 16.0 17.8 
Yus $/person 3212 5511 10581 
SEUS mmt 1.9 2.5 2.8 
APLUS mha 24.0 32.5 b 
DUF mmt 283.0 349.3 a 
PWF $/mt 100.0 145 a 
POPW m. people 3510 ,4104 4816 
COF mmt 42.2 62.7c a 
CIF mmt 43.2 44.3 43.2 
FEUS mmt 2.8 1.9 a 
PWUS $/bu 2.03 2.85 a 
LVNUS m. animal units 76.4 74.7 72.6 
PCUS $/bu 1.16 1. 77 1.84 
co us mmt 20.6 30.3 a 
crus mmt 21.5 18.1 21.5 
EXUS mmt 22.3 26.4 a 
A definition of these variables can be found in Table XXII. 
al985 values are not given for endogenous variables. 
b us us The 1985 value of APL is not used to project SE since the 
result would be inconsistent with projected pnUS A ratio of SEUS to 
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